



The Unholy Alliance of Islamic Populism and Political Entrepreneur in Jakarta Election: The Aftermath Implications

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Abstract

In the early years of Reform Era, Islam in Indonesia was portrayed as the representation of moderate Islam. While some scholars argue that Islam in Indonesia has strong ties with religious commodification. Indonesia also often presented as the best practice where Islam could work with democracy. At that time, even Islamist groups were never really considered as a real threat to Indonesian democracy, mainly because their activities were mostly described as fragmented and sporadic. In that context, the Jakarta election brings new dynamic as part of the discussion on Islamization in Indonesia after the fall of the New Order. The blasphemy case of Ahok has become a trigger for a series of demonstration that illustrates the strength of political Islam ideology in shaping current Indonesian public sphere. To discuss these recent developments the article revisits the discourse of Islamization in Indonesia. We argue that intertwine between commodification of religious symbols, the use of new media, and political interest serves as the background of the unholy alliances between religious elites and political entrepreneurs in Jakarta election. As a consequence, the event of the Jakarta election has become a critical juncture where the emergence of Islamic populism has threatened both the notion of Indonesian democracy and the existence of moderate Moslem as well.

Keywords: Islamic populism, Jakarta election, Islamization, blasphemy

Abstrak

Pada era awal reformasi, Islam di Indonesia digambarkan sebagai representasi Islam moderat. Sementara beberapa cendekiawan berpendapat bahwa Islam di Indonesia memiliki ikatan yang kuat dengan komodifikasi agama. Indonesia juga sering ditampilkan sebagai praktik terbaik di mana Islam dapat kompatibel dengan demokrasi. Saat itu, bahkan kelompok Islamis pun tidak pernah benar-benar dianggap sebagai ancaman nyata bagi demokrasi Indonesia, terutama karena aktivitas mereka kebanyakan digambarkan terfragmentasi dan sporadis. Dalam konteks itu, Pilkada Jakarta membawa dinamika baru sebagai bagian dari pembahasan Islamisasi di Indonesia pasca tumbanganya Orde Baru. Kasus penistaan agama Ahok menjadi pemicu serangkaian aksi unjuk rasa yang menggambarkan kekuatan ideologi politik Islam dalam membentuk ruang publik Indonesia saat ini. Untuk membahas perkembangan terakhir, artikel ini meninjau kembali wacana Islamisasi di Indonesia. Kami berpendapat bahwa jalinan antara komodifikasi simbol agama, penggunaan media baru, dan kepentingan politik menjadi latar belakang aliansi tidak suci antara elit agama dan pengusaha politik di Pilkada Jakarta. Akibatnya, peristiwa Pilkada Jakarta menjadi titik kritis di mana munculnya populisme Islam telah mengancam gagasan demokrasi Indonesia dan keberadaan Muslim moderat.

Kata kunci: populisme Islam, Pilkada Jakarta, Islamisasi, penistaan

Introduction

The recent Jakarta gubernatorial election has opened many eyes toward the capacity of mobilized Islamic groups in politic. The scale of support toward 212 and other series of demonstrations illustrated how far the reach Islamization in Indonesia on the public sphere. Before 212 rallies, scholars have long noticed the process of Islamization in Indonesia that has been growing since the fall of New Order regime, whether from historical, social, policies, and popular cultures such as film, radio, television and on publications (Nilan, 2006; Jones, 2007; Hasan, 2009; Smith-Hefner 2007; Fealy and Sally, 2008; Ricklefs, 2012; Bruinessen, 2013). However, the growing trend of Islamization was not perceived as a direct threat toward democracy, mainly since Islamist groups seems fragmented and sporadic (Hadiz, 2016). On the other hand, cultural analysis on the presence of Islamic symbols on public sphere shows how capitalism and popular culture industries have created the kind of Islam

that is interpreted individually, hence there were relatively little interests to project pietism into the political arena (Heryanto, 2014).

In that context, the Jakarta election and events surrounding it could be presented as a counterpoint of the theses that perceive this Islamization trend as a non-threatening event toward Indonesian democracy. The case of the Jakarta election has shown that the presence of political entrepreneurs with ethnic and religious sentiments has enabled the conservative religious groups to articulate themselves more freely in public space. This situation is not just dangerous for the moderate status of Islam in Indonesia that has been promoted by Muhammadiyah and NU, but also threatened the future of tolerance and diversity has been long perceived as integral values for Indonesian society.

The article proposes two related questions to discuss this current development; what kind of contexts and factors that led to the growing Islamic populism post-New Order era? What are the implications of the unholy alliance between Islamic populism and political entrepreneur within the context of intertwining between capitalism and new media? This article then posits that during the Jakarta election process, conservative groups of political Islam have expanded their influence on Indonesian politics by making the unholy alliance with political entrepreneurs. This alliance is only possible within the several specific contexts. The first context would be the ongoing process of Islamization in Indonesia since the fall of New Order, which in recent years has turned into more conservative outlook. The second context is the intense interest of political entrepreneurs to defeat Ahok in Jakarta election, which was considered as a hard task since prior to the election, polls show that he has strong support from Jakarta's citizen. The significance of Jakarta's governor is considered by many political actors to be very critical because the previous precedent where Jokowi used it as a stepping stone for presidential seat in 2014. The third important context would be the exploitation of new media to spread

identity-based political propaganda by conservative groups to amplify their existence and influence on the public sphere.

