



Islamic Puritanism Movements in Indonesia as Transnational Movements

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Abstract

Islamic puritanism movements are the movements compelling to return to the teachings of Quran and Sunnah, as the pure teachings of Islam and abandon even abolish other teachings outside the teachings of Quran and Sunnah. The movements of Islamic puritanism can be considered as transnational movements because they spread their teachings and ideologies, create organizations, networks, and provide financial supports across nations. This paper describes Islamic puritanism movements in Indonesia and their transnational connections. Some Islamic puritanism movements in Indonesia can be considered as part of Islamic transnational movements, in which most of the movements are centered in the Middle East. In Indonesia, Islamic puritanism movements firstly appeared in the beginning of the nineteenth century, called Padri movement in West Sumatra. It was then continued to the emergence of Islamic organizations in the twentieth century. Recently, Islamic puritanism movements in Indonesia mostly take form as Salafism-Wahabism movements.

Keywords:

Islamic puritanism movement, transnational movement, and ideology

Introduction

The term “puritan” and “puritanism”, according to *New Oxford Dictionary of English* (1998), were firstly used to denote a member of a group of English Protestants of the late 16th and 17th centuries who regarded the Reformation of the Church under Elizabeth as incomplete and sought

to simplify and regulate forms of worship. Later, this term extends not only in Christianity but also in other religions and religious movements, including Islam. In brief, puritanism can be understood as purification movements, an appeal to return to the pure teaching of religion. In Islam, purification movements desire to return to the teachings of Quran and Sunnah as the pure teachings in Islam; and abandon even abolish other teachings beyond the teachings of Quran and Sunnah.

The most obvious puritanism movement in Islam is Wahabism. Wahabism is the ideology of the Wahabi, a member of a strictly orthodox Sunni Muslim sect founded by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahab (1703–92). It advocates a return to the early Islam of the Quran and Sunnah and rejects later innovations. Wahabism is the doctrine of an Islamic reform movement. This doctrine is based on the Sunni teachings of Ibn Hanbal (780–855), involving puritanism, monotheism, and rejection of popular cults, such as the Sufi veneration of saints and tombs on the grounds that constitutes idolatry. Wahabism still becomes the predominant religious force in Saudi Arabia until recent days.

According to Khaled Abou El-Fadl, the term “puritan” denotes the groups having a reactionary attitude toward the challenge of modernity. The term “puritan” is also often described as in some other terms, such as “fundamentalist”, “militant”, “extremist”, “radical”, “fanatics”, or “*jihadist*”. However, El-Fadl emphasizes on the term “puritan” because the main characteristic of this group is its absolutism belief and without compromise. In many ways, the orientation of this group tends to be “purist”, or it always tends to purify itself, in a sense that it will not be tolerant to other viewpoints. Furthermore, puritan also considers that the reality of pluralism is the form of contamination for the real truth. The term “fundamentalist” is not appropriate, because fundamentalist will always rely on the fundamental things, without any negative connotations. The terms “extremist”, “radical”, and “fanatics” are also inappropriate.

Even though, there are some elements of “extremist”, “radical”, and “fanatics” in puritan, they are not the dominant elements. Therefore, to mention the view of fanatics’ reductionism, strict absolutism, and narrow literalism, the appropriate term is “puritan” (El-Fadl 2005, 10-11; Sutiyono et al. 2015; Kang 2009; Sleeper 2009; McKenna 2002).

Based on the background above, this paper wants to explore whether Islamic puritanism movements in Indonesia can be called as transnational and global movements, due to their link to foreign movements, organizations, ideology, teachings, and network, usually from the Middle East. This paper also wants to see the relations of the transnational movements, the possibility of strong influences, or in the most extreme form, hegemony, toward Islamic puritanism movements in Indonesia in which the end of the movements in Indonesia is only the “periphery movement” because of the strong influence or hegemony from their center in Middle East.

