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## **‘Becoming an Indonesian Muslim’ : The Idea of Religious Nationalism by KH.A.Wahid Hasyim 1945-1953**

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### **Abstract**

This study aims to view the ideas of KH. A. Wahid Hasyim on Islam and Indonesia. KHA Wahid Hasyim is an interesting figure to study in the midst of the heated debate between the two groups; the one that was interested in making Indonesia an Islamic state and the one that preferred Indonesia as a secular state. The idea of KH. A. Wahid Hasyim became the solution for this debate. This study raises the main question, namely how the relationship between religion and the state according to KH Wahid Hasyim in the Indonesian context. This research is based on literature data (text reading) and then analyzed by content analysis. This study concludes that KH. A. Wahid Hasyim is consistent in Islamic thought and prioritizes the unity and integrity of the nation. According to KH. A. Wahid Hasyim, the state serves the religious needs of the people in accordance with the Pancasila basis. In terms individual (private) matter, the government should not interfere. Meanwhile, the state may regulate issues related to social (public) matter. Kiai Wahid believes that the secularistic relationship between religion and the state is only a theory, and has never actually happened. Islam still needs the state to protect the freedom of its citizens to practice their religion, while the state needs religious legitimacy to make a set of regulations to achieve the *maslahat* (social benefit). KH. A. Wahid Hasyim's thoughts fall into the category of scholars who relate religion and the state as a mutualistic symbiotic relationship, where the state and religion support each other. On the same dimension, its relevance lies in the idea that the common interests are prioritized over personal

interests. Kiai Wahid's idea of religious nationalism is still relevant today. Especially in the context of maintaining the relationship between the state and religion, and giving the government an opportunity to participate and to facilitate its citizens in practicing their religion.

**Keywords:**

Islam, Indonesian, Nationalism-Religious, Maslahat

**Abstrak**

Studi ini bertujuan untuk melihat pandangan KH.A.Wahid Hasyim tentang keislaman dan keindonesiaan. KH.A.Wahid Hasyim adalah sosok yang menarik dikaji di tengah tarik ulur kepentingan menjadikan Indonesia sebagai negara Islam maupun negara sekuler di awal berdirinya RI, gagasan KH. A. Wahid Hasyim menjadi jalan tengah. Studi ini mengajukan pertanyaan utama yakni bagaimana hubungan agama dan negara menurut KH.A.Wahid Hasyim dalam konteks keindonesiaan. Penelitian ini didasarkan pada data-data kepustakaan (*text reading*) dan kemudian dianalisis dengan analisis isi (*content analysis*). Penelitian ini menyimpulkan bahwa KH. A. Wahid Hasyim konsisten dalam pemikiran keislaman dan mengutamakan persatuan dan kesatuan bangsa. Menurut KH. A. Wahid Hasyim, negara melayani keperluan agama rakyat sesuai dengan dasar Pancasila. Terhadap persoalan yang bersifat individual (*private*), pemerintah tidak boleh ikut campur. Sementara negara boleh mengatur dalam persoalan yang berifat kemasyarakatan (*public*). Kiai Wahid berpendapat bahwa relasi sekularistik agama-negara hanya bersifat teori, dan tidak pernah terjadi secara nyata. Islam tetap membutuhkan negara untuk melindungi kebebasan warganya menjalankan agamanya, sedangkan negara butuh legitimasi agama untuk membuat seperangkat peraturan demi mencapai kemaslahatan. Pemikiran KH. A. Wahid Hasyim masuk dalam kategori pemikir yang merelasikan agama dan negara sebagai hubungan yang simbiosis mutualistik, dimana negara dan agama saling menunjang. Pada dimensi yang sama, relevansinya terletak pada gagasannya untuk tetap mendahulukan kepentingan bersama dibandingkan dengan kepentingan pribadi. Gagasan nasionalisme religius Kiai Wahid saat ini masih relevan. Khususnya dalam konteks menjaga relasi antara negara dengan agama, dan memberi porsi pemerintah untuk turut serta di dalam upaya memfasilitasi warganya dalam menjalankan agamanya.