These contexts thus led to 212 rally and following events which affected not just Indonesian political outlook, but also the face of Islam in Indonesia. On Indonesian outlook, Jakarta's election has paved a new precedent for the systematic use of religio-ethnic hate as part of political propaganda. At the same time, political Islam figures have successfully used the mobilization on Jakarta election to bring themselves into the epicenter of Indonesian politics. Hence, whether at the local or national level it is not possible anymore for Indonesian politicians to neglect religious discourses. Finally, the Jakarta election also changed the landscape of Indonesian Islam. Whereas previously Indonesian Islam has been portrayed to be moderate and tolerant, the data shows that the notion of tolerant Islam in Indonesia might be on its demise.

These arguments thus will be elaborated into three sections. The first argument is the elaboration of scholar's perspectives on series of mass mobilizations and where this article situates analytical position within those debates. Second, we will discuss the development of Indonesian Islam after the fall of New Order which from it emerged various interpretations of Islam expressed through popular cultures and new media. The third chapter will discuss dynamics on how the previous election has become an arena for the unholy alliance between religious clerics and political predator. Moreover, the last section will also elaborate the aftermath implications of Jakarta election which implicates not only Indonesian politics but also the notion of tolerance for Indonesian Islam as well.

Important Contexts related 212 and Other Demonstrations

In regards to demonstrations, there are at least five contexts that are proposed by scholars who study Indonesia and political Islam. Some

of the analysis intersect with each other but still very useful for us to comprehend the causes and implications of these events. The first analysis focuses on the fragmentation of the religious authority. As pointed out by Najib Burhani (2018), despite an official statement from leaders of Muhammadiyah and NU not to join the rally, there are plenty of members from both organizations that were involved in the rallies. It is crucial facts that are needed to be the highlight because both organizations are the largest Islamic organization in Indonesia, thus often regarded as the representatives of Indonesian Islam in general. The fact that we found official statements spoken by Haedar Nasir (Head of Muhammadiyah) and Said Agil Siradj (Head of NU) were ignored by many of their members. In stark contrast, on the rallies, the very same members who ignored direct statements from their leaders joined the crowd that was led by new religious authorities such as Rizieq Shihab, Abdullah Gymnastiar, Arifin Ilham, and Bachtiar Nasir. Based on these findings, Najib posits that those events demonstrated that the influence of established organizations such as Muhammadiyah and NU is contested by the more recent stream of Islamic groups.

The demise of religious authority from NU and Muhammadiyah will not be possible without the second context, which is the weakening position of moderate groups within the body of those organizations itself. While traditionally both organizations are recognized for its relatively modest status (theologically and politically), NU and Muhammadiyah members have never been monolithic as an organization. Internally, each of those organizations had experiences on having members that developed the broad spectrum of Islamic interpretations. NU, for example, is a large organization who have a figure such as Gus Dur (often dubbed as liberal by his critics) that promoted inclusion and tolerance toward minority ethnic or religious groups. At the same time, this organization also has Ma'ruf Amin who throughout the years actively contributed on producing conservative

fatwa whether regarding minority religious groups such as Shia or even political case as exemplified by Ahok's blasphemy law. Nevertheless, the diversity of these Islamic interpretations within NU and Muhammadiyah are under threat in recent years, mainly because the leanings toward conservative groups are getting stronger. As also pointed out by Burhani in the case of Muhammadiyah, the presence of conservative groups within the organization has become more visible in the past few years of development (Burhani, 2013). The rise of a conservative figure like Ma'ruf Amin as Rais Aam (one among the three most important positions at NU) also signaled how the similar process is also happening to the organization. Arifianto (2018) also noticed the tendency mainly looking from the rise of conservative clerics such as Abdul Somad within NU.

During the Jakarta election, the contestation between the conservative camp and the progressive camp became even more apparent. Influential figures from NU and Muhammadiyah positioned themselves on a different side on the alleged religious blasphemy case by Ahok, which also related to the support of political candidates. Followers from both organizations were located in between debates by these figures from each respective organization. For Muhammadiyah, Amien Rais, Dien Syamsuddin, Syafii Maarif, (all of them once the head of Muhammadiyah) voiced different and often contradictory statements on these events. Comparable to their Muhammadiyah counterparts, Ma'ruf Amin and Said Agil also stand in different position despite both of them held an official position at their organization. Nevertheless, on public and mass media the voice of conservative camp gained much broader attention and coverage, which might also be taken as an indicator of the change that is happening on those two respective organizations.

