THE INDONESIAN ISLAMIC HIGHER EDUCATION RESPONSE TO COUNTER THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RADICAL-EXTREMISM IDEOLOGY

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Kata Kunci:
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Abstrak

Studi ini bertujuan untuk melihat dan menganalisis strategi Perguruan Tinggi Keagamaan Islam dalam membendung arus paham keberagamaan radikal-ekstrim. Berdasarkan survei yang dilakukan untuk memproleh respon dari para mahasiswa baru, dan wawancara mendalam dengan para pengambil kebijakan kampus, hasil studi menunjukkan ada potensi tumbuhnya paham keagamaan radikal di lingkungan mahasiswa. Potensi tersebut berada pada tataran pemikiran atau pemahaman keagamaan. Meski persentasenya terlihat kecil (10-15 persen), namun berpotensi bertambah jika dibiarkan. Selain itu, potensi itu dianggap telah ada sebelum para mahasiswa itu masuk Universitas. Menyikapi hal tersebut, pihak Universitas melakukan langkah-langkah preventif melalui beberapa kebijakan, seperti melakukan review kurikulum, melakukan supervisi dan evaluasi tenaga pendidik, serta monitoring dan evaluasi kegiatan kemahasiswaan. Namun masih terdapat beberapa kendala dalam melaksanakan kebijakan pencegahan ideologi radikal agar tidak berkembang lebih luas di IAIN (sekarang UIN) Surakarta, seperti pemantauan kegiatan mahasiswa di luar kampus dan memberlakukan keseragaman dalam pelaksanaan kebijakan di tingkat Fakultas dan Jurusan.

Abstract

This study aims to perceive and analyze the strategies of Islamic Higher Education in Indonesia to counter the radicalism of religious understanding. Based on the survey conducted to get the new students' responses and an in-depth interview to the campus policymakers, there is a potential growth of radical religious understanding in the student environment. The potential is at the level of religious thought or understanding. Although the percentage is considered small (10-15 percent), it certainly can grow if it is left unchecked. In addition, what should be recognized is that students can embrace radical ideology before their admission to the university, not because of it. In response, the university also took preventive steps through enforcing several policies, such as holding curriculum reviews, performing educator supervision and evaluation, as well as monitoring and evaluating student activities. However, there are still several obstacles in implementing the policies of preventing radical ideologies from growing wider at IAIN (now UIN) Surakarta, such as monitoring student activities outside the campus and imposing uniformity in implementing the policies at the Faculty and Department level.

Introduction

Since 2009, cases of radicalism and extremism in Indonesia have involved some higher education students, including Islamic higher education students. In 2009, three Students of State Islamic University (UIN) Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta were arrested by the Special Detachment *(Densus)* 88 Anti-terror of Indonesian National Police, for an act of terrorism. In the middle of May 2010, *Densus* 88 arrested two students of Muhammadiyah Unversity of Surakarta (UMS) for being suspects in some acts of terrorism in Aceh. In August 2010, *Densus* 88 arrested a terrorist suspect known as an alumnus of Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB). In 2011, it was known that one of the hardliners involved in the mail bomb incidents called "Bom Buku" (book bombs) was once studied at IAIN (UIN) Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta.[1] In 2016, *Densus* 88 also arrested a suspect in an act of terrorism in Bekasi, who was registered as a student of IAIN Surakarta.[2]

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[1] The detailed report on book bombs and the Pepi Cell is available in, "Generasi Baru Teroris" Tempo Magazine May 2-8, 2011. As for the profile of 17 suspect members of Pepi Cell, see: "Tuduhan kepada 17 tersangka Bom Buku dan Serpong", Okezone, Wednesday, April 27, 2011.

[2] M Wismabrata, "Satu Terduga Teroris Bekasi Pernah Dikeluarkan dari IAIN

Many higher education institutions in Indonesia have formed a special team to avert the danger of radicalism in the student environment. Gadjah Mada University (UGM) and State Islamic University (UIN) Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta, for instance, have formed what is called the NII Crisis Centre, aimed at keeping their students well-informed about the danger of NII teachings and providing a disillusionment program for those on whom the ideology of NII was imposed. University of Indonesia (UI) employs giving public lectures on the danger of teachings of NII and other radical religious movements, which are held at the beginning of each academic year. UIN usually invites disillusioned NII activists in such forums.[3] In ITB, the socialization of the danger of NII and the deradicalization program is administered by the Service and Da'wah Division of Salman Mosque. The Salman Mosque of ITB in collaboration with the NII Crisis Centre, delivers a public lecture on the danger of extreme religious teachings at the beginning of every academic year, one of the purposes is to provide new students with necessary information about radical groups' strategies and modus operandi for recruiting new members.

Meanwhile, some other higher educational institutions like IPB, UIN Maulana Malik Ibrahim Malang,[4] and the Faculty of Medicine and Health Sciences of UIN Jakarta employ boarding houses for new students: new students have to stay in the boarding houses during their first college year. In those boarding houses, new students learn basic knowledge of Islamic teachings comprehensively under *Ustadz* and *Ustadzah* (male and female experts in Islamic teachings) with moderate religious views. In the boarding houses, new students are protected from the infiltration by radical and extreme religious groups, commonly targeting new students.

Surakarta," *Kompas.Com*, last modified 2016, accessed June 14, 2018, https://regional.kompas.com/read/2016/12/14/20094401/satu.terduga.teroris.bekasi.per nah.dikeluarkan.dari.iain.surakarta.

[3] See: http://www.detiknews.com/read/2011/04/29/101430/1628335/10/ui-akan-beberkan-bahaya-nii-kw-9-pada-mahasiswa-baru.