**Kata kunci:**

Islam, Indonesia, Nasionalisme-Religius, Maslahat

**Introduction**

Since Indonesia's independence, there were two big groups that wanted to change the direction of nationalism. The first group was represented by a handful of people who wanted Indonesia to become an

Islamic state, or at least implementing Islamic law and incorporating Islam as part of the constitution. This group took the path of violence, including through DT-TII and NII, and small parts of terrorism. While another group was represented by those who wanted Indonesia to become secular by adopting a Western-style liberal democratic system. There was also the third group represented by the moderate group, which adopted neither of the two systems, and instead tried to find the middle ground. This group proposed a state that accommodates the interests of all parties, put religion in its place, and allow the state through the government to have an authority to regulate the technical implementation of religious matters, without intervention.

The three groups have actually carried out a tug of war of interest since the establishment of Indonesia. Founded on the basis of the unity and integrity of various ethnicities and religions, Indonesia faced the problem in terms of how to put religion in national and state life. With the existence of the plurality and multiculturalism, each party had their own views and aspirations based on their own ideologies and interests. Those in the secular nationalist group preferred a secular constitution similar to that of European and American countries. Meanwhile, those in the Muslim group preferred the idea of an Islamic state, or at least a country that has a constitution based on Islam.

In the historical aspect, religious and state relations, especially Islam in Indonesia, revolves around a story of mutual antagonism and suspicion. This phenomenon is mainly, but not entirely, the result of different views from the *founding fathers* regarding the form Indonesia in the future. One of the most important points is whether this country is "Islamic" or "nationalist". A country with an Islamic pattern is a country that uses Islam as the basis of the state. Meanwhile, a country with a nationalist pattern is a country that uses nationalism as the basis of the state (Effendi, 1998).

During the heated debate regarding the nation, it is important to discuss the figure of KH. A. Wahid Hasyim as the one who proposes ideas about the relationship between Islam and the state. This is important to discuss as there is a re-emergence of groups that are trying to separate religion and state. This article attempts to explain the views of KH. A. Wahid Hasyim regarding the relationship between Islam and the state. Even though he was born and grew up in a traditionalist santri environment, (Noer, 1996), Kiai Wahid is far from the connotation of a conservative, static, and orthodox thinker. On the contrary, he is known as a dynamic figure, visionary, progressive, even liberal (Feillard, 2008; Ma'arif, 2009; Ma'shum, 1998; Wahid, 1999). In the context of the Indonesian national struggle, Kiai Wahid Hasyim's role has a significant role in building a dynamic and harmonious relationship between religious and state life. Due to his role, there is an emergence of nationalism based on Islamic values. This ideology is later known as Nationalism-Religious. This ideology can be a bridge for the two big groups; the secularist group and the group that demands the establishment of Indonesia based on Islam. Both groups also involved in the struggle of Indonesian independence. Both have claims for their contributions, making it impossible to win one over the other. The solution is to compromise, not to say realistic, on these two differences.

### **Brief Biography of KH.A. Wahid Hasyim**

Among the prominent figures of the *founding fathers* of this nation is KH. Abdul Wahid Hasyim. Abdul Wahid Hasyim is the fifth son of Hadratus Sheikh KH. M. Hasyim Asy'ari with Nyai Nafiqah, the daughter of Kiai Ilyas Sewulan Madiun. Kiai Wahid Hasyim was the eldest son of 10 children born on Friday, June 1, 1914. At first, his father gave him the name of Muhammad Asy'ari, but it did not happen because his father thought it was not appropriate. As the first son, Abdul Wahid's name was taken from the name of an ancestor, which his father felt was the most

suitable. From Wahid Hasyim's lineage, it is known that he is still related to Joko Tingkir, a figure who later became better known as Sultan Sutawijaya from the Islamic kingdom of Demak (Atjeh, 1957).