Religion and Transnational Movements

Transnational view began with the notion of borderless world and explored the kinds of boundaries exist and why they arouse in a specific time and place. Transnational perspective tries to look at all aspects of social life simultaneously and understand how they mutually inform each other. It recognizes that some social processes happen inside the nation borders, while other processes also happen across nation borders. The processes and the institutions operate as if they are not connected to any territory but in fact they are rooted in particular places and they transcend their borders. However, the particular site and time itself—if it is traced back further—is historically connected to other places, levels, and social experiences (Levitt 2007, 22).

Religious communities are among the oldest of transnational movements and networks, and in recent times, they become vigorous

creators of transnational civil society. In an earlier transnationalism, religion accompanied trade, conquest, and colonial domination, while in the new transnationalism is carried by religion from below, by popular religious upsurge from ordinary people rather than introduced and directed from above. The old form of transnational structure, such as the Catholic Church, is the important component of transnational spreading, but recent popular, populist, and enthusiastic movements, such as Islamic fundamentalism, have spread more by spontaneous diffusion (Rudolph 1997, 1-3).

Religion or faith traditions give their followers symbols, rituals, and stories used to create alternative sacred landscapes, marked by holy sites, shrines, and places for worships. For them, these spaces are more important than the actual political geography or national boundaries. Religion also transcends the boundaries of time because it allows its followers to feel part of a chain of memory, simultaneously connected to the past, present, and future. Walls of religious buildings seem permeable; many people from different countries or locations can enter and be openly accepted. For these people, crossing the boundaries is an accepted part of their everyday religious experience (Levitt 2007, 13-16).

Transnational activity is guided by imaginary maps which boundaries do not approximate the spaces depicted on the political maps. Transnational religion makes its appearance in many forms propagated by variety of processes. Islamic transnational activities rely on strong commonalities across organizational and state boundaries. This commonality is as the result of emulation rather than cooperation:

“Islamic activists attend cooperative events, international conferences, but they do so as much to enhance themselves in their locales as to coordinate or conspire with transnational actors. Local praxis replicates common organizational templates of philanthropic and welfare enterprises that facilitate the pious acts of virtuous Muslims and sometimes become the location of political activists.

Their claims to solidarity are real and spawn financial and tactical support networks, but they do not spawn sustained cooperation or significant formal coordination.” (Rudolph 1997, 13-14)

These transnational activities show the role of local and autonomous agencies in spreading religious doctrine and practice. It also shows the shift of transnational religious initiative from the top to the local structures and networks generated from below. Such casual and informal networks are easy, even for amateurs, to create and serviceable for the immediate needs of the faithful. Religiosity therefore can create “social capital”, as a foundation for further changes in society and politics (Rudolph 1997, 15).

For Muslims, Islam is not merely a religion, but it is also a form of civilization and orientation to the world. The Muslim vision of the world is always integral and whole, with religious commitment as the central point of the vision. It is precisely the appeal to Muslims to enter Islam as *kaffah* (to enter Islam comprehensively), as stated in the Quran (2: 208). Thus, Islam cannot only be one thing, a religious object. It is not merely a system of beliefs and practices but many systems in an unceasing flux of development. It also changes the relations to evolving historical situations (Adams 1976, 29-31).

Historically speaking, when one generation of Muslim has departed from modes of behavior and ways of thinking that already established in its community, the succeeding generations usually extend this legitimacy. However, in recent times, Islamic world has faced painful dilemma posed by the modernity and its own failure of the dynamics, which at the same time do not compromise with Muslim senses of identity, special destiny, and precise life under the law of God. Later, Khaled Abou El-Fadl says, Islamic purification movements are emerged out of modernity as the reaction against modernity itself (El-Fadl 2005, 10-11).

Approaches to Islam can be divided into two major kinds, normative and descriptive. The normative approach can be categorized into three

kinds: (1) the traditional missionary approach, (2) the Muslim apologetic approach, and (3) the irenic approach. Islamic purification movements can be based on the second approach, which is the Muslim apologetic approach. Charles Adams states that: "Apologetics has been one of the principal devices by which the community has met its need for reassurance and asserted the capability of Islam to carry the Muslims into a bright new age." One of the important influences of apologetic approach is their evocation of Muslim identity with Islam and the creation of a strong pride in their religious, intellectual, and cultural heritage (Adams 1976, 34-37).