[4] Nur Kafid, "Ma'had Sebagai Role Model De-Radikalisasi," *DINIKA: Journal of Islamic Studies* 13, no. 2 (2015): 21–33.

The fact, usually found out in student environments in Indonesian higher educational institutions; that intelligent and young students who are lack of religious education are involved in the movements of radical-extremist religious groups. It can be seen as the tip of the iceberg.[5] In recent years, the phenomenon has happened to the general public. It encouraged the researchers in conducting a study to answer the question about the responses and strategies of Islamic higher education institutions to prevent the spread of radical-extremist religious groups or at least limit their growth. This study puts its focus on the State Institute for Islamic Studies (IAIN) (now known as UIN Raden Mas Said Surakarta).

Remarkably, UIN Surakarta is that the university located in a region whose people are well known for their gentle characters, friendliness, tolerance, and high culture. What is more remarkable is that Surakarta is widely known as the center of Javanese culture. However, in its history, Surakarta also witnessed some tragic incidents caused by ethnic or religious conflicts like 'Geger Pecinan', a violent incident before the 1998 political reform, 'Solo riot', the riot in Kliwon Market, and 'Gandekan tragedy'.[6] Those social phenomena show that gentleness and tenderness may provoke sporadic violence.[7] Besides, UIN Surakarta, as an institution providing higher education, cannot be separated from its social and political contexts as well as its religious practices in its surroundings.[8] According to some research, Solo Raya is categorized as a region where radical-extremist movements can grow exponentially.[9] Such a claim is

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[5] Mun'im Sirry, "Muslim Student Radicalism and Self- Deradicalization in Indonesia," *Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations* 31, no. 2 (2020): 241–260, https://doi.org/10.1080/09596410.2020.1770665.

[6] Nur Kafid, "Dari Islamisme Ke 'Premanisme': Pergeseran Orientasi Gerakan Kelompok Islam Radikal Di Era Desentralisasi Demokrasi," *Masyarakat: Jurnal Sosiologi* 21, no. 1 (2016): 57–79, https://doi.org/10.7454/mjs.v21i1.4737.

[7] Dwi Purnanto Zainuddin Fanani, Atiqa Sabardila, *Radikalisme Keagamaan dan Perubahan Sosial* (Surakarta: Muhammadiyah University Press, 2002), 8.

[8] Nur Rohman Nur Kafid, "Islamic Higher Education and Religious Transformation of the Muslim Community's Surrounding," *Jurnal Pendidikan Islam* 4, no. 1 (2018): 27–38, https://doi.org/10.15575/jpi.v4i1.2069.

[9] BNPT, "Gerakan Radikal di Solo," *Solopos.* Zuly Qodir, *Radikalisme Islam di Indonesia* (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2014). Muzayyin Ahyar, "Membaca Gerakan Islam Radikal

supported by Sholihin's involvement in the act of terrorism in 2016[10] and the disruption of a book discussion forum by several Muslim hardliners on May 9, 2017.[11]

Studies focusing on the development of radical-extremist religious movements in higher education, particularly in Surakarta, are still limited in number thus far, which does not necessarily mean the total absence of such studies. Toto Suharto and Ja'far Assegaf once studied and explained that the possibility exists that radicalism may develop at IAIN Surakarta. Their study focuses on the activities of P3KMI in the Faculty of Education and Teacher Training, most of whose members were those of the Tarbiyah Movement (PKS), who made P3KMI the training facility for their new members. This study highlights the curriculum developed and did not explore strategies formulated by heads of the faculty.[12]

In their descriptive study, Lulu Syifa et al. found that some students joining Student Activity Units (UKM) of IAIN Surakarta tend to favor moderate views and reject any form of radicalism and extremism.[13] The study of Basri and Nawang Retno at Balikpapan Polytechnic exposes that radicalism potentially develops in the college, although it is still on a small scale. The potential development is stimulated by students' interaction with organizations outside the college, and such interaction cannot be

Dan Deradikalisasi Gerakan Islam," *Walisongo* 23, no. 1 (2015): 1–26, https://doi.org/10.21580/ws.23.1.220. Muhammad Wildan, "The Nature of Radical Islamic Groups in Solo," *Journal of Indonesian Islam* 7, no. 1 (2013): 49–70, 10.15642/JIIS.2013.7.1.49-70.

[10] Wismabrata, "Satu Terduga Teroris Bekasi Pernah Dikeluarkan dari IAIN Surakarta."

[11] Bayu Ardi Isnanto, "IAIN Surakarta Heran ada Massa Tolak Bedah Buku di Kampusnya," *Detik.Com*, last modified 2017, accessed December 7, 2017, https://news.detik.com/berita-jawa-tengah/d-3496385/iain-surakarta-heran-ada-massa-tolak-bedah-buku-di-kampusnya?_ga=2.171354336.178245247.1494310882-682453309.1494225535/.

[12] Ja'far Assagaf Toto Suharto, "Membendung Arus Paham Keagamaan Radikal Di Kalangan Mahasiswa PTKIN," *Tahrir: Jurnal Pemikiran Islam* 14, no. 1 (2014): 157–180, http://dx.doi.org/10.21154/al-tahrir.v14i1.72.

