FROM FORMALIZATION OF SHARIA TO ISLAMIC CONSERVATISM: THE POST REFORM OF ISLAMIC MOVEMENT PHENOMENA IN WEST SUMATERA

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Abstrak

Kata Kunci:
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Studi ini mencoba menjelaskan tentang fenomena menguatnya gerakan konservatisme Islam, dalam konteks politik lokal di Sumatera Barat pasca Reformasi. Sejak diberlakukannya Undang-Undang Otonomi Daerah, berbagai gerakan Islam di Sumatera Barat pun secara massif bermunculan dengan berbagai varian model dan isu gerakan. Dengan pendekatan kualitatif, di mana data dikumpulkan melalui indepth-interview, observasi dan dokumentasi terkait berbagai aktifitas gerakan Islam di Sumatera Barat, hasil studi menunjukkan bahwa telah terjadi pergeseran pola gerakan Islam; dari yang awalnya berorientasi pada upaya formalisasi syariat Islam, menuju ke arah konservatisme Islam. Gerakan, baik yang berbasiskan agama maupun adat, yang sebelumnya lebih berorientasi pada pelaksanaa syariat Islam secara legal formal, belakangan justru cenderung menjadi gerakan sosio-kultural yang berorientasi pada penguatan politik identitas.

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Abstract

Keywords:
Religious
Groups,
Sharia
Regulations,
and Islamic
Conservatism

This study tries to explain the phenomenon of strengthening of the Islamic conservatism movement, in post Reform of the West Sumatera political context. Soon after the enforcement of the Regional Autonomy Law, various Islamic movements in West Sumatera have massively emerged with various models and issues of the movement. Based on a qualitative approach, wherein the data is collected through in-depth interviews, observations and documentation related to various activities of the Islamic movement in West Sumatera, the results f this show that there has been shifting pattern of its movements; from initially oriented towards the efforts to formalize Islamic sharia, towards Islamic conservatism. The movements, where it's based on religion or custom, which previously were more oriented towards the enforcement of Islamic Sharia legal-formally, later tends to become more socio-cultural movement oriented towards strengthening political identity.

Introduction

The conservatism movement, in the last two decades, has been significantly strengthening. Such a phenomenon does not only occur in developing countries but also developed countries. The conservatism movement emerged amidst the complexity of political issues at a global level, national, and local. The rise of this movement has become the main concern of scholars to study so far. On the one hand, the growing trend of conservatism is considered a criticism of global capitalism, democracy, human rights, and global injustice. But on the other hand, the activities and movements of conservatism are caused by the strengthening of political, social, and religious intolerance.[1]

In the political sphere, conservatism is usually based on populism leadership as to have happened in several countries. Such a political model always prioritizes conservatism narratives for mobilization as a strategy related to ideology and political representation.[2] This phenomenon occurs both in Muslim-majority countries and other countries. This phenomenon in the development of contemporary Islam in Indonesia is called a wave of strengthening conservatism or conservative *turn*.

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[1] Richard Youngs, "Overview: Conservative Civil Society on The Rise," in *The Mobilization of Conservative Civil Society*, ed. Richard Youngs (Washington D.C: Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, 2018), 7–12.

[2] Vedi R Hadiz, *Populisme Islam di Indonesia dan Timur Tengah* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 2019), 40.

Since the end of the authoritarian New Order regime, the face of Indonesian Islam has changed, from tolerant to a conservative Islam. The face of tolerant Islam during New Order which was supported by a group of Islamic intellectuals and civil society that pro-actively implemented the idea of compatibility of Islam and democracy in Indonesia was represented by Nahdatul UIama (NU) and Muhammadiyah.[3] However, after the Reformation, it seemed that Indonesia has successfully passed the process of political transition. But there are still problems regarding democratic citizenship. Formerly, Islamic civilians were very pro-active in spreading the seeds of democracy. After the Reformation Era, it shifted into radical conservative-populists.[4] The change is then considered a failure of the Islamic civil thesis in explaining the changes in the development of Indonesian Islam after the Reformation. The reason was because of the dynamic development of Indonesian Islam, the change of traditional religious authority into populist authority, the phenomenon of the emergence of the popular *ustad* (Islamic preacher) in various media, and the Reformation has provided more free space for conservative Islamic groups to carry out their missionary activities.[5] From this point, Islamic conservatism is no longer a peripheral phenomenon but has become a mainstream phenomenon in the dynamics of the development of Indonesian Islam. It can be seen from the emergence of some controversial fatwas issued by the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) in 2005, which stated that secularism, pluralism, and religious liberalism as a view that is in contradiction with Islam.[6] As a result, more and more

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[3] Robert W Hefner, *Civil Islam: Islam dan Demokratisasi di Indonesia* (Jakarta: ISAI cooperated with The Asia Foundation, 2001).