The discussion about transnational phenomena cannot be separated with globalization. Globalization can be simply defined as the intensification of global interconnections. According to David Harvey, "globalization principally is a manifestation of changing experience of time and space. Globalization is intimately linked with the intensification and speeding up of time-space compression in economic and social life." According to Anthony Giddens, "globalization is the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa" (Inda and Rosaldo 2000, 4).

From the viewpoint of social movements, globalization offers contradictory possibilities. On the one hand, globalization enables social movements directing their resources toward international linkages and partnerships that can diminish movement autonomy in their home country. On the other hand, globalization has provided social movements with new possible significant opportunities and resources. Globalization can modify and amplify the ability of social movements to frame their claims beyond territorial borders and to obtain resources from abroad. Globalization then brings social movements together across borders in a transnational public sphere, in which they contest and learn from each other. Transnational public sphere offers a place where forms of organization and tactics for

collective action can be transmitted across the globe. It is the medium through which various forms of collective action and social movements become “modular” and transferable to distant locations. It also provides the space where material resources can be developed and distributed across national boundaries (Guidry et.al. 2000, 1-7).

Globalization also raises the idea of “deterritorialization” and “reterritorialization” of culture as its consequences. In a more specific term, “deterritorialization” of culture means “the dislodging of cultural subjects and objects from particular fixed locations in space and time”, and “reterritorialization” of culture means “the process of reproducing culture in new space-time contexts, of relocating it in specific cultural environment.” Globalization has radically pulled cultures apart from their place. It has visibly dislodged from particular locales. It illustrates how people, or cultural subjects, traverse national boundaries, a process that brings cultures, formerly located in different parts of the world, into the same physical terrains and turns numerous places into spaces of cultural juxtaposition and mixture. It highlights how images drift easily across the globe, allowing an increasing number of viewers to participate in the imagined realities of other culture. It is a world where cultural subjects and objects no longer depend on particular localities (Inda and Rosaldo 2000, 11-12).

This discourse brings the increased global movement as a process of cultural imposition and dominance. The significance of this pattern of domination leads to the homogenization of the world. It leads to the increasing elimination of cultural difference in the world and, hence, to the crescent production of world sameness. It is the form in which the traffic in culture moves primarily in one direction, usually from the center (the West or the first world) to the rest or the periphery (the third world). Hannerz states, “Peripheral culture will step by step assimilate more and more of the imported meanings and forms, becoming gradually

indistinguishable from the center.” More comprehensive examples are stated by John Tomlinson, “globalization is the installation worldwide of western versions of basic social-cultural reality: the West’s epistemological and ontological theories, its values, ethical systems, technical-scientific worldview, political culture, and so on.” (Inda and Rosaldo 2000, 13-15).

Islamic Puritanism Movements in Indonesia

The first important period of Islamic puritanism movement in Indonesia is the Padri movement in Minangkabau, West Sumatra. It began in 1803, when three *ulamas* came back from *hajj* pilgrimage from Mecca. They were Haji Piobang, Haji Sumanik, and under the leadership of Haji Miskin from Pandai Sikek. With their experience in Mecca and Arab in general, they had already seen how the Wahabist movement doing purification in Mecca and Arabia in general. They had already seen the religious violence done by Wahabists to purify Islamic teaching. Indeed, Wahabists even sacrificed Muslims if they thought that the Muslims’ Islamic belief was no longer pure and clean, as mentioned in Quran and Sunnah (Navis 1984, 30).

