



NORMS AND NEW MEDIA AS NEW PILLARS OF NEW NETWORK TERRORISM

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Abstract

Keywords:

narratives; needs;
networks; new
media; new network
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Terrorism is a constant phenomenon. However, the pattern and style of terrorism have changed considerably since 2010. This paper uses a case-study approach to explore the factors that lead individuals to join terrorist groups today. Analysts have long focused on three factors that drove individuals to join terrorist groups: “needs, narratives, and networks,” commonly referred to as the 3N. This paper identifies two more: norms and new media (2N). Now recruitment often occurs through social media. Besides that, this study found that people who adhere to good norms are vulnerable to being affected by terrorism. The results of this study indicate that not all terrorists have bad personalities. The results of this study inform the community that the internalization of values is accomplished not only by teaching goodness but also by directing goodness. In addition, this research has implications for enhancing the digital literacy abilities of the community.

Abstrak

Kata kunci:

narasi; dorongan;
jaringan; media
baru; terorisme
jaringan baru;
norma

Terorisme adalah fenomena yang permanen. Namun, pola dan gaya terorisme telah banyak berubah sejak tahun 2010. Artikel ini menggunakan pendekatan studi kasus untuk mengeksplorasi faktor-faktor yang menyebabkan individu bergabung dengan kelompok terorisme jaringan baru. Para ilmuwan telah lama berfokus pada tiga faktor yang mendorong individu untuk bergabung dengan kelompok teroris: "dorongan (*needs*), narasi (*narratives*), dan jaringan (*networks*)," yang biasa disebut sebagai 3N. Dalam artikel ini, kami mengidentifikasi dua lagi: norma (*norms*) dan media baru (*new media*) atau disingkat dengan 2N. Sekarang rekrutmen sering terjadi melalui media sosial. Selain itu, penelitian ini menemukan bahwa orang yang berpegang pada norma yang baik rentan terpengaruh terorisme. Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa tidak semua teroris memiliki kepribadian buruk. Adapun implikasi dari hasil penelitian ini adalah pengetahuan pada masyarakat bahwa internalisasi nilai bukan hanya dilakukan dengan mengajarkan kebaikan, tetapi juga mengarahkan kebaikan tersebut. Selain itu, penelitian ini juga berimplikasi agar masyarakat semakin meningkatkan keterampilan literasi digital.

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INTRODUCTION

One of the problems and challenges arising from globalization is terrorism in the name of religion (Mir, Hassan, Qadri, & Lecturer, 2014). According to Azra (2016), There are several main issues related to “terror” and “terrorism”. First, “terrorism” is a complicated moral issue. This is one of the main reasons it is difficult to define “terror” and “terrorism”. Terror and terrorism are frequently depicted as certain violent acts,

particularly those related to politics (political violence), are justified, while others are unacceptable or indefensible. According to this explanation, the violence categorized in this section is commonly referred to as “terror” or “terrorism”. This hypothesis suggests that are usually related with political dynamics. In addition, terror and terrorism are forms of unjustifiable violence, regardless of their motivation or objective.

Terrorism is “attitudes and actions that threaten others deliberately and violently, carried out by individuals or subnational groups to achieve political or social aims” (Enders & Sandler, 1993). Thus, it is understandable that terrorism breeds intimidation between parties. Therefore, it is understandable that terrorism promotes oppression between parties. As for Bruce (2013), terrorism encompasses a variety of elements, including the presence of violence; intimidation of other parties; creation of concern and fear; connection to a specific political goal, creation of victims, destruction of public facilities, and unusual crimes. On the other side, Sandler (2014) contends that terrorism effect fundamental change and instant. Thus, terrorism is defined as behavior that uses violence to influence policy, raise public fear, lead opinion, result in loss of life, and cause damage to public facilities (Arciszewski, Verlhac, Goncalves, & Presses, 2009; Horgan, 2017; Männik, 2007; Moghaddam, 2005; Ozer, 2016; Thornton, 1964). Based on these limits, the behavior of terror and terrorism has repeatedly occurred in various parts of the world.

According to Kruglanski, Bélanger, and Gunaratna (2019), three factors lead individuals to embrace radicalism and join terrorist groups in the name of religion: needs, narratives, and networks. These are often abbreviated as 3N. First, needs. These needs can be interpreted broadly. Every human being has a drive that comes from within. For instance, the desire for self-existence, the need to correct the past, and the want to endure. These impulses are essential factors that cause individuals to

be influenced into radicalism and terrorism in the name of religion. For example, many individuals who committed acts of terrorism saw them as atoning for past sins (Mappareasa, 2019).

Additionally, jihadist activity is considered a form of self-preservation, and they wish to be treated with greater respect and consideration. When viewed in a global context, the desire to preserve Western hegemony, the desire to demonstrate solidarity with various conflict-torn Middle Eastern countries, and the desire to escape dissatisfaction with the performance of the government can all influence individuals to become involved in radicalization and terrorism networks (Ma'arif, 2009; Purwawidada, 2014; Rahardanto, 2012). Meanwhile, terror behavior is caused by a high drive for aggressive behavior (Victoroff, 2005). On the other hand, Borum (2004) explained that one of the factors that cause individuals to become involved in terrorism is a potent death instinct. Another impetus that influences individuals to engage in terrorism is the desire to achieve “*shahid*”/martyrdom status (Moghaddam, 2009) and find the meaning of life (Kruglanski, Chen, Dechesne, Fishman, & Orehek, 2009).