[13] Juma'iyah & Titi Nur Rohmah Lulu Syifa Pratama, Eko Nur Wibowo, Lia Safitriningsih, "Variasi Pemahaman Keagamaan Mahasiswa IAIN Surakarta," *Academica* 1, no. 1 (2017): 113–125.

rigidly controlled,[14] just like the finding of Dina Afrianty. She conducted a study on radicalism and extremism among students of UIN Jakarta.[15]

Furthermore, Saifuddin Chalim, through his study, found that the potential development of radicalism at universities is also affected by factors such as the leadership, mission, and curriculum of the universities.[16] Meanwhile, M. Zainal Anwar et al, in their study on the trend of Soloraya Muslim millennial's religiosity, found that those millennials have different opinions about Pancasila as the state ideology of Indonesia. Some of them are neutral, meaning that they accept Pancasila as Indonesia's basic philosophy while others feel no obligation to obey Pancasila.[17] On the other hand, this finding can pose a threat for the future generation and, instead, a challenge for higher educational institutions in performing their role and function in developing the vision of social transformation.

Based on the explanation mentioned earlier, this study aims to describe the potential of radicalism and extremism development and the strategies along with the policies formulated by IAIN (UIN) Surakarta to prevent and overcome those development. This study employed a mixed-method. The quantitative method was carried out through a survey while the qualitative method was conducted through an in-depth interview. The survey involved distributing questionnaires to the freshmen of the 2017/2018 academic year. As the freshmen to the university environment,

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[14] Nawang Retno Dwiningrum Basri, "Potensi Radikalisme Di Perguruan Tinggi (Studi Kasus Di Politeknik Negeri Balikpapan)," *JSHP* 3, no. 1 (2019): 84–91, https://doi.org/10.32487/jshp.v3i1.546.

[15] Dina Afrianty, "Islamic Education and Youth Extremism in Indonesia," *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism* 7, no. 2 (2012): 134? – 146, https://doi.org/10.1080/18335330.2012.719095. Also see. Alexander R Arifianto, "Islamic Campus Preaching Organizations in Indonesia: Promoters of Moderation or Radicalism?," *Asian Security* 15, no. 3 (2019): 323–342, https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2018.1461086.

[16] Saifuddin Chalim, "Pengaruh Misi, Kurikulum, Dan Kepemimpinan Di Perguruan Tinggi Terhadap Perilaku Anti-Radikalisme Mahasiswa," *Jurnal Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan* 3, no. 1 (2018): 33–43, 10.24832/jpnk.v3i1.728.

[17] Islah Gusmian M. Zainal Anwar, Yuyun Sunesti, "Pro Dan Kontra Pancasila: Pandangan Politik Anak Muda Muslim Di Solo," *Politika: Jurnal Ilmu Politik* 12, no. 1 (2021): 107–127, https://doi.org/10.14710/politika.12.1.2021.107-127.

they need an adaptation process, and as young generations, they are beginning to enter the phase of self-discovery. The survey involved 500 respondents, all of them were new randomly selected freshmen of 2017/2018 academic year from the total of 2.930 freshmen. The sample distribution covered all the existing faculties, departments, and study programs. The quality control over the questionnaire result was established using the spot check method carried out randomly to 20 percent of the selected respondents, which showed no significant mistake.

The qualitative method, in this case, the in-depth interview, was used to know the policies developed by decision-makers in the university as the response. The interview involved informants at the university and faculty level. The purposively sampled interviewees were held to those in charge of student affairs, namely Vice-Rector for Academics and Student Affairs (the university level) and Vice Dean for Student Affairs (the faculty level). Besides, library research for more relevant data from other sources was also conducted to help perform the data analysis.[18]

Ideology, Radicalism, and Deradicalization

Ideology is usually defined as human worldview. Ideology helps them determine whether something is good or bad and whether or not something is ideal. In the social context of national and state life, ideology gives the ideal social order and shows how to create it.[19] Islamic ideology, meanwhile, refers to a set of values Muslims consider their way of life, which is derived from Islamic sources in the forms of traditions or the Qur'an.

Radicalism refers to an extreme way of thinking and acting[20] A radical individual will immediately reject the existing rules and replace them with the new ones. Radical people always demand extreme changes

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[18] Sugiyono, *Metode Penelitian Pendidikan Pendekatan Kuantitatif, Kualitatif, dan R&D* (Bandung: Alfabeta, 2013).

[19] Ian Adams, *Ideologi Politik Mutakhir: Konsep, Ragam, Kritik dan Masa Depannya* (Yogyakarta: Qalam, 2004).

[20] Leon P Baradat, *Political Ideologies: Their Origins and Impact* (London: MacMillan, 1994).

and consider the prevailing traditions and situations they are living in to be enemies to be destroyed. With regards, radicalism rejects any form of compromise. Simply put, radicalism inevitably blames any previous and current systems or traditions.

In religious life, radicalism is characterized by some attitudes;[21] asserting truth claims and blaming others; considering differences (in faith, religion, and thought) to be opponents; and favoring literal and textual interpretations of religious teachings and refuting other methods of interpretation. Consequently, this justifies the assertion about truth claims and fuels hatred against other individuals or groups, followed by the spread of the *takfiri* ideology, accusing other people of being apostate. On the most critical point, the accusation is also made against other Muslims merely because they have a different understanding of Islam due to different methods of interpretation.

In national and state life, those radical groups do not hesitate to reject the idea of a nation-state, contravene national laws, and challenge the national ideology, which all they consider not to be derived from Islamic teachings. Indonesia, the world's Muslim-majority country, is seen as an apostate country from their perspective; Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution are considered apostate ideology and constitution in their separate ways; the government elected through the mechanism of democracy is regarded as the apostate government.

Historically, the religious movements with radical ideology in Indonesia embracing *takfiri* can be found in some Muslim hardliners. Like Komando Jihad, the Imron group, the Indonesian Islamic State (NII), *Hizbut Tahrir*, and some other movements legitimizing violent actions in the name of Islam. In contrast, according to Al-Qaradhawy, a religious practice that adopts extremism contradicts Islamic teachings that advance moderate views and cultivate tolerant attitudes.[22]

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[21] William E. Shepard, "Islam and Ideology: Towards a Typology," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 19, no. 3 (1987): 307–335, https://www.jstor.org/stable/163657.