The Wahabist movement in Arab inspired the aforementioned Padri *ulamas* to do Islamic purification in Minangkabau. They thought that the Islamic condition in Minangkabau was no longer pure and clean since it was still mixed with *adat* teaching and other teachings from other religions and beliefs. They also thought that *tasawwuf* (Islamic mysticism) was not a pure form of Islamic teaching because it conducted the rituals that were not mentioned in the Quran and Sunnah. Therefore, they condemned *tasawwuf* teaching as *bid’ah* (heresy), and must be purified. Inspired from Wahabism in Mecca, Padri *ulamas* urged Minangkabau Islamic communities to return to pure Islamic teachings which do not mixed with superstition, heresy, or myth. This purification movement then turned into radical movement, with the duty of differentiating the faithful and the unfaithful as well as

proposing for *jihad* (holy war) against those who did not follow the call of purification.

Padri *ulamas* believed that in Minangkabau Islamic communities, especially among the followers of *thariqa* (Sufi orders), many of religious practices were considered as superstition, heresy, and myth. Thus, the practices were in conflict with the basic principles of Islam and needed to be “purified” even it can be attacked with violence, if required. The Padri’s movement in conducting the purification of Islam in Minangkabau, therefore, arouse long-term conflict between Padri *ulamas* and its proponents against traditional the *ulamas*, the *adat* leaders, the royal members of Pagarruyung, and the followers of *thariqa* (Navis 1984, 31).

The second period of Islamic Puritanism movement in Minangkabau occurred in the early 20th century, precisely around 1906, when four Minangkabau *ulamas* returned from Mecca after several years studying Islam. These four *ulamas* were Haji Muhammad Jamil Jambek from Bukittinggi, Haji Muhammad Taib Umar from Sungayang, Batusangkar, Haji Abdullah Ahmad from Padang Panjang, and Haji Abdul Karim Amrullah (also known as Buya Hamka) from Maninjau. The movement of the four *ulamas* above was also known as “*Kaum Mudo*” reformists’ movement because, at that time, they were young and ambitious to make a change and purification to Islam after they came back from their study in Mecca. These four reformist *ulamas* proposed criticism, especially on Sufi and mysticism practices, that were followed by much of the Minangkabau population. They believed that the practices were not compatible to Islam, and they were very proactive in inviting the followers of *thariqa* to abandon their religious practices and come back to the “pure” Islamic teachings. Because the *ulamas* that defended Sufi and traditional practices were old, and the *ulamas* who renounced them were all young, then the names “*Kaum Tuo*” and “*Kaum Mudo*” came up. Therefore, the conflicts arouse during their movements were called as the conflict between “*Kaum Mudo*” against “*Kaum Tuo*” (Fathurrahman 2007).

The next period of Islamic puritanism movement in Indonesia in the beginning of 20th century was marked by the emergence of formal organizations and movements. In the historical period of Indonesia, this period is known as the resurgence period, due to the raise of many organizations as the tools to struggle against colonialism and cultivate nationalism. The Islamic puritanism movement then was more organized and formal in character under Islamic organizations. Among other Islamic organizations, the Islamic puritanism campaign was intensively conducted by Muhammadiyah, al-Irsyad, and Persis (*Persatuan Islam*).

Muhammadiyah is one of the great Islamic organizations that has important role for the development of Islam in Indonesia until recent days. Muhammadiyah was founded by K.H. Ahmad Dahlan in Yogyakarta on 18 November 1912. The founding of this organization was suggested by his pupils and colleagues in Budi Utomo to establish an institution with permanent character to facilitate his thought and movement. The aims of the organization are to spread Islam among population and to promote religious life among its members. For these purposes, the movement was done by establishing educational institutions to avoid the fate of the traditional *pesantren*, which often had to be closed down following the death of the *kyai* (leader). The other efforts were done by publishing books, newspapers, and periodicals.

Ahmad Dahlan spent about three years for studying Islam in Mecca, and one of his teachers was Syekh Ahmad Khatib. After his return to Yogyakarta, he had already influenced with reform and purification ideas. He proposed the need for abandoning traditions, which in his views were not in line with Islam. He also began to change the direction of prayer (*kiblat*) in several mosques directly to Mecca, which in general was pointed to the west. He even wanted to change the direction of prayer in Sultan's mosque also but he failed to do it. Later, only after he succeeded his father as *khatib* (preacher) of Sultan's mosque, he finally made it happen (Noer 1973, 74).