The brilliance of Kiai Wahid's state career did not come in an instant. He started the organizational process as secretary of NU Ranting Cukir in Jombang, NU's lowest organizational structure. Then he became the chairman of the NU Jombang Branch, which since then, he chose to be a politician rather than a pesantren leader (Dhofier, 1982). His career in the organization was accelerated. Two years later, he became the chairman of the newly formed Central Ma'arif Department by PBNU. The brilliance of his political career was seen as he represented NU at MIAI (Majelis Islam A'la Indonesia) in 1940. A year later Kiai Wahid resigned. This decision was taken after the MIAI conference and the III Indonesian Muslim Congress discussed differences in understanding between GAPI and MIAI regarding Indonesia in parliament. Another opinion states that his resignation was due to his father's demand to develop the Tebuireng pesantren (Dahlan, 1996).

In the next period, he became the chairman of the federation of Islamic organizations founded in 1937 (Dhofier, 1984; Ma'shum, 1994). Together with other MIAI figures such as Abikusno T'jokrosujoso, Mr. Sartono, AK. Gani, IJ. Kasimo, MH. Thamrin, Ir. Djuanda and others, Kiai Wahid made quite a brave move. He demanded the colonial government to revoke the 1925 *Teacher Ordonantie*, which severely restricted the activities of Islamic religious teachers. Next, MIAI formed a coalition with the Association of Indonesian Political Parties (GAPI) and the Association of Government Employees (PVPN), by establishing the Indonesian People's Congress (Korindo). The congress demanded the creation of a national constitution and a parliament consisting of Indonesians. Kiai Wahid, KH. Mahfudz Siddiq, and KH. Muhammad Ilyas held the position of Presidium of Korindo (Anam, 1999). His career became brighter when Kiai Wahid represented his father as Chairman of the *Shumubu* (Office of Islamic Religious Affairs—later to be known as the Ministry of Religion), since August 1944, based in Jakarta.

Kiai Wahid is also one of the the youngest member of the BPUPKI which was formed when Japan was close to its defeat in the Pacific War. The committee was also named *Dokuritsu Zyunbi Tjoosakai*, and it was established to prepare the Indonesian independence. The members of BPUPKI were inaugurated on May 29, 1945 with Dr. KRT. Radjiman Wedyodiningrat as the chairman, a Javanese mystic. BPUPKI completed two sessions. The first session took place from May 29, 1945 to June 1, 1945. The next series of sessions took place from July 10 to 16, 1945, with the 6 additional members. By the end of the sessions, they formed 38 members to continue the meeting. They formed a subcommittee consisting of 9 people. Kiai Wahid was elected to the Committee of Nine, together with Soekarno, M Hatta, AA. Maramis, Abikusno Tjokrosujoso, Abdul Kahar Muzakkir, Agus Salim, Ahmad Soebardjo, and M Yamin.

Kiai Wahid Hasyim's experience on life nation and state was then spent mostly as Minister of State, then Minister of Religion in various cabinets. In the political arena, Kiai Wahid became one of the key figures in the scope of Muslim politicians. He was the one who played a role in taking NU out of the Masyumi Party and becoming a separate party through the NU Congress in Palembang, 1952.

### **Bridging Dialogue Between Religion and State**

Kiai Wahid's achievement was prominent during the Japanese occupation era. He represented his father in his work at Shumubu or the Office of Religion, the forerunner of the Ministry of Religion. Here, he persuaded Abdul Hamid Ono, a Japanese Muslim who is close to Japanese military officials in Jakarta. The lobbying was carried out by forming a santri militia called Hezbollah, which would later play a role in the era of the independence revolution. Another accomplishment was when he was involved in the debate before the Indonesian independence. He was confident in representing the religious nationalist group, and he took part in the formulation of establishing the state along with other national figures.

In the debate on the basis of the state in mid-1945, members of the BPUPKI session proposed three things regarding the state foundation. *First*, whether Indonesia will be made as a unitary state or a federal state (*bondstaat*) or a union state (*statenbond*), *second*, the issue of religion and state relations, and *third*, whether the state will become a republic or a kingdom. (Niswah, 2000). At that time, according to Kiai Wahid, there were three groups that dominated politics; Islamic groups, nationalist groups, and socialist groups (Hasyim, 1985c).