The third context that could explain the emergence of two rallies in the aftermath of the 2014 Indonesian presidential election is the anti-Tionghoa propaganda that was also massively exploited. While both

demonstrations were triggered by the demand for government to imprison Ahok for his alleged blasphemous act, these events were driven by more profound collective imagination as which includes the sense of threatened and marginalization. As posited by Appadurai (1996), the projection of imagination has the capabilities to move people toward action to gain their goals. While the sense of threatened and marginalization caused by the presence Tionghoa ethnic group is not new, the political status of Ahok as the incumbent governor in the area as crucial as Jakarta set the new precedent. Furthermore, his direct style of communication also often exacerbated those sentiments among religious groups. In this regard, the imprisonment of Ahok was perceived as a way to prevent the expanding influence of Tionghoa ethnic group within the Indonesian political arena and reduce their sense of marginalization. Empirically, this sentiment toward the ethnicity of Ahok is proven to be more influential than religious factor among voters not to vote him in Jakarta election as demonstrated by Sumaktoyo (2017) in his research.

The fourth important context that relates to the rallies was the presence of participants that perceive their act as part of being a pious Moslem. Early observations on the demonstrations would give an impression that these movements are represented by conservative groups, as shown as the dominant presence of hardliner groups such as FPI. Nevertheless, to portray the whole participants of 212 and 411 rallies with the broad-brush intolerant label would be misleading. Many participants join the demonstrations because they genuinely believed that Ahok comments on Quran were offensive to Islam. In this context, being part of the rallies in itself was considered a religious act and integral part of duties as Moslem to defend their religion. However, despite the participation in these rallies, these groups of people do not necessarily provide the same support toward other conservative agenda such as sharia law or caliphate political system. During his observation, Fealy noted the separation of

these supports. When the rally leaders shouted the imprisonment of Ahok, many crowds chanted, “capture, capture, capture!” When the same leaders yelled that Islamic law is more significant than Indonesian law, the same crowds went silent (Fealy, 2016).

Aside from the local contexts, some scholars also located these movements into the fifth context which is as part of the growing populism all over the world (e.g.: Brexit, Duterte, and Trump). The rise of populism in the political arena is related to the increasing dissatisfaction with the political establishment. The dissatisfaction itself could be explained by various factors ranging from economic problems to the dysfunctional formal political channel, but local factors differentiate each of these populism trends with one another. In the case of Indonesia, Perdana (2017) argues that the rise of recent religious populist leaders was enabled due to the extended absence of leftist movement in Indonesia. In many instances of populism, the binary opposition exploited by populist leaders is ordinary people versus political or business elites. The theme of exploitation by elites toward familiar people is also the central theme on Leftist groups. Thus it is common for Leftist political leaders to rise in that kind of platform, as exemplified by Chavez in Venezuela. However, in Indonesia and many Islamic countries, the Leftist movement has been absent for a long time. Therefore, instead of using the term ‘people’ many Islamic populist leaders rise with the concept of the ummah (Hadiz, 2016).

In comparison to the term ‘people,’ this concept of ummah enabled religious populist leaders to mobilize multi-class alliances. Both Perdana (2017) and Hadiz (2018) discussed that this historical background could help explain the rise of Rizieq Shihab as a populist Islamic leader despite not being part of political parties in Indonesia. Furthermore, specific to Indonesia under Jokowi, Mietzner (2016) also pointed out how despite relatively succeed on consolidated his powers with parties a parliament, Jokowi has failed to institutionalize his oppositions (mostly Islamic

groups) within the formal political structure. Hence, leaders from Islamic groups have more reason to mobilize movements to oppose the current government under the banner of ummah interest.

While these explanations have addressed various aspects of the background and events related to a series of demonstrations, the discussion on how new media is employed and its enmeshment with Islamic popular culture is quite nascent. Aside from that, with the exception study by Assyaukanie (2017), Mietzner and Muhtadi (2018), the encounter between political predatory and conservative Islamic groups in the Jakarta election through the Islamic mobilization is still has plenty of room to be explored, In this regard, this paper argues that both dimensions need to be discussed in order to comprehend more of the events and its implications on the face of Indonesian politics.

Islamization, Market, and the Fall of New Order

Democratic transition and decentralization in Indonesia after the fall of New Order has enabled the vacuum of power where many groups with various interests and backgrounds could promote their ideology on public space. Among those identities, Islamic symbols have become one of the most prominent that emerged. Nevertheless, it is impossible to discuss the general expression of Islamic symbols in public arena without seeing the dynamics of the relationship between New Order and Islam. Before the nineties, the New Order regime perceived groups associated with Islam as a threat to the nation. It was very apparent especially in between 1980-1989, where the government used military force to deal with different kind of Islamic political groups. The bad relationship between the state and Islamic groups is best demonstrated by Tanjung Priok (1984) and Talang Sari (1989) event (Akmaliah, 2016). However, the situation was changed not long after the latter fact. The declining economy after the fall of the oil boom in the early 1990's and the conflict between Suharto's family

with several military leaders had led Suharto to build more support from Islamic groups as the new base of his political position. Around the time, the political turn of Soeharto toward Islamic groups was publicly shown through his support to ICMI and his visit to Saudi Arabia to perform Hajj in 1991.

