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TABLIGHI JAMAAT SCHISM: RESPONSES AND CHANGES OF ITS MEMBERS IN INDONESIA

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Abstrak

Kata Kunci:

Islamism,
Religious
Authority, and
Tablighi
Jama'at

Studi ini merupakan analisis terhadap skisma Jama'ah Tabligh di India, berbagai tanggapan dan perubahan yang terjadi pada anggotanya di Indonesia. Dengan pendekatan sosio-antropologis dan historis, hasil studi menunjukkan bahwa skisma yang terjadi di dalam tubuh Jama'ah Tabligh disebabkan oleh konflik perebutan otoritas tertinggi gerakan para pemimpinnya di India. Fragmentasi otoritas yang terjadi setelah meninggalnya In'mul Hasan semakin memperuncing kontestasi otoritas antar anggota, hingga berujung pada pecahnya Jama'ah Tabligh menjadi dua kelompok. Pertama, mereka yang mendaulat Maulana Sa'ad sebagai pemimpin tunggal dan menamakan diri sebagai kelompok Nizamuddin. Kedua, mereka yang mendukung sistem ke-shura-an internasional dan menamakan diri sebagai kelompok Shura 'Alami. Di Indonesia, dua kelompok ini sama-sama berkembang, saling membangun garis demarkasi, saling mengklaim sebagai otentisitas kebenaran dan bergerak menjalankan dakwah sesuai dengan arahan para tetua masing-masing. Pasca skisma, keduanya pun bertransformasi ke dalam tatanan organisasi baru sesuai dengan kepentingan kelompok masing-masing.

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Abstract

Keywords:
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This study is an analysis of the Tablighi Jamaat schism in India, as well as various responses and changes that have occurred to its members in Indonesia. Using a socio-anthropological and historical approach, the study shows that the schism occurred by the conflict over the struggle for the highest authority of the movement of its leaders in India. The fragmentation after the death of In'mul Hasan further exacerbated the contestation among its senior members, resulting in the split of Tablighi Jamaat into two groups. The first group recognized Maulana Sa'ad as the sole leader and called themselves the Nizamuddin group. The second group supported the international shura system and called themselves the Shura 'Alami group. In Indonesia, these two groups are also developing, building demarcation lines from each other, claiming each other as the authenticity of the truth, and carrying out da'wah in accordance with the directions of their respective elders. After the schism, both groups transformed into a new organizational structure in accordance with the interests of their respective groups.

Introduction

Tablighi Jamaat¹ is growing rapidly in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and other parts of the world, including Indonesia. The embryo of this da'wah movement emerged in the mid-1920s in India.² Tablighi Jamaat was founded by Mawlana Muhammad Ilyas bin Muhammad Ismail al-Hanafi ad-Diyubandi al-Jisti al-Kandahlawi (1885-1944), a Deoband Sufi scholar in the city of Mewat.³ His family is well known for their piety and commitment to Islamic reform.⁴ The establishment of the Tablighi Jamaat

¹ In Indonesia, this movement is more popularly known as Jama'ah Tabligh than its original name, Tablighi Jamaat. This morphological change from Urdu to Arabic is because very few members of this movement understood Urdu at the beginning of its spread. As a solution, the followers of this movement use the help of translators from Tablighi members from Arab countries who understand Urdu until it is translated into Indonesian. This Arabic-style term continues to be used today. Zacharias Pieri, "Tablighi Jama'at," in *Handbook of Islamic Sects and Movements*, ed. Muhammad Afzal Upal Carole M. Cusack, 1st ed. (Leiden & Boston: Brill Leiden the Netherlands, 2021), 49–73.; Mathijs Pelkmans, "Walking the Truth in Islam with the Tablighi Jamaat," in *Fragile Conviction: Changing Ideological Landscapes in Urban Kyrgyzstan* (Cornell University Press, n.d.), 102–123, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctt1n7qjmt.10>.

² Shireen Khan Burki, "The Tablighi Jama'at: Proselytizing Missionaries or Trojan Horse?," *Journal of Applied Security Research* 8, no. 1 (2013): 98–117, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/19361610.2013.738407>.

³ Dietrich Reetz, "Living like the Pious Ancestors: The Social Ideal of the Missionary Movement of the Tablighi Jama'at" (DAVO Conference Hamburg, 2015), 209.

⁴ Ira M. Lapidus, *History of Islamic Societies* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 643.

was initially aimed to stop the flow of Hinduization⁵ and the syncretization of Islamic and Hindu teachings in India⁶ by inviting the Muslim community to return to the practice of the Sunnah of the Prophet.⁷

Behind the recent massive movement, amid 2018, the international public was shocked by the various conflicts among Tablighi members. In England, for example, there was a clash between supporters of the two Tablighi groups over the ownership of the headquarters.⁸ The dispute was triggered by the emergence of a group calling themselves the ‘*Alami Shura* or *Shura ‘Alami*.⁹ This group campaigns for the importance of the Tablighi followers back to the *Shura* system and claims to be the legitimate representative of this movement. In opposition, the *Shura ‘Alami* accuses those who are still loyal to the Nizamuddin headquarters, led by Mawlana Sa’ad, of being an illegitimate and deviant group. The conflict between these two groups eventually made the Tablighi Jamaat split into two opposing groups.

As the largest followers of Tablighi Jamaat after India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, Indonesia is one of the countries most affected by this schism. Some of its leaders in Kebon Jeruk, Jakarta, left headquarter as it sided with the Nizamuddin group of India. Before the schism, Nizamuddin was the headquarter for the whole followers of Tablighi Jamaat apart from Pakistan and Bangladesh. Those who chose to turn away then established

⁵ Yoginder Sikand, “The Tablighi Jamaat and Politics: A Critical Re-Appraisal,” *The Muslim World* 96 (2006), 180.; Jan Ali, “Islamic Revivalism: The Case of the Tablighi Jamaat,” *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 23, no. 1 (2003): 173–181, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13602000305935>.

⁶ Muhammad Khalid Masud, “Travelers in Faith: Studies of the Tablighi Jamaat as a Transnational Islamic Movement for Faith Renewal,” *Journal of Islamic Studies* 12, no. 3 (2001), 6.; Zacharias Pieri, “Daily Ritual, Mission, and the Transformation of the Self: The Case of Tablighi Jamaat,” *Numen* 66, no. 4 (2019): 360–380, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26745140>.