[22] Yusuf Al-Qardhawi, *Masalah-Masalah Islam Kontemporer*, ed. Muhammad Ichsan

One of the theories which can explain the phenomenon of radical-extremist religious ideology among university students is the theory of manipulative political socialization, which explains the way individuals learn about social orders concerning their social positions in social organizations and institutions. Through this socialization process, some attitudes and values are imposed on children until they are mature and adult to assume particular roles.[23] The manipulative political socialization is a top-down indoctrination leaving no room for differences and various life values. Accordingly, such a process of indoctrination will produce figures who have authoritarian personality and are highly intolerant. Maurice Duverger states that those authoritarian figures are the ones who fail to find their true selves, undergo an identity crisis, and have a volatile personality.[24] In this case, teenagers, who enter the transition phase, are the age group most vulnerable to this condition.[25]

During their self-discovery phase, young generations are vulnerable to be thrown into utter identity confusion, making it easy to be affected by manipulative and authoritarian political and religious socialization. They are psychologically and socially likely to suffer social deprivation, a condition in which they feel dissatisfied, alienated, and frustrated to the extent that the values of radical extremists will easily influence them.[26] They may suffer such deprivation in their religious life.

The high rate of violent acts in the name of religion within the last two decades makes Indonesia one of the critical regions for studying radicalism and extremism. *Global Terrorism Database* (2007) recorded that more than 90 percent of the total 421 acts of terrorism in Indonesia (from

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(Jakarta: Najah Press, 1994).

[23] Phillip Althoff Michael Rush, *Pengantar Sosiologi Politik*, ed. Karni Kartono (Jakarta: Rajawali, 1986).

[24] Maurice Duverger, *Sosiologi Politik* (Jakarta: Rajawali, 1981).

[25] Rahma Sugihartati Bagong Suyanto, Mun'im Sirry, "Pseudo-Radicalism and the De-Radicalization of Educated Youth in Indonesia," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 45, no. 2 (2019): 153–172, https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2019.1654726.

[26] Ted Robert Gurr, *Rogues, Rebels, and Reformers: A Political History of Urban Crime and Conflict* (California: Sage, 1976).

1970 to 2007) occurred in the reform era and the first period of democracy consolidation. The number of fatal attacks also increased sharply, including suicide bombings. In the history of Indonesia, the involvement of radical Muslim movements in terrorist incidents is not something new: several incidents happened before, like Cikini Bombing on November 30, 1957, Kartosuwiryo's Darul Islam (DI) movement in 1950-1960s, Komando Jihad movement in the New Order era, the hijack of the DC-9 'Woyla' by the group of Imron bin Muhammad Zein in 1981, and Borobudur Bombing by Shiites under the command of Hussein al Habsy in1985 among others.[27]

Many studies with various perspectives have been conducted to find the roots of radicalism and terrorism,[28] identifying some determining factors. The root of radicalism and extremism is so complex that identify the essential factors are problematic. Cases of terrorism in Indonesia are different from those in some other countries in that cases of terrorism in Indonesia involve many actors. Most of them are closely related to the previous movements.[29] Therefore, it can be said that the contemporary radical movements are ideologically and even biologically descendants of Darul Islam and Komando Jihad movements.[30]

In addition to historical roots, the genealogy of thoughts and ideological foundation behind radical-extremist movements' development should also be considered. The thoughts of Ibn Taimiyah and Sayid Qutb, especially the ones related to the concept of modern *jahiliyyah* (ignorance)

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[27] Zaki Mubarak, *Genealogi Islam Radikal di Indonesia: Gerakan, Pemikiran, dan Prospek Demokrasi* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 2008).

[28] Alex P Schmidt, *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research* (London: Routladge, 2011). See also, John Morgan, *The End of War* (McSweeneys Books, 2012).

[29] Julie Chernov Hwang, "The Disengagement of Indonesian Jihadists: Understanding the Pathways," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 29, no. 2 (2017): 277–295, https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2015.1034855. Also see, Julie Chernov Hwanga and Kirsten E. Schulze, "Why They Join: Pathways into Indonesian Jihadist Organizations," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 30, no. 6 (2018): 911–932, https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2018.1481309.

[30] Zaki Mubarak, *Genealogi Islam Radikal di Indonesia: Gerakan, Pemikiran, dan Prospek Demokrasi.*

and the definition of *kufr* (apostasy)*,* later supported by Abdullah Azzam with his concept of *jihad*, successfully encouraged Indonesian Muslim activists to leave for Afghanistan to perform *jihad*. All those factors get massive support from the role of Osama bin Laden as an important figure behind the contemporary neo-fundamentalist movement.[31] The poor situation gets worse when the government's policy is repressive and burdening Muslim groups. According to Mohammed Hafez, such a situation is just like the cases of terrorism in Algeria. The brutal repression of a regime gives rise to acts of terrorism by Muslim hardlines due to being oppressed.[32]

The alarming rate of radicalism and extremism in Indonesia eventually encouraged experts to introduce the idea of "deradicalization." Angel Rabasa,[33] for example, focused her study on the effectiveness of the government's deradicalization program on the parties involved in terrorist cells. She found that the deradicalization program implemented by the government through the National Counter-Terrorism Agency (BNPT) had only limited success due to the lack of involvement of civil society. Somehow it is in line with Rand Assasments' study,[34] showing that the deradicalization programs implemented in some countries have not yet enjoyed massive success because they did not involve civil people.