Within the same decade, many famous fashion designers like Alphiana Chandra, Ida Royani, and Anne Rufaidah established Islamic fashion boutique. The presence of these fashionable Islamic outlets also attracted many Indonesian female celebrities to wear hijab. Parallel to those phenomena, many Quran or Islamic learning institutions such as Executive Paramadina, Tazkiya Sejati, IIMAN, and ICNIS were established. These institutions were aimed to serve the interests of middle-class Moslem who aspire to learn more about their religion yet does not favor traditional religious education such as pesantren. Public sermons also became trend hence catapult the way for preachers like Zainuddin MZ into stardom. Flourished interests in Islam also initiated many Islamic publishing companies in big cities like Jakarta, Bandung, and Yogya. These phenomena further reinforced the theses that there were Islamization of public space in Indonesia within the last decade of New Order (Hasan, 2009: 233).

While New Order restored its ties to Islamic political groups, the television industry was also proliferated after the government permitted five private television companies to broadcast their channel. Since many of those channels had not capable of producing their program, the contents relied heavily on imported television program from US channels. In the context where society is getting Islamized, many of those programs faced criticism for not being sensitive toward Islam. One example of this situation was during the broadcast of *Work with Yan*. This program criticized because one of the scenes portrayed the actor cooking pork. Criticism toward the program was not only because pork is forbidden

in Islam, but also because the program was aired during the holy month of Ramadhan. A similar tone of criticism also directed to *Esmeralda*, a popular telenovela at that time. There were protests regarding the use of *Fatima* as a name of non-Moslem antagonist character while that name is the name of Prophet Muhammad's daughter. These two events made private television more cautious about broadcasting imported television program from the US (Rakhmani, 2016: 40).

Being situated between of secular that imported television programs and the protests from Muslim middle class, private television decided to air a sermon program, presented Quraish Shihab as Islamic scholar and teacher. Since private television at that time assumed that the program would not have many audiences, the low budget program was aired very early in the morning after *Shubuh* prayer. For seven minutes, Quraish Shihab presented various topics related to Islam. Prior to the broadcast of this program, the traditional relationship between Islamic teachers and their students were limited to the geographic boundaries. In this regard, the initiation of this television program was significant because it had negotiated those boundaries. Thus, the association tries to Islamic teachers as religious authority remained to be strong through the television sermon (Rakhmani, 2016: 41). The presence of Islamic contents on television grew even more after the fall of the New Order, mainly since producers of private TVS targeted much middle-class Muslim as their audience. Therefore, around 2000s many more Islamic television programs were aired not just during Ramadhan, but also on the rest of the months within a year. Apart from television programs, many film producers also produced many films that employed Islamic symbols as a central theme. In consequence, within the same period, "selling Islam" or the commodification of religious symbolism has become everyday life spectacles for Indonesian people (Rakhmani, 2016: 42).

In similar fashion with Islamic industry booming around the 90's, an intensive commodification of Islamic symbols could also be found on the radio broadcast, Islamic publishing, and fashion industry. On a scale that was unprecedented before, more Indonesian Muslim regarded the idea of Islamic dress code as the fundamental obligation. Whether as an effort to be pious or part of a trend, the use of hijab or even veil in public space is much more accepted than during New Order era. In the context of public sermons, following the path of Zainuddin MZ many new Islamic preachers emerge and rise to fame due to their programs in private televisions. Popular preachers such as Aa Gym, Arifin Ilham, or Mamah Dedeh has become the primary sources of Islamic knowledge for many Moslems. Unlike traditional Islamic preachers, these new preachers do not need to have an Islamic school with students to exercise their religious authority. The television program has become their school, and its viewers thus become their student. Moreover, since many of these new preachers do not have the formal religious background, their presence has challenged the traditional notion of figures who deserved to be called preacher (ustad, dai, kyai, and ulama).

While so far we have discussed Islamization on the form of commodification, there is also another aspect that emerged relatively at the same time which is the consolidation of Islamist groups. Similar to the case of Islamization, Islamist or the group that advocates Islamic law as the basis of Indonesian nation-state is not a new phenomenon. The idea of making Indonesia an Islamic state has been around since the early years of Indonesian existence. However, the fall of the New Order has enabled many Islamist groups to gain more momentum and perform their political aspiration on public spaces. Their actions usually can be separated into two aspects; the first is using organizations outside the formal political structure. Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) and Front Pembela Islam (FPI) are few among these organizations. Whereas

the first two organizations are known for their emphasis on preaching the superiority of Islamic law in comparison to Indonesian law, FPI acts more like religious vigilante groups. Under the pretext of defending Islam, FPI often forcefully sweep and raid nightclubs that are portrayed as offending the Islamic community. Some reports have posited that many of these acts could be negotiated by FPI to gain economic advancement. The second aspect that is important for Islamists is their effort to push the adoption of sharia into formal regulations. In between 2000-2009, many sharia laws were legalized in different areas in Indonesia. Among those areas are Aceh, Bulukumba, Bima, Indramayu, Cianjur, Tasikmalaya and Tangerang (Akmaliah and Pribadi, 2013: 139).