[4] Robert W. Hefner, "Whatever Happened to Civil Islam? Islam and Democratisation in Indonesia, 20 Years On," *Asian Studies Review* 43, no. 3 (2019): 375–396.

[5] Alexander R Arifianto, "Quo Vadis 'Civil Islam'? Menjelaskan Kebangkitan Islamisme di Indonesia Pasca-Reformasi," *Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia*, https://kyotoreview.org/issue-24/rising-islamism-in-post-reformasi-indonesia-ba/.

[6] Moch Nur Ichwan, "Towards a Puritanical Moderate Islam: The Majelis Ulama Indonesia and the Politics of Religious Orthodoxy," in *Contemporary Developments in Indonesia Islam Explaining the "Conservative Turn,"* ed. Martin van Bruinessen (Singapore: Institute of Southest Asian Studies, 2013), 15–16.

Muslim groups, especially those the conservative ones, massively organized a movement to reject this view. These three views were very much needed as a foundation for the realization of democracy and religious freedom.[7]

Besides, the strengthening of conservatism in the development of contemporary Indonesian Islam was also supported by the fading of liberal and progressive Muslim intellectuals in Islamic discourse in the public sphere.[8] Also, with the increasingly massive transmission of Wahabi ideology from the Middle East to Indonesia.[9] This can be seen from the proliferation of translations and publishment of books related to Wahhabism, and the establishment of educational institutions funded by countries or organizations from the Middle East. Even, the influence of conservativism has entered into various Islamic religious organizations in Indonesia such as MUI, NU, and Muhammadiyah as the mainline groups of Indonesian Islam. The figures who have progressive to liberal views are slowly kicked out and have no place in those organizations. New religious groups then massively emerged such as the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI), Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), and the Indonesian Islamic Shari'ah Implementation Committee (KPSII).[10]

The emergence of various local regulations nuanced Islamic shari'ah after the Reformation invited controversy. The strengthening of the symbolic-formalistic Islamic identity movement in several regions is very related to ideological motives and pragmatic-political interests like the Surakrata Islamic Youth Front (FPIS) group movement in Solo and the

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[7] Budhi Munawar Rachman, *Reorientasi Pembaharuan Islam Sekularisme, Liberalisme dan Pluralisme Paradigma Baru Islam Indonesia* (Malang: Pusat Studi Agama dan Multikulturalisme Universitas Muhammadiyah Malang, 2018), 10.

[8] Martin Van Bruinessen, *RSIS Working Paper*, *What Happened to the Smiling Face of Indonesian Islam?: Muslim Intellectualism and the Conservative Turn in Post-Suharto Indonesia* (Singapore, 2011).

[9] M. Imdadun Rahmat, *Arus Baru Islam Radikal: Transmisi Revivalisme Islam Timur Tengah ke Indonesia* (Surabaya: Erlangga, 2010).

[10] Haedar Nashir, *Gerakan Islam Syariat Reproduksi Salafiyah Ideologis di Indonesia* (Jakarta: PSAP, 2007).

Islamic Reformist Movement (Garis) in Cianjur. If compared with the history of movement in the past, today's phenomena are very different. In the past, ideological nuance was more dominated by movement spirit; today it is more dominated by symbolic interests and political pragmatism.[11]

Conservative groups tend to reject all kinds of modern, liberal, and progressive interpretations of Islamic teachings.[12] They became strong because their existence was not only voiced by vocal conservative elites but also supported by the existence of conservative civil society. Conservative civil society promotes the values of conservatism by combining conservative social values including religious values, national identity, exclusive ethnic identity, traditional or customary identity, and various forms of institutional, political, non-liberal ideology or restrictions on liberal personal rights. Conservative civil society does not always involve anti-democratic agendas or violent tactics, in fighting for their political interests.[13] So, it is not surprising if this group movement managed to gain sympathy and support from the lower levels of society. Their existence later becomes a partner for a conservative political regime.[14] Similar case occurred in Tunisia; where political actors and political parties have an interest in maintaining a conservative mass to achieve their political interests.[15]

Although many conservative civil society organizations explicitly claim to be independent of politics, it is just their claim to obscure the lines between civil society and politics. In fact, both have a mutual interest.

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[11] M. Zaki Mubarak, "Pendahuluan," in *Politik Syari'at Islam: Ideologi dan Pragmatisme*, ed. M. Zaki Mubarak dan Iim Halimatusa'diyah (Jakarta: LP3ES, 2018), 2.

[12] Moch Nur Ichwan, "Towards a Puritanical Moderate Islam: The Majelis Ulama Indonesia and the Politics of Religious Orthodoxy."