Sarlito Wirawan wrote some best practices and some failures of the program. The psychological method is successful enough in peace-building processes, especially when radical people are invited to see the victims in person and have a heart-to-heart talk. Besides, exploring historical and social backgrounds helps identify decisive factors behind being a radical. Both the exploration of social backgrounds and a heart-to-heart talk help heighten the awareness of radical people (building

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[31] Olivier Roy, *Genealogi Islam Radikal*, ed. Nasrullah Ompu Bana (Yogyakarta: Genta Press, 2005).

[32] Mohammed M Hafez, *Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World* (Washington: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003).

[33] Christopher Boucek Angel Rabasa, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Jeremy J. Ghez, *Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists* (Arlington: RAND Corporation, 2010).

[34] Angel Rabasa, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Jeremy J. Ghez, *Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists.*

awareness). However, Sarlito also states that the psychological approach alone is not sufficient. In some other cases, religious approaches seem to be more effective, especially if it involves a senior disappointed radical, or a former radical activist, to help the awareness-building process.[35] From this standpoint, this study hopefully can contribute alternative ideas to prevent the development of radical-extremist.

Radical Movements in Higher Education Mapping

Before discussing the policies of higher educational institutions to prevent the development of radical-extremist movements, this study mapped out the potential of radical-extremist movements to develop among university students. The mapping process began with distributing questionnaires about respondents' social demographic profiles to get the data on their perspective on Islam and the concept of nationalism. The demographic profile consists of information about their age ranges, hometowns or places of origin, the social media they frequently use, educational backgrounds, affiliations with religious organizations before the university submission, and their parents' occupation and income. The respondents' profile related to their knowledge of Islam also contains information on their skill in reciting the Qur'an, their daily practice of obligatory five-time prayers, the frequency of their attending religious activities (discussion forums on religious topics, weekly religious gatherings, and *majlis ta'lim,* or *ta'lim* assembly), and their perspective on religious teachings and their attitude toward them. Meanwhile, the respondents' profile related to their perspective on the concept of nationalism is indicated by their view on the concept of Pancasila as the national ideology of Indonesia, the concept of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI), *Khilafah* (caliphate)*,* and their attitude towards the enforcement of Sharia law (Islamic laws) in national and state life.

Based on their age ranges, most of the respondents are teenagers;

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[35] Sarlito Wirawan Sarwono, *Terorisme di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Alvabet, 2012).

18 years old (55.6%). Though they widely vary by the economic background of their parents, they are similar by age: they are in the phase of transition to adulthood, and they have a volatile personality.[36] If they are left without proper guidance and careful supervision, the probability of their plunging into behaving in a negative fashion or even into carrying out violent actions, is a high degree.[37] The study of Noorhadi Hasan on a young member of Salafi joining Laskar Jihad found that the hardline group involved working-age teenagers in their violent actions.[38] In the framework of manipulative political socialization, those at this age tend to be authoritarian and introverted figures who barely tolerate different views.[39] Moreover, in this digital era, young people can easily access any information and play essential roles in spreading information, including religious affairs.[40]

If seen from their hometown, the students of UIN Surakarta represent all the provinces in Indonesia, although most of them come from Central Java (80%) and East Java (11%). It reflects the broad ethnic and cultural diversity of those students. Should the diversity be appropriately appreciated and managed, it will increase the potential for the development of the academic values of the university. However, at the same time, such diversity can potentially provoke any conflict.[41]

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[36] Bagong Suyanto, Mun'im Sirry, "Pseudo-Radicalism and the De-Radicalization of Educated Youth in Indonesia."

[37] William A. Costanza, "Adjusting Our Gaze: An Alternative Approach to Understanding Youth Radicalization," *Journal of Strategic Security* 8, no. 1 (2015): 1–15, http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.8.1.1428.

[38] Noorhaidi Hasan, "The Drama of Jihad: The Emergence of Salafi Youth in Indonesia," in *Politics of Dissent* (London: Oxford University Press, 2010), 44–62, https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195369212.003.0003.

[39] Maurice Duverger, *Sosiologi Politik, 196.*

[40] Zuly Qodir, "Kaum Muda, Intoleransi, Dan Radikalisme Agama," *Jurnal Studi Pemuda* 5, no. 1 (2016): 429–445, https://doi.org/10.22146/studipemudaugm.37127. Also see Fajar Purwawidada, *Jaringan Baru Teroris Solo* (Jakarta: Gramedia, 2014).

[41] Khoirul Anwar Kresna Abdi Parela, Winin Maulidya Saffanah, "Konflik Mahasiswa Timur Di Kota Malang: Studi Kasus Pada Mahasiswa Timur Di Kota Malang," *Sosioglobal : Jurnal Pemikiran dan Penelitian Sosiologi* 3, no. 1 (2018): 27–39, https://doi.org/10.24198/jsg.v3i1.19278. Also see. Hasruddin Nur Andi Dodi May Putra Agustang, "Konflik Mahasiswa Parang Tambung Universitas Negeri Makassar," *Phinisi Integration Review* 3, no. 1 (2020): 2020, https://doi.org/10.26858/pir.v3i1.13163.

The respondents also vary in their educational backgrounds. Ranked by their percentage point, graduates of SMA (45.6%) form the majority, followed consecutively by those of MA (37.4%), those of SMA Islam (10.6%), and those of Pesantren (2.8%). It may imply that students of UIN Surakarta have varying degrees of knowledge about Islam, which offer great potential for the university as long as they foster tolerance for each other. Otherwise, this can pose a serious challenge to learning processes, the embodiment of Islamic values in the curriculum and academic cultures, and the achievement of graduates' competency standards.