When BPUPKI drafted the Constitution on July 13, 1945, Kiai Wahid put forward two proposals; *first*, the Article 4 paragraph 2 of the draft Constitution stipulated that “only native Indonesians shall become President” plus “Muslims” (Muhtar, 2021). He considered that if these two conditions were met, then the president’s orders would have a great impact. *Second*, Article 29 concerning religion which mentions “the religion of the state is Islam, by guaranteeing the freedom of people of other religions to worship according to their respective beliefs”. According to Kiai Wahid, this article will have a great psychological impact for Muslims to fight to defend the upholding of the state, because according to religious teachings, life can only be given up for religious ideology (Yamin, 1959). With this demand, Boland (1971) assessed that Kiai Wahid had used the draft Preamble to the 1945 Constitution as a starting point for further regulation towards an Islamic state. (Bob, 1958). Boland’s view was apparently too hasty. This is because what Kiai Wahid was fighting for was not an Islamic state, but a national state which was regulated using Islamic law, although it was not as strict and formal as he once envisioned. Kiai Wahid, through his writings, has emphasized his thought on a country that can protect all national entities in Indonesia.

Wongsonegoro, a liberal Javanese, and Husein Djajadiningrat, a head of the Bureau of Religion in the Japanese era, considered that the seven words above (in the Jakarta Charter) have the potential to lead to religious fanaticism because a Muslim is forced to practice Islamic law. However, this assumption was rejected by Kiai Wahid Hasyim. He refers

to the principle of deliberation which, for some people, may consider this sentence as an exaggeration, but for some others its meaning may not be that far (Boland, 1971). In several of his writings, Kiai Wahid is considered firm when it is related to Islamic principles, but flexible in the context of nationality, as long as it can reach the *maslahat*. Kiai Wahid's suggestion (Dhofier, 1984), when measured by the current socio-political situation, it may seem out of date. However, when measured by the situation at that time, the proposal was not unreasonable. This can be seen from the decision of the BPUPKI trial which accepted the two proposals of Kiai Wahid.

In the next stage of the trial, Kiai Wahid together with Abikusno Tjokrosujoso (Sarekat Islam), Kahar Muzakkir (Muhammadiyah), Agus Salim (PII) were pioneering the ratification of the Jakarta Charter, after going through a long debate (the political reasoning of the *founding fathers* of the Islamic group was having the same collective imagination; carrying an Islamic ideology on the Indonesian political stage, which was represented by the people from Masyumi such as: M. Natsir, Sukiman, Sjafrudin Prawiranegara, and Mohammad Roem, or from other groups such as NU; KH. Wahab Hasbullah, KH. A. Wahid Hasyim, KH. Imron Rosyadi, and so on; Muhammadiyah; Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, Kasman Singodimedjo, including those from Perti, PUI, PSII, and Persis; such as KH. Ahmad Hasan, KH. Ahmad Sanusi, KH. Abdul Halim, and so on. Several other Islamic parties who were very persistent in the Constituent Assembly were Zaenal Abidin, Isa Ansari, KH. Masykur, and of course M. Natsir and Kasman Singodimedjo. They proposed arguments about: 1). Islamic holistic character, 2). The superiority of Islam over all ideologies, and 3). The fact that Islam is embraced by the majority of Indonesian citizens) (Effendi, 1998). These four people were ideologically opposed to secular nationalist groups such as Soekarno, M. Hatta, M. Yamin, A. Soebardjo, and AA. Maramis who objected the seven words which stated “...with the obligation to practice Islamic law for its adherents” in the fourth paragraph of the Preamble to the Constitution (Boland, 1971).



It is impossible to clearly understand the demands of Islam mentioned in the Jakarta Charter, and the meaning is still unclear until now. The verb "to practice" can indeed mean to do (by oneself), or to apply. Then did the Jakarta Charter require the state to oversee the implementation of the Shari'a? or should the state make its own laws for those who are Muslims? or must the state regulate its people to be pious? all of these questions remain unanswered (Boland, 1971).