[13] Richard Youngs, "Overview: Conservative Civil Society On The Rise".

[14] Richard Youngs, "Overview: Conservative Civil Society On The Rise".

[15] Budi Juliandi, Basri Ibrahim, and Saifuddin Herlambang, "Politik dan Konservatisme Islam: Indonesia dan Tunisia," in *Proceedings of Annual Conference for Muslim Scholars* (Surabaya: Ancom Proceedings Annual Conference of Muslim Scholars Kepertais Wilayah IV Surabaya, 2018), 913–921, http://proceedings.kopertais4.or.id/index.php/ancoms/article/view/191.

From this then various populist political parties emerged.[16] The pattern of their movements which generally combines the basis of religious issues and nationalism, and often disguises their interests (between maintaining conservative values (tradition) and reawakening traditional identities), in some cases, often compete and seek influence among conservative groups.

Nationalism established by conservative civil groups is relatively shallow civil nationalism. They only look for ownership, community, and certainty; even to some extent, they turn to be aggressive and intolerant. Usually, their rise coincides with the emergence of phenomena of populism, nativism, nationalism, right-wing extremism, illiberalism, and authoritarianism. In the context of Indonesia, the phenomena can be in the form of religious intolerance, anti-Pancasila, anti the Republic of Indonesia, anti-Muslim leaders, anti-minority groups.[17]

On one side, the wave of conservatism is considered part of the biological child of democracy but on the other hand, its activities and movements conflict with democratic values. Their presence on a certain scale poses a threat to the future of democracy itself. Sidney Jones said that such groups are intolerant civil society groups. There are at least three (3) variants of this intolerant group: *First,* the vigilantism groups that is the group that tends to be vigilant and uses violent methods in their action. *Second,* the groups that actively advocate at the grassroots level and use their activities as media for government pressure. *Third,* the groups that want to replace the democratic governance system with the system of *Khilafah.*[18]

The strengthening of the current wave of conservatism in Indonesia is in line with the progress of democratization which tends to be stagnant. So, the conservative elites seek to regain their privileges in the past rather

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[16] Vedi R. Hadiz, *Populisme Islam di Indonesia dan Timur Tengah.*

[17] Denny J.A., "NKRI Bersyari'ah atau Ruang Publik yang Manusiawi?," ed. Satrio Arismunandar (Cerah Budaya Indonesia, 2019).

[18] Sidney Jones, "Sisi Gelap Reformasi di Indonesia: Munculnya Kelompok Masyarakat Madani Intoleran," in *Sisi Gelap Demokrasi Kekerasan Masyarakat Madani di Indonesia,* ed. Husni Mubarok dan Irsyad Rafsadi (Jakarta: Pusat Studi Agama dan Demokrasi Yayasan Paramadina bekerjasama dengan The Ford Foundation dan The Asia Foundation, 2015), 9.

than strengthen the democratic system. Although they always face strong resistance from civil society groups, they seem to never stop doing various movements that lead to the weakening of the institutionalization of democracy.[19] Some of these groups include the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), Laskar Jihad, the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI), and the Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) which claim to represent the new face of the post-Reform Islamic movement.[20] Their various activities are the effects of socio-political phenomena that are strengthened with an ideological (religious) basis to attract individuals or other groups that have a similar ideology.[21]

Like in the case of the emergence of the Islamic Shari'ah movement in Aceh, West Java, South Sulawesi, and West Sumatera, these various movements succeeded in giving birth to Shari'ah Regional Regulations (*Perda* Shari'ah). If related to the historical context of the struggle of Islamic groups that try to incorporate Islamic Shari'ah into the state institutions, their movements have a link to the groups that want to make Islam the basis of the state.[22]

MUI itself, as a 'semi-official' state institution, leads to conservativism after Reformation. The issue of fatwa (legal opinion) 'haram' on Secularism, Liberalism, and Pluralism shows that the MUI no longer puts forward the attitude of Islamic moderatism, but tends towards puritanical Islam.[23] The climax can be seen from the movement of "Aksi Bela Islam/Islam Defense Action" in 2016 over the blasphemy case by the Governor of Jakarta, Basuki Tjahya Purnama (Ahok). The action became

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[19] Marcus Mietzner, "Stagnasi Demokratik Indonesia: Elite Konservatif vs Masyarakat Sipi," in *Merancang Arah Baru Demokrasi Indonesia Pasca Reformasi*, ed. Usman Hamid AE Priyono (Jakarta: Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia, 2014), 152.

[20] Khamami Zada & Arief R Arofah, *Diskursus Politik Islam* (Jakarta: LSIP (Lembaga Studi Islam Progresif) dan Yayasan Tifa, n.d.).