According to Kruglanski, Bélanger, and Gunaratna (2019) the second factor that leads individuals to join terrorist movements is narratives or narration. Every ideology has a relatively straightforward narrative, textual, and black-and-white, making them easy to understand (Purwawidada, 2014, 8; Rahardanto, 2012). In addition, these narratives are also associated with the framing that it is obligatory to carry out jihad and fight against those hostile to Islam. This narrative influences some individuals to carry out radicalism and terrorism. On the other hand, the jihad narratives brought and disseminated by terrorists also result from shallow conclusions, such as cognitive distortions and heuristics (Borum, 2004; Milla, 2008, 2010; Victoroff, 2005), which causes the transfer of targets/terror targets or referred to as displacement (Borum, 2004) and ingroup-outgroup behavior (Moghaddam, 2005).

The third is networks (Kruglanski et al., 2019). Every radicalism and terrorism in the name of religion has networks and organizations, both local and international. This network then influences individuals to be willing to be part of them. These networks spread to various regions to then influence and recruit individuals. In addition, this network will also maintain the commitment of each individual in carrying out his role in radicalism and terrorist organizations. This terrorist network also affects group dynamics in the way that each member utilizes his or her particular expertise to foster group cohesion (Milla, 2010; Victoroff, 2005). In addition, there is also a process of developing group identity (Milla, 2010). On the other hand, there is also an opinion that individuals are involved in terrorism because of the social learning process carried out by individuals against terrorist groups (Borum, 2004).

In addition to the 3N factors, other factors can influence individuals to be involved in terrorism movements, namely environmental factors. These environmental factors can vary, such as community culture, poverty, media influence, religious influence, and books and films (Purwawidada, 2014).

There are various changes in the pattern or pattern of terrorism in specific periods. Some of these changes are as follows. First, terrorists used large bombs in the 2000s, while recently, terrorists have used small bombs. Second, in the past, terrorists used symbols of other religions and foreign countries (such as churches, foreign embassies, and foreign nationals) as terror targets. Meanwhile, currently, terrorists prefer police offices, public spaces, and places of worship (mosques) to be targeted by terror (Lindawaty, 2018). Likewise, according to Sarwono (2012), terrorism events in the form of bombs since 2010 have changed. Precisely it started when the bomb incident at the Adz-Dzikra mosque (Cirebon City resort police station). This change in action patterns can be read because, since the 2009 JW Marriot bombing, Indonesia has been relatively safe

from terrorism events. In addition, the targets of terrorism since 2010 have changed to places of worship (mosques) and police stations or manifestations of the police.

According to Sarwono's research (2012) and Ansyaad Mbai (2014) also revealed that today's terrorism, even when the pattern of action and the targets of action have changed, a new, organizationally independent cell still shares ideological ties. This indicates that the new terrorism cell is unaffiliated with the existing network, the majority of which are associated with the Afghan global terrorism network. Additionally, this new terrorist network received a distinct "education". If the old terrorism network is taught war, the new terrorism network will not receive war education. With this new pattern, it becomes essential to examine the factors that cause new network terrorism. Moreover, research related to this theme is still relatively minimal.

On the basis of this argument, it may be assumed that the causes of new network terrorism may differ from those of old network terrorism. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to investigate and develop the causes of new network terrorism (from 2010 to 2019) and to explain the psychological dynamics associated with such terrorist behavior. Research into the identification of these causative elements is crucial for a number of reasons. First, terrorism is an event that is very likely to occur indefinitely. Because it appears indefinitely and crosses the times and global political conditions, terrorism can metamorphose into several new patterns. Second, due to the metamorphosis towards the new pattern, the causative factors also undergo metamorphosis. Third, searching for new causal factors is useful for understanding recent network terrorism events and a modality for developing the appropriate treatment framework for new network terrorism. Good problem-solving is oriented to the causative factor, meaning that treatment as a problem-solving solution should be able to eliminate or minimize the occurrence of the causative factor.

Fourth, the inability to trace the causes of new network terrorism will potentially result in the development of terrorist events from time to time. These causal factors will be discussed from a psychological perspective, although it is possible to find causal factors from various fields (religious, political, economic, and social). Based on this explanation, it is important to conduct research on the search and formulation of the factors causing new network terrorism.

METHODS

This research uses a qualitative approach with a case study method. The data collection used in-depth interviews with four informants. The first informant with the initials AI is the Bali bombing convict I (interview on January 16, 2020 and February 27, 2020 at the Polda Metro Jaya Narcotics Detention Center); the informant with the initials HJK who was imprisoned for sending drugs and financing to the Santoso group (interviews on April 3, 2020 and April 10, 2020 at his home in Klaten); an informant with the initials ABS who was a former terrorist convict in 2014-2017 and had joined Jamaah Islamiyah and ISIS (interview 18 September 2021 and 25 September 2021 in Malang); and an informant with the initials SM who was a former terrorist convict in 2014-2019, had joined Jamaah Islamiyah and ISIS, and had gone to jihad for Syria (interview September 25, 2021 in Malang).

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Global Terrorism And Its Development In Indonesia

Terrorism begins with a radical attitude that uses religious arguments. According to Aryani (2020), the roots of radicalism in the name of religion come from the Wahhabi movement in Saudi Arabia. In addition, the Wahhabis are known for their jargon “return to the Qur’an and the sunnah” so that the Wahhabis claim to be followers of

the Salafis. Therefore, Wahhabism is regarded as a puritanism movement, which is a movement that seeks to purify the teachings of Islam from teachings that are believed to have originated outside Islam. This Wahhabi is attributed to Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahab who lived from 1703-1792 (Rohmaniyah & Woodward, 2012; Salama, 2011). The hallmark of Wahhabism is understanding religious texts textually, resulting in an attitude of assuming wrong religious practices that are different from their understanding of the religious text (Saifuddin, 2017). The Book of *Taubid*, written by Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahab later became one of the causes of the spreading of Wahhabi radicalism. In the next stage, this condition develops into one of the triggers for violence against other groups that are considered different, resulting in acts of terrorism in the name of religion.