It is also important to note that the process of commodification and the rise of Islamists should not be seen as a separated process. On the contrary, both of the methods have intertwined and become the essential background to explain the supporters of demonstrations that are discussed in this paper. The discussion on this knowledge enables us to see that the participants of the series of mass mobilization are far from being monolithic. It is essential because, as also pointed out by Fealy before; to generalize the whole participants as part of the Islamists will be problematic since it does not include many varieties of political expression during the demonstrations (Fealy, 2017).

Many news outlets reported that some of the participants celebrate their participation by having selfie and upload the pictures on social media. For others, the demonstration became the opportunity for them to visit Jakarta as part of the leisure time. The illustration of these cases does not mean to portray their participation as lacking religious motivation. The point we are trying to make is that the seemingly profane motivation could intersect with sacred motivation which in this case is to defend Islam from the blasphemy words by Ahok. Thus justify the first proposition that the participants of mass mobilization cannot merely be understood within the

box of “conservative Islam.” To comprehend these cases, it is more useful to borrow the term post-Islamism which was posited by Asef Bayat. He suggested that Muslim society in the context of globalization and pressure to consume has a different kind of religious expression (Bayat, 2007). Many current Moslem has to deal with the ambivalence and contradiction where they are aspiring to be pious as regulated by Islam as the religion but at the same time want to be a part of modernity (Heryanto, 2014: 25).

In this regard, social media emerge as the new public space for Indonesian Moslem to embrace the piety and modernity simultaneously. On the one hand, it gives an opportunity to strengthen their Islamic identity through the consumption of Islamic preaching performed by popular new preachers in new media such as Youtube or Instagram. On the other hand, the enmeshment between new media and Islamic identity in Indonesia also could not be separated from the projection of hoax and hate speech. In the early period of Reformasi, Laskar Jihad already employ Internet as a means of propaganda to justify their war against Christian groups in Maluku (Brauchler, 2004: 270). On the Internet, the spread of hoax information, particularly about US conspiracy against Islam, is popular among the religious militant group in Indonesia (Lim, 2005). Nevertheless, in these recent years, hoax information is spreading outside of the small numbers of militant groups, this news also consumed by general social media user. An exemplifying case of these phenomena is the rise of Jonru as the new authority regarding Islamic information on the Internet. Barely known outside of his online activity, Jonru employed Facebook to posit his value on Indonesian politics mainly related to Islam. His bold statements, albeit often without factual basis resonated with millions of Facebook users, particularly for those who have dissatisfaction toward the government.

This kind of authority is only possible because social media allowed individuals to have significant reach out to their followers or

friends. Therefore, despite differences in economic, ideology, and political contexts that become the background of events, the emergence of social media has become more critical for recent social changes. It is a phenomenon, happening all over the world. The events of Arab Spring, Occupy Wallstreet, and the London Riot in 2011, are few of cases where the use of social media demonstrated its potentials on amplifying the level of social movement. However, as proposed in the early argument, the use of social media also brought the capacity to spread hate speech and hoax news. Aside from the earlier mentioned cases, Indonesia also witnessed the significance of social media in spreading hate speech from the alleged blasphemy case of Ahok. The news spread on the Internet triggered the incident. It was started when Islamnkri.com site uploaded a video showing Ahok talked about the use of Quran verses in politics. This video later was also uploaded to Buni Yani's Facebook account with some commentaries:

BLASPHEMY TOWARD RELIGION? "Ladies and Gentlemen (Muslim voters) are duped by verse 51 on Surah Al-Maidah (entering hell) you are also being fooled." It seems like there will be something terrible happen related to this video.

This second upload was later becoming viral on social media and was reproduced into different versions added with scary narratives designed to threaten the collective imagination of being Muslim in Indonesia. It did not take too long before the spread of this footage became the fuel that sparked an offline collective movement. At this point, the counter information regarding this video has become irrelevant. Many Moslem already regarded Ahok as a governor who did blasphemy act toward the Quran even before the trial. At the same time, the hate spreads projected from the Internet were also performed offline (Lim, 2017: 6). In this situation, many interests intersect with one another and consolidate to fulfill their political objective. Whether because of Islamist ideology,

part of the popular cultural expression, or political oppositions who want to take the seat of governor all of them joined their power to force government and imprisoned Ahok for his blasphemy crime.