[21] Noorhaidi Hasan, *Islam Politik di Dunia Kontemporer Konsep, Ideologi, Teori* (Yogyakarta: Suka Press, 2012).

[22] Haedar Nashir, *Gerakan Islam Syariat Reproduksi Salafiyah Ideologis di Indonesia.* (Jakarta: PSAP, 2007), 55.

[23] Moch Nur Ichwan, "Towards a Puritanical Moderate Islam: The Majelis Ulama Indonesia and the Politics of Religious Orthodoxy."

the evidence of a form of fragmentation of religious authority in Indonesia after the Reformation. Through this action, the conservative groups successfully mobilized their mass for one purpose. They also succeeded in transforming religious conservatism into a commodity of pop culture and used religious psychology and the fear of Muslims to suppress the other groups.[24]

The turning point of strengthening religious conservatism in Indonesia after the Reformation did not only occur at the national level but also in the local. In West Java, for example, the rise of Islamic conservatism is inseparable from the historical links between the birth of Darul Islam and the Indonesian Islamic Army (DI-TII).[25] This historical background indirectly has a strong influence on the emergence and development of religious conservatism and intolerance lately. Also, it is supported by the various policies of the local political elites who tend to discriminate against minority groups such as the Ahmadiyya people and the Shi'ah and favor the majority group.[26]

In West Sumatera, the phenomenon of the strengthening of the conservatism movement is unique compared to other regions in Indonesia. The existence of a philosophy of life; "*Adat Bersendikan Syara', Syara' Bersendikan Kitabullah*/Customs based on Shari'ah, Shari'ah based on the Holy Book (ABS-SBK)" as the main reference of society in various dimensions of life, makes the conservatism movement inseparable from the existence of Minangkabau culture. The strong relation of religion and culture, to some extent, also triggers tension and conflict between the two, especially in dealing with modernity.[27] Besides, strong religious and

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[24] Ahmad Najib Burhani, "Aksi Bela Islam: Konservatisme dan Fragmentasi Otoritas Keagamaan," *Maarif Institute for Cultural and Humanity* 11, no. 2 (2016): 16.

[25] Windy Dermawan Irman G.Lanti, Akim Ebih, "Examining the Growth of Islamic Conservatism in Indonesia the Case of West Java," *RSIS Working Paper* 322, no. July (2019).

[26] Amin Mudzakkir, "Konservatisme Islam dan Intoleransi Keagamaan di Tasikmalaya," *Multikultural & Multireligius* 16, no. 1 (2017): 57–74.

[27] Taufik Abdullah, "Adat and Islam : An Examination of Conflict in Minangkabau," *Cornell University Press; Southeast Asia Program Publications at Cornell University* 2, no. 2 (2019): 1–24.

cultural relations in Minangkabau also appears in politics and government. Local governments have always made this ABS-SBK philosophy a foothold in formulating various regional policies.

In the last two decades, the development of Islam and the strengthening of Islamic identity has become increasingly prominent in the land of Minang. Various Shari'ah regional regulations (*Perda*) are also quickly enacted, among others, regulations related to zakat, infaq, alms, sharia banking, eradication, and prevention of public ills (concentrated), Muslim dress code, and the obligation to read and write the Quran. These various regulations, both manifest and latent, are the potential to be a threat to the existence of minority groups in West Sumatera.[28] Conservative groups that actively advocate for these policies belong to the Islamic Shari'ah Implementation Committee (KPSI).[29] Through this organization, conservatism in West Sumatera continues to strengthen.

Strengthening conservatism, whether based on religious or traditional groups in West Sumatera, can be seen from two viewpoints; *first*, since the enactment of the Regional Autonomy Law, West Sumatera is one of the regions that is actively demanding the enactment of Shari'ah Regional regulations. Up to now, there have been dozens of shari'ah-based policies that have been implemented in some regencies/municipality areas. *Secondly*, activities of the conservatism movement carried out by religious and traditional groups such as the Sharia Concern Figure Forum (*Forum Tokoh Peduli Syariah*/FTPS), the Minang Community Forum (*Forum Masyarakat Minang*/FMM), *Paga Nagari Sumbar* (PNS), the High Minangkabau Natural Customs Density Council (*Majelis Tinggi Kerapatan Adat Alam Minangkabau*/MTKAAM), Islamic Sharia Implementation Committee (*Komite Penerapan Syari'at Islam*/KPSI), Minangkabau Muslim Movement (*Gerakan Muslim Minangkabau*/GMM),

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[28] Delmus Puneri Salim, *The Transnational and the Local in the Politics of Islam; The Case of West Sumatera, Indonesia* (Springer, 2015).