Terrorism in Indonesia began with the emergence of Darul Islam/ Army Islam Indonesia (DI/TII) by Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosoewirjo in 1942. According to Purwawidada (2014), this condition is considered as the stage of the spread of ideology. In addition, the stage of spreading ideology also involved the Al Mukmin Islamic boarding school in Ngruki and the Usroh network. The next stage is the personnel formation stage which involves several figures, for example, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and Abdullah Sungkar. There was also the formation of Jamaah Islamiyah (JI), an important organization that triggers terrorism in Indonesia. The third stage is consolidation, forming a new organization called Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT) (Purwawidada, 2014). These various organizations and figures are affiliated with Al Qaeda.

Al Qaeda is an international organization that is the parent of several terrorist organizations globally, including ISIS (Islamic State in Iran and Syria). ISIS was initially called ISI (Islamic State in Iraq). In the early stages, the ISI was named Tauhid wal Jihad, led by Abu Mushab Al-Zarqawi and affiliated to Al Qaeda. ISI is an extension of Al Qaeda in dealing with the United States and its allies in Iraq. Initially, this movement

was supported by the Iraqi people. However, because the ISI likes to carry out bomb attacks both against the Iraqi government and the United States, the ISI is hated by the Iraqi people because it is considered to deviate from the national struggle and trigger sectarian wars. After Al-Zarqawi died in June 2006, the leadership of the ISI was taken over by Abu Hamzah Al-Muhajir and then moved again to Abu Umar Al-Baghdadi. Abu Umar Al-Baghdadi was killed in 2010, and Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi led the ISI. In his leadership, the ISI grew rapidly due to its expertise in war strategy, so the ISI expanded their operations to Syria. That year, the ISI also formed a new front to support its operations in Syria, called Jabhat al-Nusrah and led by Abu Muhammad al-Jaulani. His movement towards Syria caused the post-Osama bin Laden al-Qaeda leader Ayman Al-Zawahiri to urge the ISI to focus its operations in Iraq and leave Syria. At this point, a dispute arose between Al-Zawahiri and Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi. On April 17, 2013, the ISI declared itself free from Al-Qaeda fi al-Iraq and added Syria to its organization's name, thus becoming ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria). On the other hand, Al-Jaulani, who led Jabhat-Nusrah, also broke away from ISIS. On June 29, 2014, ISIS declared itself an Islamic state (Muhammad, 2014). The development of ISIS in Indonesia began with the oath of allegiance to the Islamic Shari'a Activist Forum (FAKSI) on July 6, 2014 and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's support for ISIS on August 2, 2014. After that, the development of ISIS proliferated, marked by several acts of terrorism that have features like ISIS and the terrorists' acknowledgement of their affiliation to ISIS.

Based on this explanation, it can be understood that at first, ISIS had the same goals and was affiliated with Al-Qaeda. However, in the middle of the road, ISIS has a difference of opinion with Al-Qaeda which causes it to break away from Al-Qaeda. Then, ISIS launched its operations according to its understanding and declared a caliphate (*khilafah*). Therefore, the style of terror operations carried out by ISIS differs from

those carried out by Al-Qaeda. At this point then, Al-Qaeda – and the organizations affiliated with it – are considered to be the representation of the old network terrorism, while ISIS – and the organizations affiliated to it – are considered to be the representation of the new network terrorism.

Old Network Terrorism And New Network

Over time, there has been a change in the model of the terrorism movement. The most important factor of the change in the model of the terrorism movement is due to the learning factor. The old terrorist networks – for example, Al-Qaeda, Jamaah Islamiyah (JI), the Indonesian Mujahidin Council/Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), and Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT) – have very neat and suitable organizational structures. So, if one person is revealed and caught, the police will find it easy to uncover other terrorist members. Thus, the terrorist network will be easily paralyzed. Learning from this phenomenon, people who engage in new network terrorism do not use a rigid and neat structure. This is so that the terrorist network is not easily exposed by the police (Sarwono, 2012).

On the other hand, the boundaries between the old and new networks are also quite complex. Although Al Qaeda and its affiliated organizations often represent the old network – for example, JI, MMI, and JAT – some important figures within these organizations are affiliated with terrorist organizations that represent new networks, such as ISIS. For example, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, an essential figure from MMI and JAT, then pledged allegiance to ISIS. In addition, Santoso, who was an important figure from the East MMI, also later switched and pledged allegiance to ISIS.

According to one research informant (AI), the old terrorism network is represented by Al Qaeda and all organizations, such as Jamaah Islamiyah. Meanwhile, the new network of terrorism is represented by ISIS (Islamic

State of Iraq and Syria) and every organization that has pledged allegiance to it. The difference in the terrorism model between the old and new networks lies in several aspects.

The first aspect is the way of taking allegiance. The old network terrorism has a very structured and neat organizational structure. This excellent and awesome organizational structure resulted in the presence of representatives of terrorist organizations. For example, Jamaah Islamiyah, which is affiliated with Al Qaeda has a central structure. In various countries, it is represented by *mantiqi*, while in multiple regions, it is characterized by *wakalah* (Purwawidada, 2014). In addition, the terrorist organization also has a structure tasked with recruiting and allegiance to potential terrorists. Thus, the old network terrorism has always used the direct and face-to-face model of loyalty (*baiat*) (Mappareasa, 2019). Meanwhile, new network terrorism does not always use the direct and face-to-face allegiance model (*baiat*). Most of the new network terrorism uses a virtual allegiance model, i.e. allegiance through video.