⁷ Yoginder Sikand, *The Origins and Development of the Tablighi Jamaat 1920-2000* (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 2002), 66. Eva F. Amrullah, “Seeking Sanctuary in ‘The Age of Disorder’: Women in Contemporary Tablighi Jamā’at,” *Contemporary Islam* 5, no. 2 (2011): 135–160, DOI 10.1007/s11562-010-0147-2.

⁸ Sajid Iqbal, “A House Divided,” *DAWN*, 2018.

⁹ The term ‘*Alami Shurā*’ refers to the naming of this movement at the international level, while in Indonesia this group is more popularly known as *Shura ‘Alami*.

an opposing headquarter named *Shura 'Alami*. As a result, a dispute arose between the followers of the two groups to defend their respective truth claims. This fact contradicts the results of several previous studies that show the Tablighi Jamaat as a pious movement by prioritizing the principles of social and spiritual piety.

So far, the study of Tablighi Jamaat and politics studies tend to look more at the relationship between Tablighi Jamaat and external politics involving the nation-state. Noor, for example, reveals that the success of the Tablighi Jamaat expansion to various countries is due to its commitment to abstain from involvement with any political organization.¹⁰ However, Sikand emphatically denies the movement's apolitical claims. He ensures that this movement has a political vision through the various political roles it plays. Muhammad Ilyas' vision to work gradually to promote the reform of individual Muslims, by which Islamic society will be blessed and awarded an "Islamic state" by God, emphasizes that the vision of this movement is the acquisition of political power.¹¹

Gaborieau also doubts the apolitical claims of the Tablighi Jamaat. For example, in Pakistan and Indonesia, some of its members are often involved in the internal politics of the state.¹² Mas'ud and Ahmad believe that this movement's presence in Pakistan has a relationship with Jama'at Islami.¹³ Lone also doubts this apolitical stance based on the argument that the Tablighi Jamaat does not encourage its members to be affiliated with a certain party. Still, members who join a political party are not forced to give up their political affiliation, as long as they do not discuss politics in any missionary action.¹⁴

¹⁰ Farish A. Noor, *Islam on the Move, the Tablighi Jamaat in Southeast Asia* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2012), 172.

¹¹ Yoginder Sikand, "The Tablighi Jamaat and Politics," *ISIM News Letter*, 2003, 43.

¹² Marc Gaborieau, "Transnational Islamic Movement: Tablighi Jamaat in Politics?," *ISIM News Letter* (Leiden, 1999), 21.

¹³ Muhammad Khalid Masud, "Travelers in Faith: Studies of the Tablighi Jamaat as a Transnational Islamic Movement for Faith Renewal."

¹⁴ Zulkhan Indra Putra, "The Tablighi Jamaat Movement Its Ideological Concept and

This study complements the study of the internal political dynamics of the Tablighi Jamaat. The data presented in this article show the complexity of the political competition among the Tablighi Jamaat elites over authority within the organization, which in turn leads to division [schism]. The sources in this paper were collected through bibliographic studies, both printed and electronic, as well as field studies which were supported by direct observations of the activities of the Tablighi Jamaat movement in India.¹⁵ Field data at the local level were taken in Lampung, which is considered as one of the areas with the fastest progress of the Tablighi Jamaat in Indonesia. In response to the disunity of the Tablighi Jamaat, Lampung was the main target area for the *Shura 'Alami* group's campaign. Less than two years since its arrival, *Shura 'Alami* has proven to successfully recruit nearly half followers of Tablighi Lampung, which is dominated by the middle-class elite, to join *Shura 'Alami* Indonesia.

This study aims to answer why there is a schism in the Tablighi Jamaat at its headquarter in India, how members of the Tablighi Jamaat in Indonesia respond to the schism of this movement, and what factors influence the conversion of some members of the Tablighi Jamaat in Indonesia to the *Shura 'Alami* group?

Tablighi Jamaat Schism

The attempt to dominate a group of elites inside the Tablighi Jamaat in the headquarters has generated a wave of resistance from some other elites within this movement. The shift of the Tablighi Jamaat towards internal political activism is due to the elites' in seeing the possibility of a "political opportunity structure" after the death of Mawlana In'amul Hasan. This "political opportunity" triggers the emergence of the rise of

Organizational Structure," *Afkaruna: Indonesian Interdisciplinary Journal of Islamic Studies* 9, no. 1 (2013): 16–25, <https://journal.umy.ac.id/index.php/afkaruna/article/view/26>; Sukron Mamun, "Tablighi Jamaat, An Islamic Revivalist Movement and Radicalism Issues," *Islam Realitas: Journal of Islamic and Social Studies* 5, no. 2 (2019): 145–159.

¹⁵ Some of the data about the main characters of the *Tablighi Jamaat* India who were in dispute were obtained from direct observations at the headquarter of Nizamudin, India, during May-August 2014.

social movements due to changes that occur in the political structure.

Tarrow stresses that the increase in social movements occurring during the changes in political conditions open up opportunities for interference from other parties so that social movements can change policies and political structures.¹⁶ This political opportunity is underlined by several factors, such as the numerous independent centers of power within the regime; the regime's openness to new actors; instability of political alignments; the presence of influential supporters for the challenger; and the role of the regime in facilitating the taking of collective claims.¹⁷ Several important components make up social movements, such as rebel awareness, where certain members of society feel deprived and persecuted, and have complaints directed at a system that is considered unfair.¹⁸ This sense of collective injustice, when it develops, will, in turn, motivate a person to become a member of a movement.¹⁹ This political opportunity theory has much in common with resource mobilization theory when the phenomenon is seen as a focus of the mobilization of external resources of the movement. Often, the rise of a movement joins with the pre-existing and highly organized individual goals become the movement's resources and support.²⁰

Another factor that drives the emergence of political opportunities for the elites is the vulnerability of the existing political system towards challenges. It is caused by several factors such as increased political pluralism, decreased oppression, division within the elites (especially when it grows to the point where some support organized opposition), and

¹⁶ Sidney G. Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movement and Contentious Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

¹⁷ Mark Lichbach and Alan Zuckerman, *Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure: Advancing Theory in Comparative Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 4.

¹⁸ Ryan T. Cragun and Deborah Cragun, *Introduction to Sociology* (Seven Treasures Publications, 2008), 233-234.

¹⁹ David S. Meyer, "Protest and Political Opportunities," *Annual Review of Sociology* 30 (2004): 125-145, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/29737688>.