[29] Zainal, *Islam Radikal di Sumatera Barat Pasca Orde Baru (1998-2012): Kajian Historis Gerakan Ormas Islam Garis Keras* (Tanggerang Selatan: Lembaga Studi Islam Progresif (LSIP), 2015).

Indonesian Mujahidin Council (*Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia*/MMI), Islamic Defenders Front (*Front Pembela Islam*/FPI), *Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia* (HTI), *Fakta*, *Arimatea*, Islamic Sharia Enforcement Forum (*Forum Penegak Syariat Islam*/FPSI), *Fardu'ain*, and the West Sumatera Libas Forum (*Forum Libas Sumbar*/FLS) are groups that actively engage in discussions, advocacy, hearings, and propaganda that lead to the application of Islamic Shari'ah, especially when addressing modernity and various religious issues.

Shari'ah Formalization Movement

Along with the development of democratization in Indonesia, especially after the democratic decentralization policy, the political Islamization movement at the local level in dealing with the implementation of Islamic shari'ah regulations continues to emerge. It is carried out by both political elites and religious groups. Since 1998-2013, the graph of the distribution of the application of Islamic law in Indonesia is increasing massively.[30] This is caused by at least four factors; (1) local history and culture; (2) corruption and the desire to divert people's attention from the issue of corruption; (3) political elections at the local level; and (4) the low capacity of government at the local level in managing their regions. The last factor is the most dominant factor that becomes the cause of the massive political Islamization movement.[31] What has been done by the local elite groups then intersects with the interests of religious groups and Islamic political parties. So that the formalization of the Shari'a movement found momentum in the framework of maintaining the stability (interests) of the local political elites.[32] In addition, local geographical and cultural factors also prompt the spread of the Shari'a

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[30] Michael Buehler and Dani Muhtada, "Democratization and the Diffusion of Shari'a Law: Comparative Insights from Indonesia," *South East Asia Research* 24, no. 2 (2016): 261–282.

[31] Robin Bush, "Regional Shariah Regulations in Indonesia: Anomaly or Symptom?," *Expressing Islam: Religious Life and Politics in Indonesia* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing Intitute of Southesast Asian Studies, 2008).

[32] Michael Buehler, *The Politics of Shari'a Law - Buehler* (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2016).

formalization movement, especially in areas that have historical experience and structural Islamic traditions such as West Java, Aceh, South Sulawesi, and West Sumatera.[33]

Although the massive formalization of the Shari'ah movement is continuing, its application actually invites criticism. For those who support it, Sharia Regional Regulations are regarded as a solution to various social problems. While for those who oppose to it, the Sharia Regional Regulation is considered in contradiction with Human Rights (HAM) and democratic values.[34] Sharia Regional Regulations are always discriminative towards women groups in Indonesia. Sharia regulations tends to give restrictions on women's freedom. The women often become the 'target' as well as the 'victim' for implementing the Shari'a law such as the obligation to wear Muslim dress code, night activities restrictions, and restrictions on opportunities for expression in public spaces. As a result, not a few women who lose their rights to work and to get a proper education.[35]

The Sharia regional regulations in Indonesia can be classified into several categories based on their substance. *First*, Perda related to the morality of the community such as *Perda* against prostitution, adultery, and alcohol. This *Perda* is commonly referred to as a *Perda* on anti immorality. *Secondly*, *Perda* on women's dress code such as the obligation of Muslim women to wear Islamic clothing in certain places. *Thirdly*, *Perda* on people's religious understanding such as the necessity to read and write the Quran. In this *Perda*, there is a clause that states that the reading and writing skills of the Qur'an are a condition of marriage. *Fourthly*, *Perda* on the management of social funds from the public such as zakat, donations,

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[33] Minako Sakai and Amelia Fauzia, "Islamic Orientations in Contemporary Indonesia: Islamism on the Rise?," *Asian Ethnicity* 15, no. 1 (2014): 41–61.

[34] Ahmad Suaedy, "Penerapan Syariat Islam dan Tantangan Demokrasi di Indonesia," in *Agama dan Kontestasi Ruang Publlik: Islamisme, Konflik dan Demokrasi*, ed. Badrus Samsul Fata (Jakarta: The Wahid Institute, 2011), 13.