The second aspect is the target of terror. The targets of the old network terrorism are non-Muslims and their symbols, the United States and its allies and their symbols. Based on this, the terrorist behavior of the old network did not target Muslims and their symbols. Meanwhile, the new network of terrorism that started in 2010, the target of terror is widespread. Terror targets are not only non-Muslims and the United States and their symbols. It also targets Muslims and their symbols (Mbai, 2014; Sarwono, 2012). For example, the bombing of the mosque of the Cirebon resort police office, the planned bombing of the police station in Delanggu and Klaten, the planned bombing of the At Ta'awun mosque in Delanggu Klaten, the planned bombing of the Baitul Makmur Solo Baru mosque, and planting bombs at the tomb of Ki Ageng Gribig Jatinom Klaten (Purwawidada, 2014).

The third aspect is war training and assembling bombs. The old network terrorism involved training in warfare and learning to assemble a bomb in the process. This is because some of the old terrorism masterminds are alumni of the Afghan military academy. In addition, training in war and assembling bombs can also be carried out because the direct and face-to-face allegiance process makes it easier for recruiters to identify potential terrorists and train them to fight and make bombs. The new network terrorism does not necessarily involve training in war and assembling bombs. This is because the *bai'at* (allegiance) process can be done remotely or virtually.

The fourth aspect is the thinking model. According to AI, the informant, the old network terrorism assumes that the organization is *min ba'dhil muslimin*. Thus, the old network terrorism does not force other people to follow their religious provisions even though they think a system other than the Islamic system is wrong. However, new network terrorism considers its organization the *jama'atul muslimin* (for example, ISIS). This kind of understanding results in Muslims who do not take allegiance to him being believed to have disbelieved/*kafir* (out of Islam), so they can be killed. This difference in thinking patterns causes the old network of terrorism not to make Muslims and their symbols targets of terror. In contrast, some acts of terrorism by the new networks give Muslims different understandings of their groups and their symbols of terror targets.

The fifth aspect is the power of terror. According to AI as the informant, the old network terrorism has great terror power. This is because every act of terror carried out by the old network was initiated by the bomb and war experts and prepared carefully and in detail. Therefore, the terrorist acts of the old network always killed many victims or caused considerable damage. The new terrorist network does not have great terror power. Some of them even failed, and their acts of terror did not

kill many people. In fact, some of them only involved individuals with minimal weapons, for example, the stabbing of the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs Wiranto by ISIS sympathizers in 2019.

Meanwhile, the SM informant explained several differences between the old network terrorism and the new network terrorism. Some of these differences are the same as those conveyed by AI, the informant, while others are different. An example of how recruitment has changed is that in the past, terrorist organizations would recruit members through direct face-to-face interactions and persuasion. They would then provide education to new members based on their abilities. This process was highly structured. However, newer terrorist organizations are now using social media and technology to recruit members, allowing them to pledge allegiance to leaders without meeting in person. Someone can simply take allegiance through social media or make a video of allegiance and then send it to ISIS (Haryadi & Muthia, 2017). Thus, it is easier to enter into a new network of terrorist organizations.

The next difference lies in the aspect of understanding. Although both old and new terrorist networks are radical, SM considered that the old network terrorism has a deeper religious understanding and is more familiar with etiquette than the new network terrorism group. This is due to the old pattern of recruiting terrorism networks that involve the halaqah system. Meanwhile, new network terrorism groups have an immature understanding, so their way of thinking is shallow and very inclusive.

Next, the difference between old and new terrorist groups can be seen in the resistance to conflict. New network terrorism groups are more vulnerable to conflict because of this very textual and shallow understanding. In addition, this is due to the lack of guidance for new network terrorism groups. Thus, they are more violent, have bad morals, no affection, and consider others enemies.

ISIS has a style of movement in the form of doing anything that can achieve the goal of jihad, so the ISIS movement tends to be sporadic, small, and less structured. For example, in ISIS, there is a fatwa. “If you cannot do jihad in Syria, then jihad is allowed wherever you are and in any way.” Therefore, if the old terrorism network carried out its acts of terror by arranging large-scale bombs, then ISIS sympathizers carried out acts of terror with small-scale bombs or by shooting or stabbing targets and targets. This is the impact of the new network terrorism that it does not adhere to a strict training system, so its terror capabilities are small. It differs from the old network terrorism, which has an extensive and comprehensive terror capability.

According to an SM informant, ISIS believes apostates (*murtad*) are not always people who leave Islam. Muslims, but their understanding is not following the understanding of Islam them, can be considered apostates. In addition, this kind of person is considered more dangerous than non-Muslims or infidels because they are considered “enemies in a blanket”. Therefore, ISIS or the new terrorist network organization, targets not only infidels but also Muslims who are considered apostates, for example, the Indonesian National Armed Forces (*Tentara Nasional Indonesia*) and Indonesian National Police (*Kepolisian Nasional Republik Indonesia*). This is in line with what was written by Wibowo and Hapsari (2020).

Based on this explanation, it can be concluded that there is a difference between the old network terrorism and the new network terrorism. The distinction lies in the method of allegiance, the target of terror, the strength of the terrorists, as well as war training and bomb assembly.

Factors Causing Individuals Joining New Terrorism Networks

New network terrorism is terrorism that has a different movement model from the old network terrorism, although the goal is to create

political instability. The factors that cause and encourage criminal acts of terrorism that exist in the old terrorist network are also present in the new terrorist network, for example, the urge to find meaning in life, the desire to avenge the Western hegemony, guilty feeling, and the willingness to die as a martyr. However, the new network terrorists have differences from the old network terrorists. For example, allegiances can go through virtual, so they do not meet directly with terrorist figures and lack war and bomb-making skills. Thus, the differences in the model of the terrorist movement in the new network can lead to differences in the factors causing the occurrence of criminal acts of terrorism in the recent terrorist network.