The important element of Muhammadiyah is *Majelis Tarjih* (The Council of Opinions), which established based on the decision of organization congress in Pekalongan in 1927. The function of this council was to issue *fatwa* or *hukum* (religious judgment) of particular questions or problems on which Muslims were uncertain. The problems did not necessarily concern with rituals or religious practices but also with non-religious problems, although all judgments should be based on the *syari'ah* (Islamic law). The decisions of the council would be considered as a guide for the leaders and the members of Muhammadiyah. One of the *fatwa* that is obviously dominated by purification movement is the *fatwa* to fight against "TBC" (*Takhayul, Bid'ah, Churafat*—Superstition, Heresy, Myth), which are considered as "contaminate" the faith of Muslims. Islam, therefore, must be cleaned and purified from those elements, and returned back to its pure teaching based on Quran and Sunnah (Noer 1973, 74).

The second organization, al-Irsyad, was founded by Syekh Ahmad Soorkati, an Arabic descendant originated from Sudan. At first, he arrived in Indonesia as the member of Jami'at Khair, the organization that founded by Arabians in Indonesia. However, he did not agree with the discrimination of Sayyid (direct descendant of Prophet) and non-Sayyid within it. He then resigned from Jami'at Khair and found al-Irsyad in 1913. As formal organization, al-Irsyad got legal recognition by Dutch government in 1915. Al-Irsyad emphasized on education as its field operation. At first, it concentrated on Arab communities in Indonesia but later it gradually expanded its movement to broader scope to other Muslim communities in Indonesia.

In its development, the leaders of al-Irsyad became more acquainted with the writings of Muhammad Abduh, an Egyptian reformist theologian, on his view of education. In 1938 for example, they underlined that education for children must be placed on the instructions in *tauhid* (basic theology), *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence), and Islamic history. The idea of

purification expressed in their statement that education is a preparation to respond the 'call of God to sacrifice body and soul without any hesitation'. Education was viewed as 'character formation', 'will formation', and training for 'devotion to duty' (Noer 1973, 65).

The next organization is Persatuan Islam (Persis), founded in the early 1920s in Bandung by Haji Zamzam and Haji Muhammad Yunus. Zamzam had spent around three years in Mecca to study Islam in the Dar al-Ulum institution while Muhammad Yunus had mastered Arabic thoroughly and received intensive religious education. The concern of Persis to disseminate its ideas was held by holding public meetings, *tabligh*, sermons, study groups, and publishing books, pamphlets, and periodicals. Unlike the other organizations, Persis seemed to enjoy public debates and polemics. Therefore, they put more concern with publishing and non-formal public meetings rather than establishing schools and Islamic educations (Noer 1973, 90).

One of the main figures of Persis is Ahmad Hassan. Both Hassan and Zamzam were campaigned to combat *bid'ah* practices in Muslim communities. The practice of Islam should be based on the Quran and Hadits. Hassan was condemned the practice of taking *usalli* in the *shalat* (prayer) that usually took by the adherents of Nahdlatul Ulama. His statement was based on his re-examination of the Quran and Hadith which did not give him any evidence for *usalli* practice. It is merely an innovation by *ulamas* that could not be derived by the two sources of law, and, therefore, the practice of taking *usalli* must be abolished because it is *bid'ah* (Noer 1973, 87).

In the New Order era, Islamic puritanism movements in Indonesia seemed to "go underground" because of the oppression of the regime toward these movements. Formal organizations should accept Pancasila as the only basic principle for their movements, including Islamic organization. The regime also employed "tight control" to the activities of

the organizations. Islamic puritanism movements in Indonesia rose again with the emergence of “radical-conservative” Islamic organizations in the late of 20th century, precisely after the fall of the New Order regime in 1998. These movements were proliferated as a consequence of the elimination of the oppression toward Islamic movements and organizations done by the New Order. In the New Order period, Islamic movements were considered as serious threat and hazard, both ideologically and politically. Islamic movements were then viewed as political threat and enemy. Thus, the New Order government commonly called the Islamic movements as “*ekstrem kanan*” (the right extreme), and compared them with communism, which was called as “*ekstrem kiri*” (the left extreme).