In the same way, those respondents are also different in terms of their involvement activities with the Islamic organizations. 47% of respondents have joined Islamic organizations before their submission to the university. Some of them joined such organizations during their years at senior high schools; meanwhile, 39.6% of the respondents have not. The organizations of which they are members of are varied: Rohis (18.2%), Ikatan Remaja Masjid (9%), Ikatan Remaja Muhammadiyah (3.4%), IPNU/IPPNU (3%), and other organizations (6%). Besides, those respondents having joined Islamic organizations can be classified by their activity levels in the organizations into four categories of scales: very active (4.8 %), active (32.2%), moderately active (12.6%), and inactive (2.2%). In sum, the majority of the 2017/2018 new students of UIN Surakarta, despite their different levels of activity, have prior experience in Islamic organizations.

Such different levels of activity are in line with their status and roles in those organizations. Some serve on committee members (13.6%), some become associate members (25%), and some are sympathizers (3.2%). Each of the three roles creates different levels of emotional bond for the organizations. Those elected to be committee members are at the highest level of activity in their involvement because they play a role in running the organization. Associate members are second to the committee members in the level of activity in that they are only cadres of the

organization, while the sympathizers are at the lowest level. The respondents are bound by the rule and constitution of the organization; however, they also enjoy deep emotional intimacy with their fellow members.

As for their general knowledge of Islam, especially their fluency in reciting the Qur'an, the respondents can be said to have an only rudimentary knowledge of Islam. On a percentage basis, they are divided into four categories: very fluent (6.2%), fluent (66.8%), quite fluent (25.8%), unable to recite the Qur'an (0.4%). It suggests that the achievement of graduates' competency standards (SKL) should be prepared much better. Although those considered fluent and quite fluent from the majority group, close attention should still be taken to achieve the existing competency standard. In addition, it also shows that their understanding of the Qur'an needs to be broadened by providing some trainings. Strangely enough, this is in contrast to the fact that they have been actively involved in some Islamic organizations before their years in UIN Surakarta, which is shown by the percentage of the frequency of their attendance to religious forums of their organization: always present (5.2%), frequently present (26.4%), rarely present (57.4%), and absent (9.0%). At this rate, they can be considered relatively active in religious forums, in the forms of discussion forums on religious topics, weekly religious gatherings, and *majlis ta'lim*.

The above data is almost in line with their nugget of information about religious movements like HTI (25%), NII (17%), and Jamaah Islamiyah (10%). Moreover, they once heard about other organizations such as Negara Kurnia Allah (2%) and JAT (6,4%). Given that they are the generation fully literate in technology, it is easy to access any information on such Islamic organizations through printed or electronic media.

Throughout the history of past and contemporary Indonesia, radical religious ideologies embracing the attitude of *takfiri* can be found in some hardline Muslim movements like Komando Jihad, Imron group,

Indonesian Islamic State (NII), and Hizbut Tahrir, among others which consider acts of terrorism to be legal in the name of Islam. This attitude substantially deviates from Islamic teachings that voice moderate views and foster tolerant attitudes.[42]

In fact, most of the respondents (91.8%) strongly agree that Islam is a religion which gives a mercy (*rahmat*) to all creations. Most respondents believe that the universal mission of Islam is to grant mercy to all creations. Only 0.4% of the respondents disagree. However, when asked whether or not Indonesian Muslims' traditions and practices necessarily follow the teachings of Islam, the respondents offer different answers: strongly agree (7.2%), agree (48%), disagree (38.8%), and strongly disagree (2.2%). It means that despite the existing agreement of the majority group, the responses of those who disagree with such statement should be warmly and well-received; this potentially causes something contrary to the vision and mission of the university.

Likewise, a probing question as to whether some religious practices, like pious visitation or pilgrimage *(ziyarah)* to graves, *tahlilan* and *Yasinan* – both are assemblies to recite the *Yaasiin* chapter of the Qur'an and perform prayers, follow Islamic teachings receives such varied responses: strongly agree (22.2%), agree (53.2%), disagree (17%), and strongly disagree (3.8%). When they asked the question, whether the religious practices of Indonesian Muslims are following the Qur'anic and Hadith teachings, the majority of the respondents 53.6%)strongly agree, 14% of the respondents agree, 27.4% disagree, and 1.4% strongly disagree with the statement. In other words, the majority of the respondents nod their agreement with the statement; nevertheless, the response of those disagreeing with it should be wisely received and take concern for the sake of the fulfillment of the university's vision and mission.

As for the respondents' knowledge of the nationalism concept, they are asked whether they have heard from their previous experience in their

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[42] Yusuf Al-Qardhawi, *Masalah-Masalah Islam Kontemporer*.

respective organizations the statement that Pancasila is an apostate ideology and that NKRI is an apostate country. The majority of the respondents (90.6%) replied that they never heard the former statement in religious forums they attended, while 6.6% admitted hearing such a statement. Meanwhile, 92% of the respondents have also never heard the latter statement in their previous forums, and only 5.4% of them confirm that they have heard it before. Besides, 69.2% of the respondents admit that they have never heard the statements about the need to establish an Islamic Caliphate *(Khilafah Islamiyah)* in Indonesia, but 25.2% admit that they have heard the statement in their previous organizations.

Based on those questions, respondents the asked about their attitude towards the establishment of an Islamic state (a state established and governed based on the Qur'an and the Sunnah) as the best government system for Indonesia. The respondents reply the question with various responses: strongly agree (37.2%), agree (40.8%), disagree (14.6%), and strongly disagree (2.4%). This data shows that many respondents nod their agreement with the demand of particular groups to replace the system and ideology of Indonesia with the system of the Islamic State. Badly neglected, this potentially poses a serious challenge to the university or to higher education in general, especially in its effort to instill the value of nationalism into students.