[35] Ahmad Fuad Fanani, "The Implementation of Sharia Bylaws and Its Negative Social Outcome for Indonesian Women," *Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies* 7, no. 2 (2017): 153–174.

and alms. *Fifthly*, *Perda* on Islamic education that includes *Madrasah Diniyah* and reading-writing of the Qur'an. *Sixthly*, *Perda* on the development of Islamic economics which includes *Baitul Mal wat Tamwil* (BMT) and Islamic People's Credit Bank (*Bank Perkreditan Rakyat Syariah*/BPRS). *Seventhly*, *Perda* on the faith such as the rules on the prohibition of Ahmadiyah activities and other Islamic groups considered misguided. *Eighthly*, *Perda* on the management of the grand mosque, hajj services, and the greeting of Ramadan.[36]

West Sumatera, is one of the Provinces that have produced and implements Sharia Regional Regulation in a big number. Some of these regulations are *first*, *Perda* on women dress code such as in Pasaman Regency that is Perda No. 22 of 2003; Sawahlunto/Sijunjung Regency with *Perda* Number 2 of 2003; Agam Regency with *Perda* Number 6 of 2005; Pesisir Selatan Regency with *Perda* Number 4 of 2005; Tanah Datar Regency in the form of an Appeal Letter from the Tanah Datar Regent Number 451.4/556/Kesra-2001 Regarding Appeal/ Muslim/ Muslimah Dress-code addressed to the Head of the Education and Labor Office; Solok Town with *Perda* Number 6 of 2002 concerning obligation to wear Muslimah dress-code; Padang City with Padang Mayor's Instruction Number 451.422/Binsos-III/2005 concerning to the Implementation of Adolescent *Wirid* (God remembrance) in Early Morning and Anti-Narcotics as well as obligation to wear Islamic clothing for the students of MI, SLTP/MTS and SLTA/SMK/SMA/Senior High Schools in Padang City; and Padang Mayor's Instruction on 7 March 2005 concerning the wearing of Islamic clothing.

Secondly, *Perda* related to religious understanding such as *Perda* Number 6 of 2003, Sawahlunto/ Sijunjung Regency with *Perda* Number 1 of 2003, Padang City with *Perda* Number 6 of 2003, Pasaman Regency with *Perda* Number 21 of 2003, Pesisir Selatan Regency with *Perda* Number 8

[36] Dani Muhtada, *Perda Syariah di Indonesia: Penyebaran, Problem, dan Tantangannya, in Scientific Oration for the VII Anniversary of the Faculty of Law, Semarang State University on December 4, 2014 in Semarang.* (Semarang, 2014).

of 2004 and Agam Regency with *Perda* Number 5 of 2005. There is also a *Perda* in the Province level of West Sumatera that is *Perda* Number 7 of 2005 concerning the Qur'an literacy and instructions from the Mayor of Padang Number 451.422/Binsos.III/2005 concerning the implementation of Adolescent *Wirid*, *Subuh* Education, and *Anti-Togel*/Narcotics and obligation to wear Islamic clothing for students of elementary school/MI/SLTP/MTS and SLTA/MTS and SLTA/SMK/MA in Padang City, Solok Regency with *Perda* Number 10 of 2001 about the Obligatory Reading of the Qur'an for Students and Brides, Padang City with *Perda* Number 6 of 2003 concerning Reading and Writing Al-Qur'an, *Perda* Number 3 of 2003 concerning the obligation to read the Quran in Padang, Sawahlunto Regency with *Perda* Number 1 of 2003 concerning al-Qur'an Writing and Reading, Agam Regency with *Perda* Number 5 of 2005 concerning the reading and writing of the Qur'an, and *Perda* of the Province of West Sumatera with Number 7 of 2005 concerning the reading and writing of the Qur'an.

Thirdly, *Perda* on *Zakat* in Solok City with Number 13 of 2003, *Perda* in Solok Regency with Number 13 of 2003, *Perda* in Pesisir Selatan Regency with Number 31 of 2003, *Perda* in 50 Cities with Number 26 of 2003, and *Perda* in Bukittinggi City with Number 29 of 2004, and *Perda* in Padang Panjang with Number 7 of 2008. *Fourthly*, *Perda* related to Morality, such as in Bukittinggi City with *Perda* Number 20 of 2003, *Perda* of Padang Pariaman Regency with Number 2 of 2004, *Perda* in Solok city with Number 6 of 2005, *Perda* in Pesisir Selatan Regency with Number 4 of 2006, and *Perda* in Padang Panjang City with Number 3 of 2004.

Of the several *Perda* born in the West Sumatera above, there are many of the articles that have similar redaction. This is allegedly an imitation or just a "copy-paste" of a similar regional regulation that appeared before. For example, in *Perda* on *Zakat*, Article 3 of the *Perda* Number 7 of 2008 in Padang Panjang City is exactly the same as Article 3 of the *Perda* Number 31 of 2003 in Pesisir Selatan Regency. Article 2 of *Perda* Number 2 of 2010 in Padang city, Article 2 of *Perda* Number 3 of

2007 in Purwakarta Regency, and Article 2 of *Perda* Number 2 of 2008 in Cimahi are all the same. Also, Article 4 of *Perda* Number 7 of 2008 in the City of Padang Panjang also has the same redaction with Article 3 of *Perda* Number 18 of 2006 in South Solok Regency, Article 3 of *Perda* Number 13 of 2003 in Solok Regency, and Article 3 of *Perda* Number 1 of 2011 in Sumedang Regency.