Syafi'i Anwar called these new movements as Radical Conservative Islam (RCI) because their movements were based on literal, strict, and exclusive interpretation of holy texts. Syafi'i Anwar pointed the main characteristics of RCI movements as follows: (1) They commit to the “*syari'ah* mindset”, that everything must be ruled under *syari'ah* to show the comprehensiveness of Islam, as stated in the verse “enter into Islam comprehensively (*kaffah*)”; (2) They tend to develop anti-pluralism agenda because Islam is the only truth, while others are regarded as untruthful and thus means infidels. Muslims who concern on pluralism ideas then can be categorized as *syirk* (close to infidels); (3) they have a different interpretation of *jihad*. They interpret *jihad* as war against non-Muslims to maintain religion of Allah. Therefore, jihad is combined with violence; (4) they have a strong belief that Muslims are victims. In conspiracy theory, they fell that others (especially Christians and Jews) have an agenda to eliminate Islam. Thus, Muslims become victims or, at least, the target of potential offensive (Anwar 2007, 188-189).

Some organizations that can be categorized as RCI movements are Majelis Mujahiddin Indonesia (MMI) and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). The most important agenda they shared is “*syariahization*” of

Indonesia, which often manipulates religious sentiments or politicizes issues appealing for ordinary and public support of the Muslims. Among those organizations, the appeal to abolish Indonesia as nation-state and return to *kebilafah Islamiyah* (Islamic imperium), or at least Islamic state, was intensively campaigned by MMI and HTI. Beside manifested in those organizations, the ideology of Radical Conservative Islam is also permeated to Islamic political parties proliferated after the fall of the New Order regime. One of Islamic political parties that are strongly imbued with this ideology is Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) that always proposes *syari'ah* to be the official law in Indonesia. However, they do not operate this agenda by conducting direct action like other organizations but by using democracy mechanism as the members of the parliament.

These Radical Islamic groups believe that *syari'ah* is the only solution in solving multi-dimensional crisis in Indonesia, such as economic crisis, weak state, uncertain political condition, and lack of law enforcement. They propagate that *syari'ah* is not only able to solve the problems. They believe that *syari'ah* is also able to create a better future for Indonesia. However, the bigger problem is that they often carry out violence and, therefore, cause victims in the demanding of the implementation of *syari'ah* as official law in Indonesia, both from the fellow Muslims or non-Muslims. Consequently, this agenda is not only upsetting non-Muslim communities but also worrying the majority of moderate Muslims (Anwar 2007, 187; Kafid 2016; Mudhoffir 2017; Rahman 2017).

Islamic Puritanism Movements as Transnational Movements

Transnational perspective tries to look at all aspects of social life simultaneously and understand how they mutually inform each other across nation borders. Islamic puritanism movements in Indonesia can also be seen based on this perspective. It is especially true based on the statement of Syafi'i Anwar: "The radical Islamic groups transform religio-political thoughts from Middle East, especially ideology of radical *salafism*". This

statement is confirmed in Abdurrahman Wahid's book: *"Ilusi Negara Islam: Ekspansi Gerakan Islam Transnasional di Indonesia"* (The Illusion of Islamic State: The Expansion of Transnational Islamic Movements in Indonesia), in which it describes the thrust and penetration of transnational Islamic movements to Indonesia (Wahid 2009).