These are the data supported by the respondents' positive responses to the obligation of the enforcement of sharia law for Muslim citizens: strongly agree (32.2%), agree (48.2%), disagree (10.8%), and strongly disagree (2.6%). The data indicate a strong trend toward the enforcement of sharia law. However, when this enforcement of sharia law is confirmed with the question about the limb amputation punishment, 13.4% strongly agree, 38.2% agree, 37.2% disagree, and 4.6% strongly disagree. Meanwhile, when it is confirmed to the question about the enforcement of the stoning *(rajm)* punishment for those doing *Zina* (unlawful sexual intercourse); tha data show a strong agreement (23%), agreement (47.2%), disagreement (19.8%), and strongly disagreement (3.8%).

From the aforementioned quantitative data, it can be concluded that most of the 2017/2018 freshmen of UIN Surakarta have moderate religious views, and only a few have radical ones. However, 10-15% of them having radical views have a potential for growth if it is not considered. The qualitative data on the policy-making process at both the university and faculty levels show almost the same trend.

It is likely for the radical religious movements to develop in university life, especially among students, given their broad and varied religious backgrounds. However, for the movements to overgrow in universities remain a remote possibility since state institutions adopt a particular system and mechanism under which the activities of civitas academics are being monitored. If some students embrace radical religious views, they usually take such views outside the university.[43] The students embrace radical views, form their groups and organizations, and spread their views. Being performed silently makes the movements hard to detect, not to mention that they have established contact with other groups or organizations of their like outside the university.[44] In this regard, an effort to investigate the possibility of becoming radical students should begin with exploring their educational backgrounds. However, organizations with radical views can be guaranteed to have no room for growth and development in UIN Surakarta.[45]

Another factor behind the impossibility of radical movements to grow in UIN Surakarta is that moderate religious views dominate the dynamic nature of religious views in the university. So far as is known, UIN Surakarta houses at least three groups with different religious views: *first,* those who regard UIN Surakarta as a *pesantren*-like institution, in which they hope to enrich their knowledge of religion; *second*, those having affiliation with moderate social organizations like NU and Muhammadiyah; and *third,* those minority groups, with narrow religious

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[43] Interview with Ari Hikmawati, 30/05/2018.
[44] Interview with Sidiq, 26/06/2018.
[45] Interview with Siti Choiriyah, 14/03/2018.

views they took before entering the university. The last group is enthusiastic about religious activities and even organizes small gatherings to share their views with the freshmen.[46]

The Policy on Averting and Countering Radicalism

Notwithstanding the remote possibility of radical-extremist movements – which has recently been claimed to decrease in number - to grow among students of UIN Surakarta, those in charge of the policy-making process in the university have formulated strategies and policies to prevent the growth and development of radical religious views. The policies are implemented through taking some actions:[47] designing a religious-moderation-based curriculum, monitoring and evaluating the performance of lecturers, and monitoring students' activities.

The strategy to design the religious-moderation-based curriculum is implemented by ensuring that all course syllabuses aim for the same learning output. The percentage of university courses ranging from 20 to 30 percent is designed with a clear orientation towards supporting graduates' profiles and following the vision and mission of the university. The process of the implementation involves the knowledge consortium of the university. In the meantime, preventing and countering the development of radical religious views at the faculty level[48] focuses on lecturers and contents of the learning curriculum by controlling and monitoring the implementation of the curriculum and learning processes.

The control and monitoring mechanism is also aimed at shaping a common perception of all lecturers about the program of preventing and countering the development of radical views among students. The evaluation and monitoring processes have not been completed based on the implementation of *Tridharma Perguruan Tinggi* (the three main functions

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[46] Interview with Abdul Matin (16/05/2018)
[47] Interview with Abdul Matin (16/05/2018); Interview with Sidiq, 26/06/2018; Interview with Siti Choiriyah, 14/03/2018; Interview with Ari Hikmawati, 30/05/2018.
[48] Interview with Sidiq, 26/06/2018; Interview with Siti Choiriyah, 14/03/2018; Interview with Ari Hikmawati, 30/05/2018.

and responsibilities of higher education).[49] Considering that lecturers are the spearhead in constructing the model of students' religiosity, the evaluation and monitoring processes have been initiated since the recruitment process by considering their track record and affiliation with religious views and organizations. The existing lecturers evaluate and monitor the processes by providing them with trainings and regular meetings at the beginning of every semester before starting the learning processes. The control and monitoring processes also involve sure students of the related class; usually, class leaders write down whatever the lecturers explain. The lecturers who present narratives of violence and radical-extremist views during learning processes will receive particular punishments.

In addition, due to the policies mentioned above, preventing and countering the radical views among students is also implemented through imposing values of nationalism.[50] This policy is integrated into the orientation program of academic culture and student affairs (PBAK), addressed for the freshmen. The university also monitors and controls students' activities, either at the university or faculty levels. The university demands that every unit of students' activities be directly under the Vice-Rector for Student Affairs and Vice Dean for Student Affairs. It means that various types of students' activities are allowed and accommodated but, at the same time, are monitored not to lead to radical-extremist views and actions. In other words, all students' activities are allowed as long they lead to the better development of students' quality, rightly in line with the vision and mission of the university. In this regard, having different views and opinions are not prohibited. However, such differences should be appreciated appropriately to foster a culture of discussion to broaden intellectual horizons and prevent acts of violence. It shows that the policies of UIN Surakarta are anticipative and persuasive, as the cultivation

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[49] Interview with Abdul Matin (16/05/2018); Interview with Siti Choiriyah, 14/03/2018; Interview with Sidiq, 26/06/2018.
[50] Interview with Abdul Matin (16/05/2018).

of friendly attitudes and cooperation and the emphasis of dialogues and soft approaches. It is absolutely in line with the mission of Islam to underscore the value of *rahmatan lil 'alamiin*.