²⁰ Sidney G. Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movement and Contentious Politics*.

increased political participation.²¹

The major changes occurring in the political structure, in turn, will give an advantage for social actors to initiate phases of “political opposition.” According to Tarrow, this political dimension of opposition is a strategy developed by those who are not in power to oppose the elites or rulers. Collective action becomes a counter-movement for those who have minimal access to institutions. They move in the name of new or inaccessible accusations.²² The dynamics of this oppositional culture will usually involve various actions such as improvisation, adaptation, and innovation which are limited by pre-existing perceptions.²³

The schism among Tablighi Jamaat can be traced back to 1995. There was a fragmentation of authority within Tablighi Jamaat after the death of Mawlana In'amul Hasan, the third leader of the Jamaat. This condition made the control of this movement no longer under Hazratjee (single leader) instead replaced by a *Shura* system (a kind of advisory body). Before the death of In'amul Hasan, for movement coordination, a consultative body or "Shura" council was formed consisting of ten *Shura*.²⁴ This body served as Hazratjee's assistant until his death. The polemic is that In'amul Hasan did not appoint a single person to be his successor as Hazratjee. Since then, the *Shura* members discussed selecting a name that had the right to be appointed as Hazratjee to replace In'amul Hasan. However, until the third day, an agreement was not made. Support was divided into three factions. Mawlana Sa'ad himself, one of the influential figures at that time, actually proposed that for the time being, there was

²¹ Peter K. Eisinger, “The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities,” *American Political Science Review* 67, no. 1 (1973): 11–28, <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/abs/conditions-of-protest-behavior-in-american-cities/3D17B9B2CE4CFF5ED5544E203C43E427>.

²² Sidney G. Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movement and Contentious Politics*, 1-3.

²³ Lichbach and Zuckerman, *Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure: Advancing Theory in Comparative Politics*, 4.

²⁴ For more details, see the website entitled "Explanation of Shaykh Fadhil" delivered at the last day's lecture of the Indonesian Shra 'Ālamī group convention in Jakarta. Accessed from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3IyCRBMmZgI&t=8266s>

no need for Hazratjee in Tablighi Jamaat.²⁵ But the proposal was not fully agreed upon by all members of *Shura*.

Therefore, the members of *Shura* decided to appoint three people from the representatives of each group as *faisalat*,²⁶ to lead the consultation at the Tablighi Jamaat Headquarter in Nizamuddin, in turn, every day. The three *faisalat* are Mawlana Izhar, Mawlana Zubairul Hassan, and Mawlana Sa'ad. The consultation result of appointing the three names as *faisalat* made the control of the movement organization no longer in the hands of a single leader or Hazratjee but shifted to a world consultative body consisting of ten *Shura* members with three people served as *faisalat*. Such a *Shura* system runs until all the *Shura* members die.

At the beginning of 2014, the number of *Shura* members remained three, with two *faisalat*. They are Mawlana Zubair, Mawlana Sa'ad al-Kandahlawi (India) as *faisalat* and Haji Abdul Wahhab is a *Shura* senior from Pakistan.²⁷ In the middle of the same year, Mawlana Zubair,²⁸ as one of the *faisalat* in Nizamuddin died. Practically, Mawlana Sa'ad became the only *faisalat* who was still alive. Mawlana Sa'ad's position as the sole facilitator at the Nizamuddin Headquarters encouraged the emergence of ideas from his supporters, represented by Mewat group²⁹ to appoint him

²⁵ Cited from "The Evil Plot to Destroy Nizamuddin Markaz," *Banglatruenews*, 2019.

²⁶ *Faisalat* is the term for the person who is authorized to make decisions in the work colloquy of the *Tablighi Jamaat*. Among the ten *Shura* members formed by Hazratjee In'amul Hasan there are three *faisalat*, and only Mawlana Sa'ad was still alive when this study was carried out. In contrast to the *Shura* (advisor), the position of the *faisalat* is more special because its authority can determine the decision of the colloquy.

²⁷ Afroz Alam and A Mirsab, "Tussle Over Tablighi Jamaat Global Leadership Leads to Violence," *Twocircles.Net*. When this article was written, there were two *Shura* appointed by In'amul Hasan. Currently only Mawlana Sa'ad who is still alive after the death of Pakistan's Haji Abdul Wahab in 2019.

²⁸ Mawlana Zubairul Hasan is the son of Hazratjee In'amul Hasan who was appointed as *Shura* and *Faisalat* at Nizamuddin's headquarters. He served with Mawlana Sa'ad in managing the work activities of the Tablighi Jamaat at the Nizamuddin headquarters. They share a role in conditioning the members who come from all over the world to Nizamuddin. These two figures normalize this movement until the death of Mawlana Zubair in March 2014.

²⁹ Mewat is a small town located in Uttar Pradesh (UP), where Mawlana Ilyas, the movement's founder, started his work. For the Tablighi Jamaat, Mewat is special because of the friendliness of its people in honoring guests who come to take part in the khuruj

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as Hazratjee. But the proposal was rejected by supporters of Mawlana Zubair, represented by Delhi group. It was Delhi group that often insisted on adding new *Shura* members and criticized the unfinished emirate after the death of Hazratjee, In'amul Hasan.

The wave of resistance to the appointment of Mawlana Sa'ad as the sole leader was aggravated by the authoritarian attitude of Mawlana Sa'ad himself, who did not want to accommodate Mawlana Zuhairul Hasan to continue the privileged position of his father, Mawlana Zubair.³⁰ Without considering the India-Pakistan conflict, the opposition represented by Mawlana Zuhair and Mawlana Ahmat Lat raised the issue of adding world *Shura* to the Tablighi Jamaat International Conference in Raiwind City, Pakistan. Even without Mawlana Sa'ad's approval, Bhay Wahhab as the person in charge of the Pakistan Tablighi Jamaat decided to add 13 world *Shura* members.³¹ Mawlana Sa'ad and his supporters rejected this decision. They reasoned that the major decisions concerning Nizamuddin and the Tablighi Jamaat should be made in Nizamuddin and that the decision-maker should be Mawlana Saad. This was based on the fact that the only surviving *faisalat* was Mawlana Sa'ad.³²

Mawlana Sa'ad's rejection of the *Shura 'Alami* system further worsened the atmosphere at Nizamuddin. This condition prompted his opponents to carry out a series of political maneuvers to earn support from inside and outside the headquarters, including involving Deoband Fatwa Council in giving legitimacy to the discourse of religious deviation aimed at Mawlana Sa'ad. The conflict between these two groups eventually led to a bloody conflict between supporters during Ramadan 2016 at the

program. In addition, the people also participated intensely and accepted Mawlana Ilyas' call to preach throughout India. The members of this movement called the Mewat people the forerunner of the transnationalization of the Tablighi Jamaat. Interview with Maulana Abdul Hakim Gujarat in Shahdol, Madhya Pradesh India, in June 2014.