The influence of foreign ideas, organizations, and movements are clearly shown in Islamic puritanism movements in Indonesia, even since its first form in the Padri movement in Minangkabau, West Sumatra. All of the pioneers of Padri movement were *hajjis*, means Muslims who came back from pilgrimage in Mecca, and usually they also spent several periods there studying Islam under prominent figures. However, it had been stated that they were much influenced by Wahabist's ideology and movement in Arab when they conducted purification. The Wahabist's movement and ideology were inspired the *hajjis* to do the same purification in their homeland in Minangkabau. In the second period, it also began with the similar event, with the arrival of four young *hajjis* from their pilgrimage and study in Mecca. The *hajjis* did the same thing as their predecessors to make purification movement in Minangkabau.

The strong influence of ideas and movements from outside can also be clearly seen in the later period of Islamic puritanism movements in Indonesia with the emergence of Islamic organizations. Most of the founders of organizations spent several years in Mecca to learn about Islam. Some of the examples are KH Ahmad Dahlan, the founder of Muhammadiyah, and Haji Zamzam, the founder of Persis. Moreover, al-Irsyad was founded by an Arab, Syekh Ahmad Soorkati, from Sudan. From these facts, it can be inferred that the teachings, ideas, and movements from Arab were strongly influenced the founding fathers of those organizations. Indeed, they practiced these ideas to the members of their organizations and to Indonesian Muslims in general.

Those influences cannot be separated from the role of Mecca and Medina (Haramayn—the two *harams*) as the center of Islam which are not

only used as places for worshipping and pilgrimage but also for education and studying Islam. Haramayn becomes the center of Islamic intellectuals and education, as well as the “melting pot” for Muslim scholars from around the world. The influence of Haramayn as the center of Islam to Indonesia began at the 16th and 17th century. Then, it becomes intensively developed in the later centuries. For Indonesian people at that time, studying Islam at Haramayn was more prestigious and gave more values rather than any other places. Consequently, the alumni of Haramayn also got more respect and honor rather than anyone else. Therefore, it is no surprise that the influence of Middle East, especially Haramayn, is undoubtedly strong toward the Islamic movements in Indonesia (Azra 1994, 59; Suharto 2017).

These strong influences can also be called as hegemony due to the domination of Middle Eastern ideologies, supports, and even finance toward Indonesian Islamic movements. Transnational relation and network between Middle East and Indonesia are the dominant relation, in which the Islamic movements in Indonesia are merely as the extension of the Middle East movements. Middle East as the center then dominates other regions as its peripheries, including Indonesia. This is precisely what Ina and Rosaldo proposed as the relation in globalization. They state that global movement can be a process of cultural imposition and dominance. It is the form in which the traffic in culture moves primarily in one direction, usually from the center (the dominant) to the rest or the periphery. They also worry that this pattern of domination leads to the homogenization of the world. It leads to the increasing elimination of cultural difference in the world and, hence, to the production of world sameness.

The hegemony and domination of Middle East ideology and movements did not only happen in the past. Wahid describes how this domination of ideology and movement expanded and infiltrated Islamic elements in Indonesia so that they threatened the diversity and the richness of the local nuances of Islam in Indonesia. The ideology of

Middle East forces Islam Indonesia to be unified under their monopoly of interpretation, which they called as purification movement. This movement is actually a political expansion to compel their influence and ideology toward Indonesian Muslims, who are actually already diverse in its essence. They always compell others—either Muslims or non-Muslims—in the name of Islam, whereas in Islam, it is stated that there is no compelling (*laa ikraba fi al-diin*—there is no compulsion in religion) (QS 2: 256).

Indeed, the Islamic purification movements in Indonesia are not only influenced by the ideology and the movements from Middle East. The purification movements are the extension and the expansion of Middle Eastern movements that are transformed and infiltrated to Islam in Indonesia. Wahid then describes the development of Islamic movements in Middle East and how it expands and spreads all over the world, including Indonesia as its periphery. Among other movements, the most influential and intensive movements from Middle East are Wahabism, originated from Saudi Arabia, Hizbut Tahrir from Jordan, and Ikhwanul Muslimin (Muslim Brotherhood) from Egypt. These organizations have affiliations in Indonesia to perform their agenda (Wahid 2009, 77-78).