The Jakarta Charter only lasted 56 days, because the day after the Proclamation of Indonesian Independence (18 August 1945), the seven words were omitted. The Christian-populated region had conveyed a message to Mohammad Hatta that they would not join a republic that displayed such an Islamic identity, four Islamic leaders including Kiai Wahid from NU agreed to the compromise. In fact, Kiai Wahid suggested the Islamic leaders to change the principle of divinity with the addition of the Godhead of the One, a formula that has implications for monotheism (monotheism) for Muslims (Noer, 1990).

As a prominent figure, Kiai Wahid certainly has a long-term vision about the elimination of the seven words. At that time the condition was so risky and uncertain. The period of revolution is not the right time for Islamic nationalists to insist the realization of their Islamic ideals. Defending Indonesia's independence must come first. This view was summed up in Kasman Singodimejo's speech in the constituent assembly which stated why Islamic groups did not argue when Islamic provisions were removed from the Jakarta Charter. At that time, according Niswah by quoting Nasution, considering the defeat of Japan and the arrival of the Allied troops, it was not appropriate to discuss the material in depth. (Niswah, 2000). Kiai Wahid, whom Harry J. Benda referred to as "... *the most prominent representative of Indonesian Islam at the close of the Japanese era*" (Benda, 1958), shows a moderate way of thinking that puts the public interest above personal or group interests. He wants the unity of the people, both fellow Muslims, and with people of other religions within the framework of the Indonesian state.

For Kiai Wahid, the fundamental issue is not how to establish an Islamic state, but the virtues of Islam are essentially brotherhood, justice, and good character. This was stated by Kiai Wahid in an article at the *Mimbar Agama* in 1951 (Hasyim, 1985c). While on the other hand, Pancasila is the basis of the state that must be respected, because the values of Pancasila give freedom to every religious person to carry out their respective Shari'a. Here Kiai Wahid gives an assessment that religious values are more macro-scale than Pancasila which is Indonesian locality.

This readiness to compromise appears to be based on a relatively liberal understanding of the Jakarta Charter (Feillard, 1996), Kiai Wahid has explained his view with the following arguments: *First*, the conditions at that time urgently needed unity to face the Dutch who were trying to return to their colony, *secondly* he had accepted with the understanding that the obligation to follow Islamic law for Muslims would be detrimental. has its place in the honest application of Article 29 of the 1945 Constitution which guarantees the freedom of every citizen to embrace religion and practice according to their respective religions. (Zuhri, 1987). Satisfied with the article that denotes "freedom" (whereas the Jakarta Charter says "obligation"), Kiai Wahid has a flexible interpretation of Jakarta Charter, and not a more rigid one as feared by some people related to Islam.

In this position, Kiai Wahid may seem inconsistent with his own position. At first, together with Islamic nationalists, he supported a state based on Islam by fulfilling it with the clause "by implementing Islamic law for its adherents" on the basis of the state constitution. However, in subsequent developments he agreed to the removal of the seven words. As a statesman, he prioritized the larger interests on a long-term scale. There was a leap of thought in Kiai Wahid. It emphasizes the substance side more than the appearance of formality. He is wiser in addressing the basic issues of the state, and in placing the position of Pancasila in the religious structure of Indonesian Muslims. What Kiai Wahid was fighting for at that time was to make efforts to Islamize all fields, especially in the state constitution. However, when he encountered a big problem concerning

the unity and integrity of the people, he was willing to give up his personal opinion, for the benefit of the people.

In fact, as mentioned by Boland (1971), this clause was very important in the following years because it provided opportunities for the Islamic community who tried hard to implement the ideals of an Islamic state in a constitutional way. In essence, the Jakarta Charter is the “way” to a state based on Islam, as Kiai Wahid and Islamic nationalist groups wanted in the BPUPKI session. However, the Islamic nationalists chose to “let go”.

### **Religious Nationalism in Indonesian Constitution**

In the context of the national and state, Kiai Wahid tends to position religion and the state in a mutually complementary symbiotic-mutualistic frame. He argues that the secularistic relation between religion and state is only theoretical, and never applies anywhere except for those who are atheists. He also criticized the pattern of integralistic relations between religion and the state. This misconception, according to Kiai Wahid, arose from the theory of unity between state and religion that was held by some Indonesians at that time. In fact, the Indonesian government basically agrees on the separation between religion and the state in the sense that the government does not interfere in the affairs of a religion, except in certain matters (Hasyim, 1985b).