³⁰ Amanatullah, "Tablighi Markaz Hazrat Nizamuddin Delhi Few Facts Few Historical Events Part 1," 2016, 46.

³¹ Lutfi Al Banjary, *Saksi Sejarah: Hasil Usaha Mediasi Ikhtilaf Tabligh (SA Dan MS)* (Jakarta, 2018).

³² M. Burhanuddin Qasmi, "Tablighi Jamaat at the Crossroads," *The Milli Gazette*.

Nizamuddin headquarters.³³ Four elders of the headquarters who were at odds with Mawlana Sa'ad decided to leave Nizamuddin and establish *Shura 'Alami* Tablighi, with its headquarter in Bhopal District, Madya Pradesh State.

The departure of these four Nizamuddin elders became the beginning of the institutionalization of the *Shura 'Alami* movement within Tablighi Jamaat in the world. The establishment of the *Shura 'Alami* group has created a new fault in the long history of the Tablighi Jamaat. Those who want the world *Shura* council as the highest consultant in the Tablighi Jamaat authority call themselves 'Alami Shura' or, more popularly, *Shura' Alami* in Indonesia. Meanwhile, those who want the Tablighi Jamaat to remain subject to the direction of the Nizamuddin headquarters and appoint Mawlana Sa'ad as hazratjee or the sole leader in the authority of the Tablighi Jamaat called themselves Nizamuddin group.

The immediate appearance of *Shura' Alami* group and their placing at the forefront of the discourse to save the world, Tablighi Jamat symbolizes the conflict between religious doctrines between truth and falsehood, as many of the ideologues of this movement claim. According to the author, the schism occurred in the organizational body of this movement is more on the result of the long-term dynamic interaction between political Islam in struggling for authority in the organization and the short-term reaction to the process of change that took place after the fragmentation of authority due to the death of the third Hazratjee, Mawlana In'amul Hassan.

The birth of the *Shura 'Alami* group, in the case above, was initiated by an elite group of Tablighi Jamaat who began to be marginalized from social mobility at the Nizamuddin headquarters. This group emerged in a situation where the position of Mawlana Sa'ad, as one of the world's remaining *Shura*, was strengthened after the death of Mawlana Zubair, his partner in the faisalat structure at Nizamuddin. The political opposition of

³³ Sajid Iqbal, "A House Divided," *DAWN*, 2018, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1391624>
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the *Shura 'Alami* group was further worsened by Mawlana Sa'ad's refusal to accommodate Mawlana Zuhair (son of Mawlana Zubair) as a partner in leading Nizamuddin. His background as a fiqh expert is also accused of contributing to Mawlana Sa'ad's authoritarian attitude, which tends to be rigid towards reform. With the strengthening of Mawlana Sa'ad's position, groups that opposed him were automatically marginalized from all kinds of mobility in Nizamuddin.

Marginalized groups under the shadow of the increasingly powerful Sa'adiyah regime ultimately pushed the opposition to maximize all available opportunities for political opposition. The death of all members at the central *Shura* council had indirectly provided benefits for some of the actors of this movement to rise and become members of the world *Shura* and patented this system under the authority of Tablighi Jamaat. On the other hand, this condition also provided an opportunity for the remaining *Shura* members to rise and become sole emir. The dispute between the two opposing groups, in the end, prompted them to contest each other for the highest position in this movement.

The culmination of the opposition of the Sa'adiyah regime can be seen in the efforts of some Nizamuddin's elites from the opposition side to take the State of Pakistan as a partner in mediating the conflict of this movement. The interference of members of the Pakistani Tablighi just made the situation worse. The ongoing bilateral conflict between Pakistan and India has also influenced the Indian government's policies that tend to discriminate against India's Muslim minorities, including the headquarters of Nizamuddin. Some observers think that the effort to reunite the India-Pakistan Tablighi Jamaat will only worsen the image of the Indian Tablighi Jamaat, due to the government's accusations against Nizamuddin's headquarter as a Pakistani spy.

The key to the success of the *Shura 'Alami* group in defeating its rival, the Nizamuddin group, in influencing world Tablighi members to join this group lies in the informal cells that have been formed for a long time among the world Tablighi Jamaat. The ability of the *Shura 'Alami*

figures to build a framework of action that emphasizes the importance of joining the *Shura 'Alami* side to face the challenges of the heresy of the Nizamuddin group has a great influence on the institutionalization of this group. With various flaming rhetoric, the *Shura 'Alami* group stimulated the emotions of Tablighi members and spread anti-Nizamuddin sentiments.

By building false rhetoric and accusing Mawlana Sa'ad of deviating from Islam's corridors, the *Shura 'Alami* reconstructed social reality. To borrow the Klandermans' term,³⁴ it would encourage an analytical shift from individuals to groups as a basis for collective action. Through this social reconstruction, *Shura 'Alami* can increase the awareness of potential perpetrators of the movement and attract the audience's sympathy. Borrowing Tarrow's term,³⁵ framing rhetoric related to the context of interests and conflicts in a drama that can evoke one's emotions is very important.

The campaign carried out by the *Shura 'Alami* group was strengthened and approved by a fatwa issued by the Deoband Fatwa Council.³⁶ Based on that fatwa, the *Shura 'Alami* group stated that avoiding the greater misguidance of the Tablighi Jamat is obligatory to stay away from Nizamuddin (Mawlana Sa'ad), who is currently in a deviation. Conversion of the Tablighi Jamaat to the current *Shura 'Alami* system is considered a necessity. It is the same with the obligation of khuruj, which this group always echoed long before the split.

³⁴ Bert Klandermans, *The Social Contractions of Protest and Multiorganizational Fields*, in Noorhaidi Hasan, *Laskar Jihad* (Jakarta: Pustaka LP3ES Indonesia, 2008), 160.