According to AI informants, many people are influenced and encouraged to join new terrorist networks because they assume that carrying out jihad is *fardlu 'ain*, meaning that everyone has to do it. In addition, it is also due to opinions about the importance of establishing an Islamic state or caliphate (*khilafah*). The opinion of this AI informant is reinforced by data from the Alvara Research Center survey that as many as 29.6% of professionals claim that it is essential to establish an Islamic state, 23.5% of students admit to agreeing with the establishment of an Islamic state, and as many as 16.3% of students think that they agree. Establish an Islamic state. On the other hand, 19.6% are professionals, 23.4% of students; and 23.3% of students think it is necessary to carry out jihad to establish an Islamic state/caliphate. In the Indonesian context, this figure is relatively high (Ali & Purwandi, 2019). Another factor that causes acts of terrorism in new terrorist networks is the hope that their acts of terrorism or jihad are able to create a jihad area. As for the jihad field is believed to have many virtues; for instance, the spoils of war are regarded as a blessing, so if they are consumed, their bodies are also regarded as being blessed by God.

According to AI sources, the invitation of ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi influenced the formation of new terrorist networks. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared ISIS to be a caliphate and a forum for the Muslim community. This means all Muslims must join him. The urge to get the blessings of the jihad field is coupled with this influence, so many people take allegiance to him. According to Lofland and Stark (1965, 874), figures who are considered religious play an essential role in the process of one's religious conversion. According to Ferguson and Binks (2015), terrorism is one type of religious conversion. In addition, religious conversion is also influenced by the perspective of solving religious problems (Lofland & Stark, 1965), as did Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, who spread the understanding that the solution to various problems is the caliphate. The role of the media also aids ISIS' influence on new network terrorists, the AI informant said. This is because ISIS is expanding simultaneously with media and technology, including the Internet and its accessibility. On the other hand, internet users around the world, including Indonesia are very high. According to Ali and Purwandi (2019), many Indonesians study religion through social media and the internet. This condition has the potential to be influenced by ISIS, which also uses the internet and social media.

According to HJK, a person who was sentenced to prison in 2014 for distributing drugs and sending money to the Santoso group, the first factor that causes individuals to be affected by the new terrorist network is their desire to uphold the Shari'a and God's laws. This is because in the Qur'an it is explained that whoever judges other than Allah's law, is called an infidel (disbeliever/*kafir*), unjust (persecuted/*zalim*), and *fasiq* (damaged). In this case, the HJK informant did not agree with the mention of terrorists. HJK even considers that the title jihadis is more appropriate for them because they are fighting in the way of Allah in earnest (jihad). Moreover, the system applied in Indonesia and various other countries (both the government and the economic systems) is considered a system

created by infidels. Thus, the system is also considered not in accordance with Islamic principles and values. Therefore, they are compelled to replace the system with a system based on God's commandments.

Related to these factors, it can be understood that one of the factors that cause individuals to commit acts of terror, including new terrorist networks, is caused by the interpretation of the verses of the Qur'an. According to Khairunnisa & Zain (2016); Rodin (2016); and Syauqi (2020), there are several verses of the Qur'an that are often understood only textually, thus encouraging them to carry out acts of terror. In addition to understanding the verse textually, individuals who carry out acts of terror also think only the Qur'an and hadith can be used as evidence. Thus, they do not leave room for reason to interpret the proposition (Rohayana & Sofri, 2021).

The second factor that causes individuals to be involved in acts of terrorism (jihadism according to HJK informants) is the desire to submit to Allah's law. It is clear in the Quran. In fact, the HJK informant explained that the Qur'an is a *kitâbun mubîn* (a clear book) and *hudan linnâs* (guidance for humans). So, there is no reason to reject Allah's law which is considered clear. God's law in the Qur'an does not need to be interpreted again, so there is no need to create a new system (both government and economic systems). According to Azani and Koblenz-Stenzler (2019), one of the reasons a person is influenced by terrorism is to prove himself committed to religious rules.

The third factor that causes affected individuals to join the terrorism movement (jihadism) is revenge. There are several models of this revenge factor: revenge against the United States and its allies who have persecuted Muslim brothers in various Islamic countries and revenge against security forces in Indonesia who are considered arbitrary and help enforce infidel law. In this case, Hastuti (2018) and Zahri & Savira (2017) wrote that revenge predisposes and motivates individuals to commit violent behavior, one of

which is terror behavior. When an individual has a sense of revenge, the individual has negative emotions and a great urge to want the target or target to accept violent behavior from the individual for specific reasons.

As for ABS, one of the informants, a person who had been involved in both the old and new terrorist networks (Jamaah Islamiyah) and was imprisoned in 2014 for his involvement in the terrorist network, stated that a number of factors led individuals to join the new terrorist network. The first factor is the environmental factor. ABS admitted that in 1995 – 1998 (that is, at the age of 13 – 16 years), he was a student at a boarding school that introduced jihadi ideas. Then, in 1999, when he was educated at the Vocational School (*Sekolah Menengah Kejuruan/SMK*) level, the ABS informant was active in an Islamic spiritual organization (*robis*), and became a mosque youth. In addition, the *robis* followed by ABS informants were also fostered by a political party with a genealogy with the Ikhwanul Muslimin (one of the movement organizations in Egypt). According to Rahardanto (2012), the environment can be a factor that causes individuals to become terrorists.