In addition, the similarity of the redaction among the articles in the *Perda* can also be found in the *Perda* about *Madrasa Diniyah*, reading the Qur'an, and obligation to wear Islamic clothing for Muslimah. This shows that the process of the formulation of sharia regional regulations is not conducted seriously and deeply. In other words, the emergence of various regulations above is because of the consideration of political interests rather than the need for effective governance in the region.[37]

Based on the years of the emergence of various *Perda* above, those *Perda* emerged between 2002 and 2008. But they emerged more massively in 2003-2005. Their emergence can not be separated from the support and role of a number of elites both at the legislative and executive levels, Islamic organizations, and traditional organizations in West Sumatera. The most prominent is the role of KPSI. Compared to other similar organizations, KPSI is very active and vocal in advocating the implementation of Islamic shari'ah in the West Sumatera region.

KPSI is a mass organization born from community support in the West Sumatera, especially from Muslims who feel anxious and concerned about the development of community conditions that are considered becoming far away from Islamic religious values such as the rampant immorality, gambling, and liquor. Besides, there is legitimacy from the philosophy of life of the people of West Sumatera, "*Adat Basandi Syarak, Syarak Basandi Kitabullah*". From here, KPSI has a central and important role in the movement of the formalization of Islamic Shari'ah in West

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[37] Dani Muhtada, *Perda Syariah Di Indonesia: Penyebaran, Problem, dan Tantangannya, in Scientific Oration for the VII Anniversary of the Faculty of Law, Semarang State University on December 4, 2014 in Semarang.* (Semarang, 2014).

Sumatera.[38]

However, after the emergence of several Shari'ah regional regulations, the formalization of Islamic sharia is no longer the main issue in West Sumatera. There has been a change in the issue and orientation of the conservative group movement from the formalization of shari'ah towards the socio-cultural movement, in the form of strengthening identity politics that is the realization of Islamic morality in public space. Some of the movements carried out such as increasing the passion of Islam in public space, communal piety, and expression of Islam that leads to the development of Muslim societies.[39]

Religious Conservatism Movement

Political euphoria and the opening of freedom of expression as a result of the Reformation have been successfully utilized by several religious groups to gain their political interests. Various political associations, mass organizations, and political parties emerged. No less than 200 mass organizations and new political parties were established, starting from the conservative-puritan style to the liberal-secular.[40] Various religious organizations with various characteristics and ideologies are also growing. They become a vocal group and active in the local political stage. Moreover, the policy of democratic decentralization seems to be a new space for their existence.

Their philosophy of life of ABK-SBK which has been the main reference for the people of West Sumatera, in certain contexts, is often echoed with narratives nuanced with group interests. This jargon has become an effective media that is 'capitalized' for the political and religious interests of certain groups including to trigger religious sentiment. Like in the case of the rejection of the construction of the Siloam Hospital and

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[38] Zainal, *Islam Radikal di Sumatera Barat Pasca Orde Baru (1998-2012): Kajian Historis Gerakan Ormas Islam Garis Keras.*

[39] Asef Bayat, *Pos-Islamism* (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2011).

[40] Luthfi Assyaukanie, *Ideologi Islam dan Utopia Tiga Model Negara Demokrasi di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Freedom Institute, 2011).

the termination of the Tionghoa ethnic *crematorium* at the Teguh Unified Association (*Himpunan Bersatu Teguh*/HBT).

In the case of the rejection of the construction of the Siloam Hospital, they used ABS-SBK jargon to protect and save the Minang tradition from Christianization. In fact, administratively, the procedure for the establishment of Siloam Hospital has been fulfilled. While in the case of terminating the crematorium, they argue that it is very disturbing because its location is close to the mosque, in a densely populated location, and does not consider environmental harmony.[41] The HBT actually has obtained permission from the regional government and approved by the Local People's Representative Council (DPRD) of West Sumatera Province.[42]

Organizations or new religious groups that always use the ABS-SBK philosophy of life in each of their movement are the Sharia Concern Figure Forum (*Forum Tokoh Peduli Syariah*/FTPS), the Minang Community Forum (*Forum Masyarakat Minang*/FMM), *Paga Nagari Sumbar* (PNS), the High Minangkabau Natural Customs Density Council (*Majelis Tinggi Kerapatan Adat Alam Minangkabau*/MTKAAM), Islamic Sharia Implementation Committee (*Komite Penerapan Syari'at Islam*/KPSI), Minangkabau Muslim Movement (*Gerakan Muslim Minangkabau*/GMM), Islamic Sharia Enforcement Forum (*Forum Penegak Syariat Islam*/FPSI), *Fardu'ain*, and the West Sumatera Libas Forum (FLS). In responding to various socio-religious and political phenomena in West Sumatera, the narrative used by these groups lead to the strengthening of identity politics. Therefore, they gain a lot of support from the community, especially from the elite religious-cultural community.