³⁵ Sidney G. Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movement and Contentious Politics*, 1-3.

³⁶ "No Title," *Darul Uloom Deoband*. and English version on Qasmi, "Tablighi Jamaat at the Crossroads."



Figure (1): The riots caused by Mawlana Sa'ad's supporters (right) and the act of Mawlana Sa'ad who has harmed the Tablighi Jamaat (left).³⁷

To facilitate the spread of news about the Nizamuddin conflict and allegations of Mawlana Sa'ad's deviation, the *Shura 'Alami* group used social media as an instrument. This can be seen from the massive publication of this group on its official website. Furthermore, the news obtained from social media was forwarded to the Whatsapp group of Jama'ah Tabligh members around the world.

The use of social media as the main mouthpiece for the publication of the *Shura 'Alami* group's discourse products is in stark contrast to the discourse that the movement has built so far. Long before the split,³⁸ this movement always advocated staying away from all methods of da'wah that were not in line with the principles of prophetic da'wah, including the prohibition of using communication tools in khuruj activities. However,

³⁷ Downloaded from <https://m.facebook.com/groups/315193632289420>, November 7, 2019.

³⁸ There are some official websites publishing on the development of *Shura 'Alami* International, see https://www.facebook.com/groups/283032668880355/?ref=group_header, January 28, 2018. See also <https://m.facebook.com/groups/315193632289420>, on november 7, 2019.

at this time, the communication media have become the main instrument for spreading the ideology of this group. In line with what has been asserted by Robert Hefner, by using media technology skillfully, a social movement can be succeeded in defrauding large organizations and promote an alternative interpretation of Islam.³⁹

This condition supports the author's analysis, that there are certain political situations that are very conducive to the interests of the movement. Certain groups often do not hesitate to choose ways that are contrary to the previous doctrine of their group. This proves that the suggestion to stay away from all forms of denial toward the sunnah, is not the essence of the teachings of this group, but is a strategy to survive under the shadow of the ruling regime. In fact, the Sufism doctrine, which has been typical in their movement activities, did not have much influence on the tolerance attitude of its members towards frictions. The political complexity of the Tabligh Jama'ah reflects what Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori call "Muslim Politics", which is understood as competition in interpreting religious symbols and control of formal and informal institutions, which in turn play a role in providing interpretation and at the same time defending it.⁴⁰

Jama'ah Tabligh in Indonesia

The success of the *Shura 'Alami* group in mobilizing members of the international Jama'ah Tabligh and inviting them to join this group shows that the role of globalization has a great impact on the dynamics of Muslim politics in this century. Advances in information and communication technology through social networks, enable the important ideas of *Shura 'Alami* as a rescue group for Jama'ah Tabligh to be conveyed globally very quickly. However, no matter how significant the media's influence in spreading *Shura 'Alami* propaganda is, it is still necessary to consider the

³⁹ Robert W. Hefner, *Civic Pluralism Denied*, in Hasan, *Laskar Jihad*, 301.

⁴⁰ James Piscatori and Dale F. Eickelman, *Muslim Politics* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996), 5-11.

point of intersection between international Islamic discourse and the context of local political dynamics. In this context, the various manifestations of the diversity of political Islam can be seen in a region at a certain time.

Indonesia has become one of the fastest countries to respond to the split of this da'wah movement. At the beginning of its deployment, in mid-2017, all of Indonesia's 6 *Shura*, consisting of Haji Tjetjep Firdaus, Kiai Ahmad Mukhlisun, Ustad Muslihuddin Jakfar, Andi Aminudin Noor, and Mufty Luthfi al-Banjari, Haji Suaib Gani agreed to join the International Shūra 'Alami. Haji Tjetjep, as the most senior *Shura* was trusted to decide Indonesia's stance on the conflict in Nizamuddin, India:

...to unite the work of Tabligh in Indonesia, we have decided that there will be no change in order regarding the work of da'wah in Indonesia. Whatever is disputed by the masyaikh of India and Pakistan, the order is not stopped and not voiced. As for the problems that occur in Indonesia, it will refer to the order of *Shura 'Alami*.⁴¹

To legalize the decision, the Indonesian *Shura* immediately issued a letter of mutual agreement, as shown in the picture (2).

⁴¹ Recording on *Shura* Indonesia lecture, Muslihuddin responding to *Shura Alami* at a *Tabligh* meeting in Solo, Central Java. Published on August 1, 2017



KESEPAKATAN SYURO INDONESIA
TANGGAL: 26 APRIL 2017
Di Masjid Jami' Kebon Jeruk Jakarta

- A. Pada hari ini Rabu, tanggal 26 April 2017, Syuro Indonesia telah sepakat untuk mengajukan kembali kesepakatan Syuro Indonesia di Rawind pada tanggal 16 Maret 2017, bahwa:
- B. Dengan adanya perbedaan pendapat di antara para Mashaikh, maka sikap kita tetap menghemati, memuliakan semua para Mashaikh, baik yang di India, Pakistan maupun di Bangladesh. Beliau-beliau adalah orang tua dan guru-guru kita.
 1. Dalam rangka menyanjikan para pekerja dakwah di Indonesia, untuk sementara waktu terrib kerja di Indonesia tidak ada perubahan. Hal-hal yang diperselisihkan oleh para Mashaikh seperti: DTI, Muntakhab Ahadis, 5 Amal Rumah dan lain sebagainya, tidak dihentikan dan tidak ditarghribkan, baik dalam bayan-bayan maupun dalam mudakarah-mudakarab.
 2. Jama'ah-jama'ah yang akan dikirim ke Luar Negeri, ditafaqod dan route-nya dimusyawarakan dan diputuskan oleh Syuro Indonesia, copy-nya dilaporkan kepada Mashaikh. Sedangkan jama'ah-jama'ah yang akan dikirim ke Negeri Jiran, pengaturannya kembali seperti semula.
 3. Hal-hal penting dan masalah-masalah yang timbul di Indonesia, dirujukkan kepada para Mashaikh yang jittima'i, untuk dimusyawarakan dan diputuskan oleh Beliau-Beliau, tidak kepada Mashaikh yang perorangan, melalui alama yang telah ditunjuk.