The Unholy Alliances between Political Entrepreneur and Conservatives

The discussion above has shown that commodification of Islamic has enabled the rising of Islamic populism. At the same time, the Internet which was promised to open new public space has turned into a dystopian path and paved the consolidation of conservative groups in Indonesia. The intertwining of these phenomena has culminated in the series of events surrounding alleged blasphemy case of Ahok. In this regard, on the surface, the demonstration series seems purely developed by public concern related to identity attachment of being Muslim. However, comparable to similar case all around the world, the religious offense case in Jakarta is not without organized mobilization (George, 2016: 17). In this context, electoral politics is needed to be included in the analysis of 212 and other events related to Ahok blasphemy case. To comprehend the significance of electoral politics in these events, it is essential to analyze the encounter between a conservative Islamic group and political entrepreneurs that pressured the mass mobilization in the first place.

What we mean by the political entrepreneur is within the concept posited by Mark Schneider and Paul Teske (1992: 737). They define the political entrepreneur as “individuals who change the direction and flow of politics.” Since the idea was taken from the economy, they argued that political entrepreneurs also defined by their aspirations to look for profit. However, the benefit does not always necessarily limited to monetary gain like their counterpart in business. For political entrepreneurs, the effort to influence the flow in politics could mean expanding greater access in the formal political arena which could be seen in the case of DKI election.

During the Islamic mobilization which was called as Aksi Bela Islam (an Act of Islam defense), Institute for Policy Analysis and Conflict elaborated different Islamic organizations that were officially involved in the mobilization related to Ahok's alleged religious blasphemy. While officially Muhammadiyah and Nahdatul Ulama did not endorse the movement, the mass mobilization was mobilized mainly by five Islamic organizations that emerged in the post of New Order regime (IPAC, 2018: 2-4). Firstly, the Salafi-modernist network led by Bachtiar Nasir in Jakarta and Zaitun Rasmin of the Makassar-based Wahdah Islamiyah. Secondly, The FPI, directed by Habib Rizieq Shihab, a charismatic preacher of Hadrami (Yemeni) descent and other traditionalist clerics. Thirdly, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), the Indonesian branch of a transnational organization committed to the restoration of the caliphate (but deeply opposed to the ISIS version). Fourthly, Forum Umat Islam, a coalition led by Muhammad Al-Khaththath, a former HTI leader. Lastly, Urban-based zikir "councils" (majelis zikir), a form of Sufi order affiliated with charismatic preachers and sometimes with politicians seeking to boost their image with a pious middle-class constituency. These organizations do not have any parallelism in regards to historical background, the aim of organizations, or even religious practices. Nevertheless, the alleged blasphemy case of Ahok encouraged them to create an alliance.

There are at least two critical reasons why these different Islamic organizations created the alliance during 212 movement and subsequent series of mass mobilizations. First, is the figure of Ahok who bears 'double minority' status both as Chinese and Christian. Since colonial times, both of the statuses are heavily stigmatized. Chinese for a long time are stereotyped for not being perceived as 'alien' while at the same time controlling the economy of Indonesia. Ahok's gubernatorial status thus was unprecedented in the high profile area such as Jakarta and always burdened by these stereotypes. In this regard, regardless of the kind of

policies performed by Ahok his presence as Jakarta's governor was already perceived as a symbol for the further marginalization of some people in Jakarta. To the certain extent, despite showing major improvement for government transparency and public service, the accusation that Ahok's policies marginalized poor urban hold some sliver of truth. Ian Wilson has pointed out how Ahok's policies created more tension and anxieties among lower income class in Jakarta (Wilson, 2018). In Indonesia, as Hadiz has suggested, lower middle class particularly lumpenproletariat are easily tapped as part of militant Islamic organizations even long before the fall of New Order (Hadiz, 2016: 28). That is also the case in Jakarta where discontent urban poor projected their dissatisfaction within the organization such as FPI or FUI.

The existing condition thus related to the second factor, which was Jokowi's presidency that did not accommodate the aforementioned Islamic organizations. In contrast to Jokowi's position, during the SBY's administration, those Islamic groups had been accommodated socially, politically, and economically. Represented by the Surya Darma Ali as the Ministry of Religious Affairs, SBY provided proper funding for MUI as while at the same time ignored or even supported the Islamic conservative group's actions to discriminate and also attack other Islamic minority groups, particularly Ahmadiyah and Syiah (Mietzner and Muhtadi, 2018: 3). One of the reasons on why SBY accommodated the conservative groups was due to his wife background, Ani Yudhoyono which during the election in 2004 was rumored to be coming from Christian family while SBY himself lack religious background (*abangan*) (Fealy, 2016: 126). Since SBY felt of lacking religious credentials, he gave the highest Islamic authority to the Ministry of Religious Affairs which then accommodated many Islamic organizations through funding. Similar practices also commonly performed for many local governments and municipalities where local leaders would pay Islamic organizations as compensation for

their support during the local election. (Assyaukanie, 2017: 7). On the other hand, since Jokowi emphasized on infrastructure developments, many of budgets previously allocated for Islamic organizations are now replaced with social aids aimed at the general citizen.