This principle of life nation and state was seen when he made self-criticism to Muslims in his speech at the Conference between the Ministry of Religion and the Executive Board of Non-Political Islamic Organizations, which was held in Jakarta on 4-6 November 1951. He stated that as a country with a majority of Muslim population, the demands of Indonesian Muslims were very strong in enforcing the shari'a of their religion, though, stated by Kiai Wahid at the Conference between the Ministry of Religion and the Executive Board of Non-Political Islamic Organizations, which was held in Jakarta on November 4-6, 1951 “...they don't know exactly how to bring it to life.” (Atjeh, 1957).

He further stated that in the life of the nation and state, it is permissible to adhere to the First Precepts of Pancasila, namely Belief in the one and only God, but the basis of democracy (sovereignty of the people) has given guidance to the nation to maintain freedom and independence, both in general and in particular for one group to another. His statement was successfully reformulated by Abdurrahman Wahid, his son, through a short, effective sentence:

*“Explicitly, Pancasila does not mention a religious foundation in the life of the nation and state, but implicitly it enforces a government that supports religious life.”* (Wahid, 2010).

According to Kiai Wahid, the compromise between the First Precepts of Pancasila and the elements of democracy as mentioned above will provide a realistic middle ground, as he later said:

*“The aspiration of the Muslims as the largest group of our nation will bring religion to life by providing good ways and channels, but on the other hand the principle of democracy is maintained, so that the previous aspiration does not pressurize and harm other groups.”* (Atjeh, 1957).

The meeting of these two principles, according to Kiai Wahid, resulted in an agreement, the aspiration of the Muslims to bring the Shari’a to life was given a way, but the principle of democracy was also maintained so that the aspiration would not harm other groups (Hasyim, 1985b).

*“From the point of view of state law in a democratic manner, every resident of a country has freedom and independence, both in belief and religion, both in terms of wanting to express their opinions and thoughts, as well as in terms of maintaining their property.”*

Meanwhile, in terms of religion, according to Kiai Wahid, it can be divided into two, namely those that are individual such as worshipping, organizing the household, political understanding, customs, ways of working in the economic field, etc., as well as those that are related to social life including relationships between religions. In term of individual matter, according to Kiai Wahid, the government should not interfere

and can only regulate matters of religion, in terms of a societal aspect. (Hasyim, 1985b). Aspects related to special matters involving a religious group are not the responsibility of the government, such as establishing mosques, churches, and other houses of worship.

*“Thus, according to state law in a democratic manner, the government cannot interfere with individual (individual) questions, whether concerning political understanding, customs, beliefs, worship, working methods in the chosen economic field, and so on. It is not only that the government does not intervene in these matters according to state law in a democratic manner, but the government can only regulate a religious aspect of a societal nature, which arises from the relationship of one religious person with another.”*

This is where Kiai Wahid's assertiveness started to appear. As Minister of Religion at that time he formulated the relationship between religion and the state with an elegant manner. This manner was reflected in his deep understanding of the First Precepts of Pancasila and the implementation of democracy in the life of the nation and state. In his speech, he emphasized that Indonesia was not an integralistic Islamic State:

*“The Republic of Indonesia is not an Islamic state and the Ministry of Religion is not the Ministry of Islamic Religion, perhaps this misunderstanding arises from the theory of unity between state and religion which is well known by those who have the wrong opinion; and after the government changed from colonial to national, then it changed from colonial to Islamic government.”*

For Kiai Wahid, togetherness between different elements in Indonesia is part of nationalism. This is illustrated by his opinion on national issues in Indonesia.