[Handwritten signatures and stamps]

KESEPAKATAN SYURO INDONESIA, TANGGAL: 26 APRIL 2017

- C. Kita semua wajib menjaga kesatuan dan persatuan dengan mengutamakan fokus pada meningkatkan iman dan amal dan kerja dakwah, tidak membicarakan hal-hal yang diperselisihkan.
- D. Musyawarah dua tahunan di Nizamuddin, untuk sementara waktu di-pending, sampai semua Mashaikh kembali ke Nizamuddin.
- E. Keputusan/kesepakatan tersebut di atas yang disampaikan kepada umum, dibatasi yang nomor B1 saja. Adapun yang lain-lainnya hanya untuk Syuro Indonesia dan para Penanggung Jawab saja.
- F. Syuro Indonesia, kemanapun pergi yang berkaitan dengan dakwah, diputuskan dengan musyawarah, demikian pula yang akan menyertainya/mendampingi.

Jakarta, 26 April 2017
SYURO INDONESIA

1. H. CECEP FIRDAUS	<i>[Signature]</i>	
2. MUHAMMAD MUSLIHUDDIN JAFAR	<i>[Signature]</i>	
3. ANDI AMINUDDIN NOOR	<i>[Signature]</i>	3.
4. H. SUAIB GANI	<i>[Signature]</i>	4.
5. K.H. AKHMAD MUKHLISUN	<i>[Signature]</i>	5.
6. USTADZ LUTHFIE YUSUF	<i>[Signature]</i>	6.

KESEPAKATAN SYURO INDONESIA, TANGGAL: 26 APRIL 2017

Figure (2): A copy of the Letter of Agreement, the *Shura* Council of Indonesian Tabligh regarding the decision to join the *Shura 'Alami* system.⁴²

With the issuance of the letter of mutual agreement, starting from the stipulated date, the Indonesian *Shura* decided to join the international *Shura* system promoted by *Shura 'Alami*. The decision letter was then sent to all representative headquarters of the Jama'ah Tabligh in all provinces in Indonesia. However, at the end of the same year, there was an uproar at the Tabligh headquarter in Jakarta, when one of the Indonesian *Shura*, Haji Tjetjep Firdaus, chose to return to align with the Nizamuddin headquarter.⁴³ Haji Tjetjep's 'desertion' became the main "echo" of the conflict between fellow members of the Jama'ah Tabligh in Indonesia. The *Shura* council who did not want to return to Nizamuddin chose to leave the Kebon Jeruk headquarter Jakarta and made the Al-Muttaqin Mosque in Ancol, owned by Kiai Mukhlisun, the headquarter of *Shura' Alami*. The

⁴². Quoted in the *Shura* Indonesia Agreement letter issued by the Indonesian Headquarter at the Grand Mosque of Kebon Jeruk, Jakarta on April 26, 2017. The contents of this letter were conveyed to regional headquarters throughout Indonesia. My observations at the headquarter of Al-Ittihad Mosque Jakal Km. 5 Special Region of Yogyakarta May in 2017.

⁴³ *Shura* Indonesia Agreement letter issued by the Indonesian Headquarter at the Grand Mosque of Kebon Jeruk, Jakarta on April 26, 2017.

two opposing *Shura* groups immediately rushed down to the regions to promote their respective interests. As a result, Tabligh members at the regional level were also divided into two opposing groups.

In the process of disseminating ideology, these two groups maximized their trans-local network. The Shirajul Mukhlashin Islamic Boarding School, Payaman, Magelang belonging to Kyai Mukhlashun, for example, was used as a means of spreading the *Shura 'Alami* ideology in Indonesia. Through the slogan "absolute obedience" to teachers, this pesantren called on its alumni everywhere to immediately join the *Shura 'Alami* Tabligh group.⁴⁴ Similar conditions were also found in the Indonesian Nizamuddin group, which used the Temboro Islamic Boarding School as a tool to spread Nizamuddin's ideology in Indonesia.⁴⁵ In addition to using educational institutions as an instrument of dissemination, in the case of the province of Lampung, it was found that there was a role of conglomerates who were the funders of this movement to win the sympathy of its members in Indonesia.⁴⁶

To facilitate analysis at the macro-level regarding the sociological roots that support social phenomena, an observation was carried out on various social activities of members of the movement at the micro-level. It started from the motivation, encouragement, and goals of the involvement of its members in a movement.⁴⁷ For this reason, data mining

⁴⁴ Observations and interviews with Muhammad Tholhah, one of the teachers at the Shirajul Mukhlashin Islamic Boarding School, Payaman, Magelang, Central Java, in March 2018

⁴⁵ Observations on the Indonesian deliberations (musyawarah) and tabayyun at Al-Fatah Islamic Boarding School Temboro Kab. Magetan East Java, Magetan, August 2017

⁴⁶ This is evidenced from data in Lampung province, regarding the involvement of the elite who were recruited by each group as funders for the movement. The evidence is a copy of the decision of the 2018 congress of the *Nizamuddin* Indonesia group which named Haji Maulana as *Shura* or the person in charge of Lampung Province. This decision received criticism from various circles, because Haji Maulana's background was not a cleric, but a conglomerate. Similar conditions were also found in the *Shura 'Alami* group which embraced Haji Feri, a Lampung conglomerate of Chinese descent, who played an active role in donating his wealth (worth billions of rupiah) for the development of *Shura 'Alami* at the national level. Observations of the Lampung *Jama'ah Tabligh* in December 2019- March 2020

⁴⁷ James A. Beckford, *New Religious Movement and Rapid Social Change* (London: Sage/Unesco, 1988).

at the local level in Lampung Province was based on the progressivism and enthusiasm of the members in participating in the Jama'ah Tabligh action. This province always occupies the top rank in every achievement of the missionary targets of this movement.⁴⁸

There is one provincial headquarter that is used as the center of the Jama'ah Tabligh da'wah activities in Lampung. The headquarter is located in the Haji Mena area, District of Natar, South Lampung Regency. The headquarter, established on an area of 5 hectares, also has an Islamic Boarding School which is specifically used to support the ideological basis of Tabligh in Lampung. The existence of the headquarter that is integrated with the Al-Kirom Islamic Boarding School, makes this headquarter more popularly called Al-Kirom Headquarter.⁴⁹ After the schism, this headquarter chose to align with Nizamuddin. Tablighi members whose existence had begun to be marginalized from the Al-Kirom headquarters' "special position",⁵⁰ preferred to join *Shura 'Alami*, and made the Perkemas pesantren the headquarter of *Shura' Alami* Lampung.