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[41] Mahyudi Ibrahim, "Penolakan Aliansi Masyarakat Minang Terhadap Krematorium Himpunan Bersatu Teguh di Kota Padang" (Study program of Political Sciences, the University of Andalas Padang, 2019).

[42] Zulfadli, "Kuasa Ormas di Ranah Minang: Penolakan Ormas Keagamaan Tehadap Pembangunan Rumah Sakit Siloam di Kota Padang," *Sosial Budaya* 14, no. 1 (2017), http://ejournal.uin-suska.ac.id/index.php/SosialBudaya/article/view/4161.

In addition to the above local scale organizations, there are also national and transnational religious organizations. MMI and FPI are two national-scale religious organizations, which movements are ideological-political. The basis of their support is dominated by the lower classes of society. While transnational organization like HTI is mostly accepted by educated groups spreading across several universities in the West Sumatera region. All of these organizations, with local, national, and transnational basis, often work together and use ABS-SBK jargon, especially in addressing religious-based issues. In many cases, they succeeded in giving sympathy and supporting the local community until creating pressure from the local government.

In 2005, after the emergence of a fatwa issued by MUI that forbade Pluralism, Liberalism, and Secularism, the conservatism movement expanded in West Sumatera. In the city of Padang, there were sweeping actions against religious groups deemed misguided such as the attack against Ahmadiyya people at al-Mubarak mosque, Sawahan in 2006. In the aftermath of this incident, a regulation was issued to ban the various activities of Ahmadiyah groups in the West Sumatera, contained in the Governor Regulation of West Sumatera No. 17 of 2013. This regulation was born as a follow-up of the meeting between the West Sumatera Provincial Government Board, MUI, LKAAM, the Coordinating Board for Community Beliefs (*Badan Koordinasi Aliran Kepercayaan Masyarakat*/Bakorpakem), and several mass organizations in West Sumatera. In this regulation, it is clear that all activities of Ahmadiyah people were banned and the obligation for the community to report to the authorities if they find any activity carried out by the Ahmadiyya Community.

If the movement of conservative groups in West Sumatera and their penetration into higher education institutions are neglected, it will potentially be an obstacle to the existence of diversity in West Sumatera. Because they always use religious and customary-based narratives. If the people of West Sumatera put forward the strengthening of faith and

cultural values of the community, it would create positive relations in efforts to preserve and maintain religious and community traditions. On the contrary, if they act intolerant towards minority groups, it would harm relations and the continuity of harmony among religious communities in West Sumatera. If this phenomenon continues to happen on a wider scale, it will prevent the development of democracy in Indonesia.

The report of the Freedom House in 2019, related to civil society freedom and guarantee of political rights, showed that the quality of democracy in Indonesia decreased significantly. Even the report from the Democracy Index released by the Economist Intelligence Unit in 2018, the condition of democracy in Indonesia was considered getting worse that is shown by the decline of people's political participation, electoral processes, political pluralism, and poor political culture.[43] According to Marcus Miezner,[44] this is due to the existence of various maneuvers from the conservative elites who continue to strive for the privileges that they have had in the past, rather than hand in hand with the wider community in consolidating democracy. This what hitherto colors Indonesia's political constellation, both at the local and national levels. If such a situation continues to take place, democracy in Indonesia may decline.

Conclusion

The phenomenon of the strengthening of religious and customary conservatism movements that occurred in West Sumatera after the Reformation especially since the enactment of the Regional Autonomy Law can be seen from the massive movement that demands the application of Shari'ah regional regulation (Perda Syariat). After succeeding to realize their demands, the enactment of various Perda sharia'ah, various conservative groups or organizations then shifted the

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[43]"Freedom in The World 2019," accessed October 20, 2019, https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/ABRIDGED_FH_FITW_2019_Report_FINAL.pdf.

[44] Marcus Mietzner, "Stagnasi Demokratik Indonesia: Elite Konservatif vs Masyarakat Sipil".

basis of their movement's issues towards strengthening Islamic and customary identities in the public sphere. By continuing to echo the philosophy of life; Adat Basandi Syara', Syara' Basandi Kitabullah, apart from using identity politics, it would open the space for intolerance and dominance of superiority-majority over minorities both in the scope of religion and tradition in the West Sumatera. In the long run, this will be an obstacle to the process of democratization in Indonesia.

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