*“So, therefore, let us return to our respective souls, using our logic with a definite understanding, that we are a nation, regardless of religion, we are still a nation, even though there are differences in opinion or belief and understanding. or a way of life, but as a nation we should not be separated by different understanding, different views, and different beliefs.” (Hasyim, 1985a)*

In dealing with the matter of Islamic schools which were under the authority of the Ministry of Religion, Kiai Wahid, who was the most prominent figure in this department, rejected the claim of discrimination in the name of religion among Muslims and Non-Muslims. His decision was confirmed by Achmad Zaini.

*“He further argued that it was not true that the Ministry paid more attention to Muslims than to other religious groups. He rejected the claim that there was discrimination in the Ministry. As a proof he showed that subsidies going to private Islamic religious schools amounted to 1 rupiah per pupil while those to private non-Muslim schools through the Ministry of Education came to 4 rupiahs per pupil.”* (Zaini, 1998).

In this regard, it is interesting to understand what Kiai Wahid has stated decades ago:

*“I mentioned that (the joy of the establishment of PTAIN-pen) not merely because a Muslim who happens to be Indonesian, but as an Indonesian who is Muslim.”* (Atjeh, 1957)

Through the above expression, we can see that Kiai Wahid rejects self-identification as “*a Muslim living in an area...*”, he even firmly made efforts to affirm “*...an Indonesian who is Muslim*”. Thus, Kiai Wahid at that time had started a discourse of self-confidence as “Indonesians who are Muslim, and not Muslims who happen to live in Indonesia”. Kiai Wahid has tried to prevent Muslims from being guests in their own country, but instead becoming people of “Indonesian Islamic Muslim as the masters of their own home.” (Wijaya, 2011).

The narration of the above sentence is one of the cores of Kiai Wahid's confidence that rejects the idea of negating the elements of Arabic and Indonesian. Both elements have potentials to be well integrated. However, Kiai Wahid always emphasized that Indonesian identity must be maintained and there is no need to be Arab to become a Muslim. This sentence also gives another meaning, that when an Indonesian citizen is confident in his national identity, he can also become a good Muslim. It means that Indonesia and Islam can go hand in hand, and complete each

other. An Indonesian must consistently practice Islam, as well as being a Muslim who is responsible for the things that happen in Indonesia. A good Muslim is a good citizen.

This is different from the identification of Muslims living in Indonesia. They are Muslims, but do not have a good responsibility for their country. Even if the country collapses, they would not care. Islamism characteristics are strongly emphasized. This happens a lot nowadays. Some Indonesians are interested in becoming ISIS members in Syria, eventually cursing the Indonesian government as infidels, *taghut*, and other expressions, and in the end they move to a country that is suffering from war. The goal is to pursue the dream of becoming a Muslim living under the power of the Islamic caliphate, as mentioned in ISIS propaganda. However, they actually found the opposite, then hesitated and regretted having left Indonesia because of the ISIS propaganda. This is what Kiai Wahid wanted to prevent. A Muslim who only lives in Indonesia but having no attachment in the forms of responsibility and contribution to the country. Their Islamic identity does not make them feel responsible for their country. Seeing the current phenomenon, Kiai Wahid's statement can be taken into consideration.

Kiai Wahid also emphasized the necessity for Indonesian youths to always be confident in voicing their opinions and be confident as an Indonesian Muslim when dealing with other nations. Furthermore, he highlighted "The Importance of Translating Hadith During the Development Era"

*"What I mean is that I don't agree to Arabize our generation (generation) which will be different from the Indonesian language and customs."*  
Aceh, 1957)

Kiai Wahid's statement above is actually a representation of the ideas of Indigenous Islam and Indonesian Islamic Muslim; Islam that is strongly rooted with Indonesian entities. Actually, there is nothing wrong in adapting Arabic culture in expressing one's religion or Islam. The

problem is using the Arabic expression as a single and is considered the most legitimate expression in religion, so that Arabic expression becomes dominant, even hegemonizes other cultures and traditions. According to KH. Abdurrahman Wahid, Arabization or the process of self-identification with Middle Eastern culture is "... we are uprooted from our own cultural roots". Moreover, he continued, Arabization does not necessarily match the needs of Indonesians (Wahid, 2001).