Long before the split issue spread to Lampung, the journey of this organization had been marked by friction among its members to fight for charisma and a special position. Hanafi, former Mudir (director) of the Al-Kirom Islamic boarding school, who has now joined the *Shura Alami* Lampung group, said:

I resigned because many Ustadz wanted to become chairman. It has become a tradition in our place (Al-Kirom), those who are strong and are widely supported by outsiders, will win. Especially since there was the issue of *Shura 'Alami*, there's always something at stake.

⁴⁸ This data is based on the author's direct observation of the recapitulation of the annual report submitted at the National Congress in Cikampek, West Java in the period of 2008-2015.

⁴⁹ Observation in Al-Kirom Headquarter in Lampung, December 2019.

⁵⁰ Within *Jama'ah Tabligh* there are some special tasks that are considered prestigious. Such as the task of faisalot or the decision maker in a deliberation (congress), the *amir* or the temporary leader of the movement, the *mubayyin* or the counselor and many more. Those who occupy these positions will automatically distinguish themselves from the lower class members of *Jama'ah Tabligh*, who are seen as less contributing to *dakwah*. These "special positions", apart from opening the economic access of the actors to the funders, will also have implications for the improvement of their lifestyle.

Including the matter about me who graduated from the Krincing Islamic boarding school, Magelang who incidentally joined "SA". Because of that, I was constantly cornered, everything about me was criticized, including my alma mater was also attacked. Finally, I decided to resign as a *Mudir* of Al-Kirom. The power-hungry seniors said that Al-Kirom already had someone next door (Nizamuddin). After that, Al-Kirom was led by Ustadz Ridwan, who had wanted to be chairman for a long time, but in fact, Al-Kirom became even more chaotic and even its reputation was tarnished due to the cases they had committed.⁵¹

The friction between important figures of this movement has been exacerbated by the significant middle-class penetration within Tablighi Jamaat in the last ten years. The participation of the elite police officers and bureaucrats in mid-2008, followed by the participation of 'high-class' Muslim businessmen in the period 2008-2015, has brought Lampung at the peak of its Tabligh expansion. After the joining of the middle class into Tablighi Jamaat, there was a massive Tabligh missionary action in almost all corners of Lampung. In a relatively short time, the presence of the middle class in Tablighi Jamaat has also succeeded in multiplying the number of its members very significantly.⁵²

By utilizing its social network, through the Indonesian Young Entrepreneurs Association (HIPMI) Lampung, Jamaah Tabligh promotes the importance of Islamic da'wah efforts by participating in the door-to-door khuruj program. Supported by well-established finances and several strategic positions,⁵³ in a short time khuruj groups have been formed, the majority of which consist of the middle class. In some cases, there is often

⁵¹ An interview with Muhammad Hanafi, former *mudir* (Director) of Islamic Boarding School Al-Kirom, Lampung. He chose to resign from Al-Kirom and joined the *Shura 'Alami* group. Al Amin Headquarter, Thursday, January 2, 2020.

⁵² This data is the result of my direct observation of the activities of the Lampung *Jama'ah Tabligh*, during 2007-2015.

⁵³ In the last ten years, *Jama'ah Tabligh* in Lampung has experienced rapid development. This is supported by the start of the participation of the middle class in this province. Most of them are bureaucrats, high-ranking police officers, Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) members, government officials and others. In an effort to differentiate themselves from other groups, they often form *khuruj* groups consisting of the middle class, and stay at the mosque with their luxury cars.

a dispute between the khowas group and the old group. They reason that khowas group does not perform da'wah correctly and in an orderly manner. The participation of the middle class in this movement also brings unfavorable implications for the senior members. The reason is, many of their "special jobs" in Jamaah Tabligh have been lost. So it is not surprising that the voices of the middle class members are more sound than the call of "senior members" to return to the order of Tablighi Jamaat which was hailed from Nizamuddin India.

The presence of the Muslim elite as a new group in the Tablighi Jamaat, apart from bringing this movement to the peak of its spread, also had implications for the shifting of the role of the "old group"⁵⁴ in the movement's mainstream mobility. An informant told about the rise of the elite khowas,⁵⁵ who chose to join the *Shura 'Alami* group:

Members of the (elite) tabligh khowas Lampung, such as H. Hanafi, H. Zikri, H. Cik Ali are no longer in Al-Kirom. They have joined the SA. I don't know what the main reason is, but what is certain is that they are disappointed with the people from the Al-Kirom headquarter. Khowas people are indeed domineering. Especially if they have spent a lot of money at the headquarter, they usually become more arrogant, and all their wishes must be obeyed. This often causes friction between members of the Tabligh Khowas and the headquarter. On the one hand, members of the Tabligh Khowas are partners of the headquarter in carrying out the program of Tablighi Jamaat, but on the other hand, members of the Tabligh Khowas are seen as a threat to the sustainability of the strategic role played by those in charge of the headquarter.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ The term "senior members" or "old *abbab*" refers to members of *Jama'ah Tabligh* who have been in the movement for a long time and occupy several important positions such as *shura*, *Jumidar*, as well as the person in charge of the headquarter. Most of the senior members are dominated by the lower class people, only a few are from the middle class. An observation of *Jama'ah Tabligh* activities in Lampung in July 2018.

⁵⁵ The term *khowas* people are very popular in this movement, *khowas* refers to the meaning of special people who are members of the *tabligh*, usually they consist of middle class Muslims who work as businessmen, police officers, political party actors, bureaucrats and so on. The *khowas* become the pioneers of this movement in promoting its call to join the *kburuh* program. Often the *khowas* people donate funds with a nominal that is quite fantastic in the various communal activities they organize. An interview with Sujianto, a Tabligh member from Lampung, 18 October 2018

⁵⁶ An interview with Abdul Syakur, a senior member of *Tabligh* Lampung, Juli 2018.

Competition between senior members and elites for authority and charisma continued for a long time. The strategic positions in Tablighi Jamaat, such as the amir of musyawarah, the person in charge, as well as various affairs regarding khuruj gradually began to involve the middle class. Although this movement does not pay attention to hierarchy in its da'wah activities to the community, this does not apply in their interpersonal affairs. Competition is the reason why many "senior members" are often not in tune with the Tabligh movement initiated by the "middle class". Often we find various conversations between "senior members" who criticize the elite, who are judged not to be preaching based on directives, which is not to be impressed by worldly things.