Regarding the influence of the environment, a variety of forms exist. Individuals, for instance, imitate others in their immediate environment. From a psychological standpoint, this imitation is referred to as modelling (Bandura, 2003). In addition, environmental influences can also take the form of indoctrination of understanding from someone who understands terrorism to another (Bhatt & Silber, 2007; Klausen, Campion, Needle, Nguyen, & Libretti, 2016; Lankford & Gillespie, 2011). In the context of ABS, he received indoctrination about jihad when studying at Islamic boarding schools from 13-16 years old. This age is included in the category of teenagers. The characteristics of this adolescent religiosity are in the form of searching for forms of religious patterns (Bridges & Moore, 2002; Cotton, McGrady, & Rosenthal, 2010; King & Roeser, 2004; Saifuddin, 2019). When individual religiosity is developing and then

getting indoctrination related to jihad, it will have an impact on influencing individuals to understand terrorism. In addition, according to Stark and Bainbridge 1980 (1376–95), kinship factors or interpersonal relationships also influence someone to become terrorism. In the context of ABS informant, this factor occurs.

The second factor is personality and nature. This factor is obtained from the results of reflection on himself. ABS, one of the informants, explained that he was involved in both old and new terrorism networks because he felt like helping and uncomfortable if he had to refuse other people's requests for help. In the context of psychology, helping behavior is called prosocial behavior. Prosocial behavior is defined as behavior to help others, which sometimes individuals do not benefit from or are even threatened with danger (Baron & Branscombe, 2011; Kaur, 2019). In the context of the ABS informant, this condition occurred. Due to the encouragement of prosocial behavior inside ABS' self, he was in danger of being caught by the authorities in 2014 and sentenced to imprisonment.

The prosocial behavior carried out by ABS that caused him to enter the terrorism network is a factor of belief and value as Bayram (2016) revealed, the value factor that is believed to play a significant role in encouraging individuals to carry out prosocial behavior. In the context of ABS as a person, he believes that helping behavior is basically good behavior. In addition, helping groups that are considered to be jihad will increase the urge to help. In addition to the value factor that is believed, prosocial behavior is also influenced by the factor of awareness of abilities (Baron & Branscombe, 2011). ABS realized that he had several abilities, for example, the ability to operate electronic devices such as computers and the ability to deliver weapons. The realization that the ABS informant had the ability prompted him to help the terrorists, so the ABS informant joined the terrorism network.

On the other hand, prosocial behavior is also related to assertiveness (Rushton, Fulker, Neale, Nias, & Eysenck, 1989). Assertiveness is an individual's ability to communicate something that is on their thoughts and feelings but still respect others. However, in the context of ABS informants, ABS informants do not have high assertiveness (Pfafman, 2017). Individuals with a high assertiveness will have an excellent opportunity to refuse when asked for help by terrorist groups. However, in the context of ABS informants, ABS informants do not have high assertiveness.

The third factor is the search for identity and differentiating factors. According to ABS (informant), individuals can be attracted to and join terrorism, especially new terrorist networks, because of the desire to be different. This condition is related to the search and confirmation of identity. For ABS, joining a group fighting for Islam is a matter of pride. Similar to ABS, SM, another informant, also believes that the factor that influences the vulnerability of individuals to enter into new terrorist networks is the search for self-identity. According to Victoroff (2005) and Milla (2010), terrorism groups can help individuals strengthen their identities and form a single identity as mujahid or Islamic fighters and group identities that they are part of or a unit with the terrorism group.

The fourth factor is the social media factor. According to ABS and SM and the opinion of AI informants, social media plays a role in encouraging individuals to join new terrorist networks. According to Asongu, Orim, & Nting (2019); Hossain (2018); and Macdonald, Correia, & Watkin (2019), social media has a significant role in influencing individuals to join the new terrorist network in the modern era. This is because the new network terrorism uses social media more than the old network terrorism. Social media for the new network of terrorism serves as a medium for conveying information about terrorist achievements and allegiances. This aspect distinguishes the old network terrorism from

the new network terrorism. Suppose the old network terrorism requires meeting with the network leader, both the central leader and the leader of the *wakalah*, when pledging. In that case, the new network terrorism can take allegiance through recordings and then send it to the leader or social media. In this case, the ABS informant performs this role. One of them was ABS, the informant who edited a video of the slander of Santoso and the East Indonesia Mujahidin (MIT) group and then submitted it to Abu Jandal (ISIS representative in Indonesia). The ease of accessing information and this infidelity causes individuals to be compelled to join the new terrorism network.

The fifth factor is the thinking model factor or thinking pattern. According to ABS, superficial, textual, and all-black-and-white thinking models and patterns affect the vulnerability of individuals to join terrorism, especially new network terrorism. Therefore, many individuals with exact educational backgrounds (exact sciences) are easily influenced by terrorism, especially new network terrorism. They are affected, for instance, by the order of jihad to Syria and the order of jihad against symbols outside their group (for example, symbols of the government).

The sixth factor is the recognition and significance of life factors. Several factors contribute to the desire for recognition and the search for meaning in life, such as a bad past that motivates individuals to prove that they can make improvements, family and community conditions that encourage them to seek recognition from them, and atonement for past mistakes. According to ABS, this recognition factor is not only limited to encouraging individuals to join terrorist groups but also causes individuals who have previously joined old terrorist groups to switch to new terrorist groups. This is because in the ageing network of terrorism, there is a high level of compliance with the leader, marginalization of less-skilled sympathizers, as well as the existence of conflicts between leaders and some sympathizers so that the space for movement of some sympathizers

is limited. Because some of the old network terrorism sympathizers did not get recognition, they decided to move to a new terrorism network which was given a broad and flexible space to play a role. Like ABS informants, they don't need to master the science of war and make bombs, ABS can play a prominent role in new network terrorism. On the other hand, the meaningfulness of life also encourages individuals to join terrorism, especially new network terrorists. This is as revealed by Mapparesa (2019).