In reality, the implementation of some UIN Surakarta policies has notched up real success, but others face some obstacles. The process of controlling and monitoring students' activities and the climate of opinion within the university is indeed easy to undergo. Nevertheless, as an institution, the university has difficulty in controlling students' activities outside the university, not to mention preventing them from interacting with or joining radical movements, such as students' active involvement in organizations outside the university.[51] Thus, it lies the urgency of the involvement of students' parents and surrounding neighbors in doing what the university cannot do: monitoring students' activities outside the university.[52]

Even in the bureaucratic administration, the execution and implementation of the policies face many obstacles.[53] The effort to develop the standard curriculum and learning guidelines, for example, often confronted with the problem of lecturers' freedom of thought; whereas, ideally, the policy formulated at the university level should be implemented totally to the level of departments and study programs by embodying the policies in curriculums, syllabuses and semester lesson plans. If lecturers are given complete freedom in expressing and developing their thoughts without limit, the condition will be more challenging to control. Besides, the limited number of lecturers poses another obstacle for curriculum unification and lecturer recruitment. On a normative basis, the limitation would be easily overcome by the existing human resources, but this can cause another problem related to religious views and ideologies. Therefore, Ian Chalmers proposes the formation of

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[51] Interview with Abdul Matin (16/05/2018).
[52] Interview with Ari Hikmawati, 30/05/2018.
[53] Interview with Abdul Matin (16/05/2018).

social networks in the de-radicalization process.[54]

Based on the above exploration, the policies formulated by policymakers at the university level are focused merely on curriculum development. Moreover, the policies also see the issue of radicalism and extremism only from religious views, while radicalism cannot be seen only as a religious phenomenon.[55] In the digital era, social media platforms have been used as new model of the propaganda[56] and indoctrination of radical ideologies on a massive scale. Furthermore, the propaganda and indoctrination by radical groups through social media platforms are broadcasted underground.[57] For this reason, the approach to be adopted in preventing and countering the development of radical views should also integrally and thoroughly involve many elements of social structure and stakeholders.

What has been initiated by the Research Center for Development of Pesantren in Indonesia (*Pusat Kajian dan Pengambangan Pesantren Nusantara*/PKPPN—what is now known as the Center for Social Research and Education about Islam Nusantara (*Pusat Pengkajian Masyarakat dan Pendidikan Islam Nusantara*/PPM-PIN) – of UIN Surakarta as a deradicalization movement can be an alternative pattern and approach. Although it is like a semi-autonomy institution, this research center actively promotes religious literacy and creates a courteous and moderate Islam campaign. It has established an Islamic media channel called www.islamsantun.org and a social media platform to foster tolerance, religious moderation, and messages of peace in Islamic

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[54] Ian Chalmers, "Countering Violent Extremism in Indonesia: Bringing Back the Jihadists," *Asian Studies Review* 41, no. 3 (2017): 331–351, https://doi.org/10.1080/10357823.2017.1323848.

[55] Muzayyin Ahyar, "Membaca Gerakan Islam Radikal dan Deradikalisasi Gerakan Islam."

[56] Muzayyin Ahyar, "Islamic Clicktivism: Internet, Democracy and Contemporary Islamist Activism in Surakarta," *Studia Islamika: Indonesian Journal for Islamic Studies* 24, no. 435–468 (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.15408/sdi.v24i3.4859.

[57] Medhy Aginta Hidayat Rahma Sugihartati, Bagong Suyanto, "Channelization Strategies of Radicalism Among Muslim University Students in Indonesia," *Journal of Indonesian Islam* 14, no. 2 (2020): 309–334, https://doi.org/10.15642/JIIS.2020.14.2.309-334.

teachings.[58] The research center uses digital media, which have become a part of the young generations' lifestyle. In this research center, a sense of cultural unity is created and developed to the extent that it can bring a sense of togetherness and social equality, which will, in turn, prod people into joint action to promote religious moderation.

Conclusion

In general, the potential of radical-extremist religious views to develop among IAIN (UIN) Surakarta students lies at the understanding level, in the students' minds, just in common with any other higher educational institutions in Indonesia. Although it is considered small in percentage, severe neglect of this issue will cause radical-extremist religious views to have more significant potential for growth. However, it is not when they enter the university that radical views are accepted and embraced by young Muslim generations; in most cases, they have adopted such views before their university years. It indicates that the university is not the place where radical views develop; instead, such views result from students' interaction and socialization processes outside the university. By way of a prevention strategy, the university formulates some policies to design the curriculum as well as evaluate and monitor the activities of both lecturers and students. However, the implementation of the policies faces some obstacles, such as the imperfect system for monitoring students' activities outside the university and bureaucratic obstacles. It injects desperate urgency to the involvement of stakeholders and any other parties, including research centers, in the implementation process, especially in fostering values of decency and tolerance in religious practices.

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[58] Khasan Ubaidillah M. Zainal Anwar, Nur Kafid, "Literasi Islam Santun Dan Toleran: Pendampingan Terhadap Kelompok Muslim Milenial Untuk Mencegah Arus Radikalisme-Ekstrim Di Soloraya," *Engagement: Jurnal Pengabdian kepada Masyarakat* 5, no. 1 (2021): 233–249, https://doi.org/10.52166/engagement.v5i1.319.

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