While many Islamic organizations looked into possibilities to access political and economic resources, before the election, Ahok enjoyed relatively strong support from Jakarta citizens. With his direct style of communication, Ahok focuses on infrastructure development and bureaucracy transparency. Ahok was praised since many considered his figure as a refreshment in compared to stereotypical politicians that tend to be overly bureaucratic and corrupt. Therefore, it is not easy for any opposition in Jakarta election to propose a program that could differentiate them from Ahok and eventually gain the votes of the citizen. In this context, the mass mobilization of 212 events and its subsequent series helped them to erode the number of support for Ahok (kumparan.com, 2017). However, despite being rumored that several parties actively involved in the mass mobilization, it is hard to prove there was official support from these politicians toward 212 movements particularly in term of funding. But at the same time, the existence of funding to back the rallies was acknowledged openly by Bachtiar Natsir. Although he did not specify who are the politicians behind the finance of mass mobilizations, the number of funding which was mentioned could reach up to Rp. 100 billion. That considerable amount is unimaginable to come from the voluntary protesters that mostly consist of poor people (Assyaukanie, 2017: 8).

Whereas the smoking gun on systematic movement funding is hard to find, the support of politicians and parties toward these mobilizations are open in public. As previously discussed, the rise of Ahok's blasphemy case is within the time frame of the Jakarta local election. Two political party alliances emerged as his competitors. Agus Harimurti Yudhoyono-

Sylviana Murni is supported by four political parties which include Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP), Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB), Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN), and Demokrat Party. On the other hand, there was Anies Baswedan-Sandiago Uno which was supported by both Gerindra Party and PKS. Instead of trying to neutralize the divisive tension in society, their campaign team exploited the alleged blasphemy case by making public opinion to confirm that Ahok indeed had insulted Islam and deserve to be sentenced. At grassroots, particularly on mosques, the clerics advised public not to vote non-Muslim as the political leader. Eep Saefulloh Fatah, Anies's political consultant, even recorded on mosque advised openly on using the mosque as part of political mobilization (Tirto.id, 2017). From Agus's camp, not too long before the first mass mobilization, SBY held the press conference where he suggested Jokowi bring Ahok's case into the trial (Detik.com, 2016).

At this point, the enmeshment of interests between political entrepreneur and the conservative group is hard to separate. The use of identity politics on ethnic and religion has become more apparent in public space from the start until the end of the election. For instance, there were banners and campaign that said if Ahok's voters deceased, the body will not be prayed on (to suggest that they should not be considered as Moslem anymore). These kinds of hate speech were proliferated online and offline at the same time. We could see the similar tone of propaganda spread by preacher on Jumah prayer or the teenager's post on Instagram. The use of social media escalated the debates on Jakarta election and identity politics beyond the geographical boundaries of Jakarta and became national issues. Besides, beyond the propaganda, the conservative groups tried to maintain their momentum with several subsequent rallies. One among smaller scale rally was called Al-Maidah Picnic, held during the second round of Jakarta election. Ansufrri Idrus Sambo, the organizer of the event, denied any political motives behind the movement but in a

contradictive manner also said they meant to secure the election. At the same time, the kind of activities performed within this reminded how strong the identity politics associated with these movements. First, they use the white shirt and cap as a uniform. While these dresses might not be that different from any political suit (like checkered shirt used by Jokowi's supporter), these uniforms imply an association with religious symbols which was aligned with religious sentiments used during the whole election process. Second, while using those uniform, they came directly to election booth a move that might be perceived as a threat for other voters who has a different preference of candidate that could produce fear (Akmaliah, 2017).

The exploitation of identity politics brought great benefit whether for Ahok's direct political competitor and religious clerics participated in the mobilization. The use of identity politics during the Jakarta election has been proven to significantly lowered the number of support toward Ahok. Series of data has shown that throughout the period during the mass mobilizations citizens who stated will vote for Ahok decreased drastically (Mietzner and Muhtadi, 2018). Therefore, despite in the past Ahok had the high approval rating in Jakarta (reaching 74%), he lost the election to Anies Baswedan. On the other hand, the Jakarta election has provided clerics to expand their religious authority into a national political arena.

One crucial event could exemplify how mass mobilizations have located the religious leaders into central position among political figures. After the winning of Anies and Sandi, Rizieq Shihab held an event at Istiqlal mosque, where he welcomed both the candidates and Prabowo as the head of Gerindra party. Prabowo at that time openly gave his gratitude toward Rizieq Shihab, Ansari Idrus Sambo, and other Islamic preachers for their support that led to the winning of Anies and Sandi (kumparan, 2017). Before those demonstrations, Rizieq Shihab and FPI, tend to be

perceived as a small organization at the fringe of the Islamic movement. However, his role in those demonstrations gave them momentum to be at the center of conservative groups. On one part of protests, many national figures even asked to pledge loyalty for Rizieq Shihab as the great Imam of Indonesian Moslem. In this regard, Prabowo's gratitude could be seen as part of his acknowledgment toward Rizieq, FPI, and other Islamic preacher's role in helping his candidate winning this election. It is because of their position Ahok now is behind bars and more importantly lose his governor candidacy on Jakarta's ballot.