According to SM, one of the informants became involved in a new network of terrorist organizations, in addition to being influenced by doctrine, because of SM's nature, which is always to hold a favorable prejudice against something. In social psychology, prejudice is typically associated with negative prejudice, which can result in discriminatory behavior towards the group (Nelson, 2015; Payne, 2001; Pereira, Vala, & Costa-Lopes, 2010). However, in the experience of SM, prejudice leads to kindness which drives him to support the group that is the target of discrimination, namely the new network terrorism group ISIS. This prejudice then leads to helpful behavior, for example, making donations to join the new terrorist network or ISIS. According to Aknin, Van de Vondervoort, & Hamlin (2017), good prejudice and positive feelings are closely related to prosocial behavior. The two are complexly correlated. Individuals with positive feelings and prejudices against certain groups or individuals will increase the chances of these individuals helping other groups or individuals. When the individual helps, it will increase positive feelings so that the condition becomes positive reinforcement to help again.

The SM informant also said that individuals who join the new terrorism network are motivated to live more prosperously in jihad areas, for example, Syria. As a result of the conflict in Syria, ISIS considers the spoils of war to be lawful (*halal*). Thus, it becomes a kind of lure for individuals who have not found prosperity in Indonesia to join ISIS later

and go to Syria. This condition becomes unique if we look at it based on Abraham H. Maslow's hierarchy of needs. According to Maslow (1954), individuals are motivated by order of conditions, starting from physiological, safety, love, esteem, and self-actualization.

On the one hand, individuals who join the new terrorism network by leaving for Syria can seek prosperity from the spoils of war. This means the individual is still focused on meeting basic needs, namely physiological needs. However, on the other hand, at the same time, individuals who go to jihad for Syria consider themselves to be carrying out religious orders, which can then be considered self-actualization. However, this self-actualization negates the fulfilment of the need for security and love because Syria is a conflict area. In addition, social or environmental mistakes can also cause individuals to be affected by new network terrorism, according to SM.

Norms And New Media Become New Pillars Of New Network Terrorism

According to the explanations of the four informants, various reasons contribute to persons becoming involved in terrorism, consistent with the views of Kruglanski, Bélanger, and Gunaratna (2019), which is often referred to as 3N, while some other factors can be considered as new factors. Regarding the needs factor, individuals can be influenced and enter into terrorism, especially new network terrorism, due to several incentives or needs, for example there are those who are motivated by the awareness that enforcing God's law is obligatory (according to the HJK informant), but there are also those who are compelled to join. into new network terrorism because they want to show their existence, look cool, and look different (according to ABS and SM). In addition, some are involved in terrorism, especially new network terrorism, due to the urge to seek meaning. Concerning the narratives factor, all informants were influenced by the narratives propagated by the new network terrorism

groups, such as the obligation to travel to jihad locations, the obligation to assist oppressed Muslim brothers, the obligation to enforce Shari'a and Allah SWT's law, and the permissibility of jihad outside the area of jihad location. Likewise, related to network factors, new network terrorism involves its part in influencing other people. There is a process of change and the formation of new identities in other people so that other people are influenced to join new network terrorism groups. On the other hand, the new network terrorism has a different form of recruitment from the old network terrorism because the recruitment of new network terrorism can be through electronic media or directly.

The results of collecting research data on the four informants indicate that other factors cause individuals to be affected by new network terrorism and cannot be classified into 3N, namely norms and new media. Norm is a limitation of good and evil that individuals and groups believe of people, which becomes the impetus for individuals to act (Parmono, 1995). This norm is obtained from various strategies, for example, the influence of the community environment and education. In the context of ABS and SM informants who have been involved in a new network of terrorist organizations, they adhere to certain powerful norms and become an impetus for them to be involved in the new network of terrorism. ABS, the informant, comply with the norm that being a person must be helpful to others. The norms he adhered to made him willing and easy to help others, including helping people who were found to be involved in new network terrorism. Thus, ABS informants are not assertive and are willing to deliver weapons and play an active role in the dynamics of new terrorism networks. The ABS informant admitted that his father taught him the norm. Consequently, these standards are followed.

Meanwhile, the SM informant stated that the norm he followed was always to have a good attitude towards people. As with ABS informants, the norm to always have a good attitude towards people comes from

parents' education, which later becomes a permanent character and personality. Thus, this norm causes ABS informants to never think badly of their friends who seek help from new terrorist networks. What's more, his friends use the term "jihad"; on the other hand, there is also an urge to contribute to enforcing Allah's law in the SM informant.

The dynamics of belief in these norms give rise to good personalities in both. Thus, individuals with good strong characters can be considered vulnerable to being affected by new network terrorism. However, that does not mean that a good personality is not necessary. In the context of the two informants, norms and good character become complex. This means good personalities become vulnerable to new network terrorism when dynamic with other factors, such as religious background and religious knowledge.

Generally, norms are instilled through the internalization of values, one of which is done by parents. In addition, it can also be done by educational institutions. As Svensson (2020) wrote, norms include three elements: 1) normative statements that are 2) socially reproduced and 3) represent individuals' perceptions of the expectations surrounding their behavior. This means norms are produced and then transferred to other members of society. Norms instilled since childhood will have a significant impact on subsequent development. This is because, in childhood, individuals experience moral development (Kohlberg & Hersh, 1977), cognitive (Babakr, Mohamedamin, & Kakamad, 2019; Piaget, 1952), and is in the exploration phase. When individuals experience moral and mental development, parents internalize the correct values and norms, and those values and standards will become the principle of the individual's life. Plus, if parents can be models or role models and on the other hand, individuals who are still children are imitative (Saifuddin, 2019), then there will be a process of imitating the behavior of parents related to the instilled norms (Bandura, 1977, 1986, 2003; Shoben Jr., 1963). When the norms adopted

are applied continuously, it will become a good personality (Parks-Leduc, Feldman, & Bardi, 2015).