In Indonesia, Wahabism is adopted and developed by some Islamic movements, such as by Majelis Mujahiddin Indonesia (MMI). Hizbut Tahrir even makes its branch in Indonesia with the name Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). Meanwhile, Ikhwanul Muslimin movement in Indonesia is transformed into *tarbiyah* movement, which becomes the ideological basis for Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS). Even in the Middle East itself, Wahabism and Ikhwanul Muslimin have had a hand-in-hand cooperation, since 1960's, to perform their agenda and to reach their goal. Wahid calls this cooperation as a “marriage between Ikhwanul Muslimin and Wahabism.” In this cooperation, Wahabi provides financial support based on Saudi's capital, while Ikhwanul Muslimin has many militants and educated ideologists (Wahid 2009, 82-83).

Meanwhile, Hizbut Tahrir decides to go with its own movement. Hizbut Tahrir thinks that the two other movements (Wahabism and Ikhwanul Muslimin) are “less radical” because those two are too moderate and too accommodative to the Western. Therefore, Hizbut Tahrir proclaims and establishes its own movements. The situation in the Middle East strongly influences and even determines the situation in Indonesia. The movements also want to expand and proliferate the ideology as wide as possible around the world, including in Indonesia. Therefore it expands its movement by establishing branches and cells to reach its goals in Indonesia, that is to make *syari’ah* as the official law and finally to “convert” Indonesia into Islamic state (Wahid 2009, 85; Hoesein 2017; Stopler 2017; Long 2017).

These radical movements frighten the non-Muslims as well as the Muslims in Indonesia because they may threaten the diversity of the religious beliefs and the harmony of the religious life in Indonesia. In order to prevent and avoid the adverse influence of these radical Islam movements, the two biggest Islamic organizations in Indonesia, Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), have issued their official statements. Muhammadiyah has issued an official letter no.149/KEP/I.0/B/2006 stating the instructions to clean Muhammadiyah from the infiltrations and elements of Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS). Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), via its Center Board of NU (PBNU), has also issued the document of the warning and rejection of the ideology and movements of transnational extremists (Wahid 2009, 239-251). Based on this description, we are then already convinced those Islamic puritanism movements in Indonesia are the extension of Middle Eastern radical Islamic movements, and with their compulsion to implement *syari’ah* as official law, it is dangerous and threatening for the harmony of religiosity in Indonesia.

Conclusion

Islamic puritanism movements in Indonesia are actually part of the transnational movements. In the beginning, in the era of the Padri

movement in West Sumatra, transnational phenomena can be identified as the transformation of thoughts, ideologies, and values, by the return of some *Hajis* from Mecca who implemented purification movements. Later, in the emergence of organizations period, the transformation is not only in ideology and values but also in the form of organization and its strategy. In recent times, transnational phenomena are more obvious. Islamic purification movements in Indonesia are the extension of the movements in the Middle East, with the full support of financial supply, assistance, and strategy.

Islamic purification movements in Indonesia can be categorized as early purification movements in the late of 19th century and in the beginning of 20th century; and recent purification movements in the late of 20th century and in the beginning of 21st century. The difference is that the early purification movement wanted to clean or purify Islamic practices from traditional and local practices or beliefs. Meanwhile, the recent purification movements want to implement *syari'ah* or Islamic law as their purest form of the official law in Indonesia. The recent purification movements also have an agenda to abolish nation-state and return to *khilafah Islamiyah*, or at least, to change Indonesia to be an Islamic state.

It should be admitted also the phenomena of Islamic puritanism movements in Indonesia cannot be separated from the strong influence or the hegemony of the Middle East. The ideas of purification, organizations and strategies, financial supports, and the ways the movements perform their agenda are based on the Middle East. All Islamic purification movements in Indonesia have relations or connections with the Middle East. Moreover, the recent movements merely become the extension organizations of their center in the Middle East. Therefore, it also shows the hegemony of the Middle East toward Indonesia in Islamic puritanism movements as transnational phenomena.

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