What are then the implications of these movements toward Indonesia? We would like to argue that the consequences affected the most on at least two aspects: Indonesian political arena and the notion of tolerance among Indonesian Muslim. In the political field, there are two essential things that may become recurring characteristics of Indonesian politics in the future. The first would be the exploitation of identity politics at the local to national level. Since DKI case set a precedent where the use of identity politics paved the way of winning, it is most likely will become one of the preferable strategies for winning the election. However, it is important to remember that such extensive use of identity politics would only appear within particular contexts. As in the case of Jakarta, the strategy would only be exploited just if the supporter groups of each candidate could be polarized based on identity. Djarot for example, heavily portrayed as the friend of Ahok (hence should not be chosen), in North Sumatera election because most religious clerics supported his opposition. On the other hand, an area such as East Java, Central Java, or even West Java, there was less exploitation on identity politics since the basis of supporter is relatively similar on different political camps. Nevertheless, the possibility of identity politics led politicians to avoid risk by associating themselves with religious clerics.

The discussed phenomenon then led to the second implication on politics which is the transformation of religious authority into political authority among religious clerics. After the DKI election, a lot of potential local leaders concerted severe effort to be affiliated with religious identity. Whether from associating with religious groups, choosing religious clerics as their vice-governor candidate, or the combination of both, no local leaders candidate would want to be perceived as anti-religion. The phenomenon happened almost on every election in Indonesia regardless of the political parties. In Central Java, both Ganjar Pranowo and Sudirman Said chose their vice-governor candidate from santri background. The similar case could also be found in other areas such as West Java and East Java where almost everyone would label them as the candidate with the religious background. The comparable effort for risk aversion could also be seen during the presidential election. Both Prabowo and Jokowi's political camp have been trying so hard to be associated with religious clerics. Jokowi even later appointed Ma'ruf Amin as his vice-president with the hope to secure the majority votes from santri. Those events demonstrated that what once limited to religious matters, within a few months', religious clerics have opened their path to influence political and governance issues as well.

Aside from political arena, the 212 rallies also undermine the notion of tolerance that previously associated with Indonesian Islam. Mietzner & Muhtadi (2018) already demonstrated how these rallies left strong negative sentiment among general Moslem in regards of the non-Muslim leader in the political office. Moreover, after the demonstration the sentiment is shared on most classification in society regardless of the class or educational background. At the same time, as discussed before, the role of NU and Muhammadiyah as the representation of Indonesian Islam is threatened by the rise of new religious authorities. At this stage, the notion of tolerance among Indonesian Islam is in dire need to be questioned. In

this context, Menchik (2016) proposition on seeing tolerance in Indonesia as a form of communal tolerance is not convincing. Despite offering the possibilities to comprehend democracy in local Indonesian contexts, communal tolerance still only has minimal space for any individual or groups that are considered as deviant. As in the case of Ahok, this kind of tolerance thus justifies the type of discrimination addressed toward an ethnic or religious minority group. These lasting unintended consequences have now thus become a more prominent feature among Indonesian Moslem. Based on these trends these features are also will linger for quite some time that might also be initiated the demise of moderate Islam in Indonesia.

Conclusion

This article has discussed how the 212 demonstrations paved the way for the strengthening conservatives' group in Indonesia. The mass mobilizations in Indonesia are part of the ongoing social phenomenon where Indonesian society is getting more Islamized. It is the social transformation that is developing in Indonesia particularly after the fall of the New Order. The growing aspiration for Moslem to become more pious is intertwined with the consumption of Islamic commercial products from hijab to popular film. At the same time, the increasing number of devout Islam also turned out to be more conservative with their religious references. In this regard, the role of NU and Muhammadiyah as the most dominant religious authority in Indonesia also contested by new religious bodies such as FPI.

That discussed phenomenon had culminated when Ahok was accused of religious blasphemy after his speech on Al-Maidah went viral. At this time, the use of social media had a significant impact on the process of mobilization to blame Ahok. Thus, there was a series of unprecedented mass mobilization where different Islamic organizations

joined forces to demand the imprisonment of Ahok. We argue that these mass mobilizations were only possible because shared interest between political entrepreneurs and Islamists leaders. The mass mobilization served the function for religious elites to expand their religious authority into the political arena. While at the same time, religious entrepreneurs, mainly Ahok's political opponent needed the way to undermine his strong electoral position. The loss of Ahok thus demonstrated how identity politics which was mobilized by religious elites could be functioned as a useful tool to win the election.

As a consequence, the long-standing believes of tolerant Moslem as the majority in Indonesia could very much be questioned. Intolerance attitude toward non-Moslem, particularly on the political position has lingered even after the Jakarta election is over. On the other hand, the use of identity politics is very likely to be replicated in the future since the case of Jakarta has proven its impact on the election. In this regard, the election in 2019 as strong information where Jokowi then has chosen Ma'ruf Amin as his vice of president in order to quell the conservative turn by raising the Islamist figure who has contributed significantly to bring Ahok into the jail for the two years.

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