The new media is the next pillar or component that plays a significant part in persuading individuals to join new terrorist networks. Social media and its associated technology are one example of this new media. Although new network terrorism is less systematic and has fewer capabilities than old network terrorism, it has been aided by new media, one of which is social media. As a result, propaganda is easily spread. Additionally, the new network terrorism facilitates membership by online allegiance via video or social media.

According to Snow, Zurcher, Jr., & Ekland-Olson (1980), there are four types of recruiting by organizations: recruiting and conveying information in public places and a face-to-face manner. Second, conveying information and recruiting through an institutionalized mass communication mechanism. Third, recruitment from person to person. Fourth, sharing information and recruiting through member extra movement social networks. Based on this, the recruitment pattern carried out by the new network terrorist includes a recruitment pattern that has not been described in the four types of recruitment patterns. This is due to the dissemination of information and recruitment using social media, as well as doing it face-to-face. Krebs (2002) researched the terrorist networks involved in hijacking planes (the old network) and found it challenging to trace them properly. Thus, it can be understood that if the old network is difficult to trace, even more so for the new network with different recruitment patterns and mechanisms.

If we explore the relationship between individuals and social media, many individuals with psychological problems then run to social media. For example, individuals seeking self-identity, individuals seeking differentiators, individuals possessing a strong religious spirit but requiring

less effort to learn religion directly, individuals having difficulty interacting, individuals possessing low self-esteem, individuals maintaining high-stress levels, and individuals seeking a community that shares similar values and norms. This kind of psychological condition makes individuals vulnerable to being affected by new network terrorism.

According to Nasrullah (2017), There are several characteristics or aspects of new media. First, the network. The network is used to connect one computer to another. However, when new media develops, networks become an essential component in that development. Networking on new media helps one connect with others in various parts of the world without any boundaries. In the context of new network terrorism, new media networks play an essential role in disseminating doctrine and propaganda across the globe. Although the dissemination does not have a specific target, the dissemination of propaganda will still be able to target vulnerable groups, such as teenagers or individuals who experience despair or have drives that must be fulfilled.

Second, information. New media users interact with one another based on this information, whether it is self-generated information based on their own condition or information created by users or other parties related to specific events in certain contexts. The information is then uploaded, exchanged, and shared by one of the media users, and then commented on by other social media users. In the context of new network terrorism, the information contains propaganda or ideas that call for jihad and enforcing Allah's law. When an individual finds media that has it and is commented on by many people who support it, it can further influence the individual.

Third, is interactivity. New media allows one user to interact with other users in cyberspace. There are various forms of this interaction. For example, the interaction of new media users gives each other a "like" sign. In addition, new media users can also write their comments in the available fields and then reply to them through the uploader.

On the other hand, new media also provides a form of interaction in the form of giving or sharing feelings with certain signs of new media. New media also allows a user to share and promote certain information to users on their friends list to spread the information widely. This kind of interaction causes the understanding and influence of new network terrorism to grow and expand. Thus, it is easier to influence others to enter into it.

The ease of joining through online allegiance also plays a role in influencing individuals to join new terrorist networks. The two conditions will further increase individuals' vulnerability to entering into new network terrorism. Based on this explanation, it can be understood that new media and norms become new pillars for new network terrorism, which complements the three pillars formulated by Kruglanski, Bélanger, and Gunaratna (2019).

Thus, the pillars of terrorism and radicalism are 5N, namely needs, narratives, networks, norms, and new media. However, other factors also play a role in influencing individuals to join the new terrorism network, namely, the form of jihad or terror carried out within the new terrorism network is more accessible. For example, it doesn't have to be by making bombs, committing suicide bombings, and going to war. However, jihad in the new network terrorism can be carried out with knives or other sharp weapons and is directed at anyone deemed to have deviated from their understanding of Islam, including non-Muslims, state officials, the Indonesian National Armed Forces (*Tentara Nasional Indonesia*), and police.

CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTION

Conclusion

Based on the data that has been collected, several conclusions were obtained. First, there is a difference between old-network terrorism and new-network terrorism. These differences include several aspects, such as

the method of allegiance, the target of terror, the power of terror, training in war and assembling bombs. Second, several factors cause individuals to be exposed to new network terrorism. For instance, the desire to be a different person, the desire to atone for past transgressions, the willingness to enforce God's law, the ease with which one can join, the role of social media, the desire to be meaningful and valuable, miscommunication and interpretation, as well as an attitude of wanting to assist and having sound prejudice. These factors can be classified into three pillars of terrorism in the form of 3N: needs, narratives, and networks. In addition, there are new findings in the form of 2N, namely norm and new media. Third, cognitive, affective, and behavioral aspects also become components that play a role in individuals entering new network terrorism.

Suggestion

Regarding the research findings, several suggestions can be formulated. First, deradicalization and disengagement programs are increasingly being promoted. So far, the government and its various groups have implemented deradicalization and disengagement programs. Thus, the program can still be continued with changes in several aspects to adapt to the current conditions and dynamics of terrorists. Second, digital literacy education needs to be improved. Due to the significant role of new media in the dynamics of terrorism, digital literacy education needs to be improved and targeted to various parties. The public needs to be taught to think critically and filter information spread on the internet and social media, so they are not vulnerable to terrorism. Third, religious moderation education needs to be initiated and improved in various families. The family is sufficient to internalize the value of goodness and conveys the importance of excellence in a universally good context. This is based on the finding that the informants of this study are good people. However, their kindness is aimed at helping terrorist groups.

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

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