The prolonged conflict between the "senior members" and the elite has at least provided an advantage for the expansion of the *Shura 'Alami* ideology in the province of Lampung. The decision of the "senior members" who declared that Al-Kirom headquarter was only for members of the Nizamuddin-leaning Tabligh, angered the elite who were more inclined to the direction of the *Shura 'Alami* group. Al-Kirom's unilateral decision to join Nizamuddin was responded to by *Shura 'Alami* sympathizers who were dominated by the middle class to leave Al-Kirom, and jointly built the *Shura 'Alami* Lampung headquarter. This middle-class conversion is usually followed by "commissioned" clerics who accompany them when going for khuruj.

The tendency of elite groups to choose to join the *Shura 'Alami* group, apart from being disappointed with the "senior members" who often accuse them of not being orderly in da'wah, is also caused by the widespread news about allegations of deviation from the Nizamuddin group on social media, which is spread by the *Shura 'Alami* group. As a new group consisting of rational and educated groups, the Jamaa'ah Tabligh middle class becomes the group that is most rapidly affected by globalization and modernization. So that this group becomes the most "vulnerable" to propaganda and sentiment issues that are exhaled by the *Shura 'Alami* group through social media. Practically, this group is the

fastest group to obtain information, be it through electronic media or social media. Despite this fact, this group is also the one who consumes the most propaganda spread by the *Shura 'Alami* group. This is in stark contrast to the condition of the "senior members" who are dominated by lower-class Muslims who tend to stay away from all forms of modernity and support the spirit of obedience to Nizamuddin and are at the forefront of blocking the expansion of the *Shura 'Alami* ideology in this province.

Apart from media propaganda and internal conflicts that occurred among members of Tablighi Jamaat, the appearance of *Shura 'Alami* is actually welcomed by many members who come from the middle class at the regional level. Not only as a form of protest in an attempt to vent feelings of frustration, the *Shura 'Alami* phenomenon can also be read as an attempt to boost the image of the middle class in the structure of the "new" Tablighi Jamaat whose role has often been underestimated by "senior members". Senior members are often disturbed by the presence of the middle class because they often take over the strategic positions of "senior members" in the movement. In this context, *Shura 'Alami* as a 'newborn' group provides a lot of power for new members to fill. So, the fear of shifting the "privileged position" into an arena for the contestation of authority and charisma between the "senior members" and the "middle class" in fighting for the sympathy of the members of Tablighi Jamaat becomes the main cause of the transformation of the middle class under the banner of *Shura 'Alami*. The polarization of rejection between "senior members" and "newcomers" is in line with Kamaruzzaman's findings;

The conflict between this movement and the traditional ulama is a conflict of authority and charisma. When the movement penetrated this province, many "special jobs" for traditional "ulama" were "lost", because Tablighi Jamaat members did not pay attention to hierarchy in their da'wah activities to the community. That is why many traditional "ulama" do not accept this movement as "Aceh-local-Islam" people.⁵⁷

⁵⁷ Kamaruzzaman Bustamam-Ahmad, "The History of Jamaah Tabligh in Southeast AL-A'RAF– Vol. XVIII, No. 1, June 2021

From here, the conversion of Tabligh members in Lampung province can be grouped into three conversion groups. First, Tabligh members come from a middle-class background. This phenomenon is not surprising when related to the fact that in the last ten years, there has been a drastic increase in middle-class participation in this province. The penetration of the middle class as a new group supported by an established economic capital in the organizational structure of the movement, has shifted the strategic role played by the "senior members", until finally causing friction between the authority holders of the Tabligh headquarters at the local level.

Second, the members who chose to convert were the alumni of Pakistan and Payaman pesantren, Magelang, Central Java. Armed with the stigma of "absolute obedience" to teachers and the support of the late K.H. Mushlishun Payaman who stated that all the big families of the Shirajul Mukhlisin, Payaman, Magelang Islamic boarding schools wherever they are, to immediately join the *Shura 'Alami* group, made a moral impetus that proved effective in mobilizing its alumni to join. This pattern also applies to Pakistani alumni clerics who are home to *Shura' Alami* world. This proves that the informal network factor that had been built previously turned out to be one of the factors driving the conversion of Tabligh members at the local level.

Third, Tabligh members whose actions are not taken into account in the movement. This is due to several factors, such as "senior members" who do not get a special position such as being in charge or becoming amir, or because of his attitude that often goes against the flow so that he is marginalized from the mainstream mobility of the movement, and several other factors such as conflicts between fellow Tabligh members. This condition has also become fertile ground for the seedling of the *Shura 'Alami* ideology in Indonesia.

Asia: The Role of Islamic Sufism in Islamic Revival," *Al-Jami'ab: Journal of Islamic Studies* 2, no. 46 (2008): 353-400.

Conclusion

The schism of the movement within Tablighi Jamaat has various responses from Tabligh members. Some choose to stick to the instructions of Nizamuddin's headquarter and recognize Maulana Sa'ad as the sole leader of Tablighi Jamaat worldwide. Others chose to join the *Shura 'Alami* group and set up a rival base for the Nizamuddin group. But not a few Tabligh members are disappointed with the split of this movement, so they choose to be apathetic from all Tablighi Jamaat activities.

The formation of *Shura 'Alami* in Tablighi Jamaat at the local level, can be read as a form of resistance by the movement's members to their frustration in the face of the hegemony of the regime of power within the movement's body which increasingly stifles the freedom of expression of its members. Meanwhile, the transformation of the movement into a more lenient form can be read as an attempt by some of its members to express political desires that have been confined under the shadow of Nizamuddin's authority. The decision of the members of the Nizamuddin group to stick with Mawlana Sa'ad is a form of concern for the Sa'adiyah regime about the fading of the paradigm of authority which is the fundamental basis in building Nizamuddin's hegemony over all members of Tablighi Jamaat worldwide. From this it can be seen that this study offers a new paradigm in viewing a piety movement; that initially claimed to be apolitical, now has to transform into a form that is more compatible with modernity.

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Interviews

Interview with Muhammad Tholhah, a mentor at Ponpes Shirajul Mukhlisin Payaman, Magelang, Jawa Tengah, Maret 2018.

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Interview with Muhammad Hanafi, former mudir (Director) Ponpes Al Kirom Lampung, January 2020.

Interview with Abdul Syakur and Sujianto, member of Tabligh Lampung, July 2018.