To merge Islamic aspirations into Indonesian aspirations, Islam needs to be positioned as a system of Indonesian culture. Therefore, the decline or progress of Islam will be reflected in the progress or decline of the morality and intellectuality of the nation. In this case, there was a process of assimilation, for example the Islamization of Java and the Javanization of Islam, which merged and enriched each other. This is because in the first place, Islam came not to conquer Java but instead developed a civilized Javanese society by recognizing the cultural rights of the local community which had been practiced and developed for a long time (Mun'im, 2003). Moreover, Islam in Southeast Asia, including Indonesia, has so far been considered to have a different concept and political form from the Muslim countries of North Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, and South Asia. Islam in this region has a distinctive character. For example, they tend to be tolerant, moderate, and inclusive. In addition, it is more cultural in nature, and not politically structural. This peculiarity is formed through a long socio-cultural process.

Kiai Wahid's positive attitude was indirectly influenced by the epistemological basis of a typical pesantren which is institutionalized into the minds of moderate Nahdlatul Ulama residents. In this context, state moderation is defined as a need to avoid extreme actions in and to be careful in doing things. This "middle ground" politics has become a manifestation of the Sunni scholars, namely *tawassuth* and *i'tidal*, the middle ground attitude which has the core of having to uphold the principle of being fair in life. The basis of this *tawassuth* attitude is QS. Al-Baqarah 143. The next attitude is *Tawazun*, a balanced attitude in wisdom, in harmony



with historical interests. This attitude is based on QS. Ali Imran verse 112. The third attitude is *Tasamuh*, being tolerant towards differences, especially in the matter of religion, especially the issue of *furu'* (khilafiyah) which is based on the hadith of the Prophet, "Differences among my ummah are mercy". While the fourth attitude is *Amar Ma'ruf Nahi Munkar*, which has the sensitivity to encourage good deeds, useful, and beneficial for life. The basis of this attitude is QS. Ali Imran verse 104.

In anticipating socio-political phenomena, Kiai Wahid followed NU's ideology which denies the "absolute" position. One of the principles used is the proposition of *ma la yudraku kullub la yutraku jullub*, or when something is not achieved entirely, then the elements that have been achieved must not be abandoned. This is a fiqh solution that has become an inseparable part of NU's political dynamics throughout Indonesia's history and prevents it from falling into various forms of radicalism that are counterproductive to the ideals of religion and the nation state. In this case, Kiai Wahid's view of accepting Pancasila is the implementation of a fiqh doctrine. When an Islamic state is not formed, then Islamic values will try to be accommodated by Pancasila. The acceptance and practice of Pancasila, explained Muchith Muzadi, is the embodiment of the efforts of Indonesian Muslims in implementing Shari'a (Ayu Sutarto, 2008).

The implementation of Islamic values in the political system of the Indonesian national state is indeed full of complex processes. On the one hand, the Indonesian constitution does not stand on the basis of certain religious texts, but for all citizens. That means, textually, this state foundation must be able to accommodate the interests of all religious believers. On the other hand, Muslim statesmen have tried to limit, in an evolutionary way, the incorporation of religious law in order to obtain a legal position for its implementation and to be recognized constitutionally.

The first step in the early days of independence was to provide a Ministry of Religion, which would technically assist the continuity of the implementation of religious elements, not only Islam, but also other religions. From this pattern, it can be seen that there were efforts to limit

the state interference in the private sectors of its citizens, and on the other hand the state provides services for the freedom of its citizens in carrying out their religious affairs.

In subsequent developments, efforts to bridge dialogue between religion and the state also occurred through a constitutional process, through legislation. For example, the Marriage Law No. 1 of 1974, then emerged the Compilation of Islamic Law based on Presidential Instruction No. 1 of 1991, and after the reform, there were more legislative products were born. Among other things, UU No. 17 of 1999, Law no. 38 concerning Management of Zakat, Decree of the President of the Republic of Indonesia No. 8 of 2001 concerning the National Amil Zakat Agency, Law no. 41 of 2004 concerning Waqf, Law no. 28 of 2008 concerning Islamic Banking, and so on. This kind of process is also supported by regional regulations in various regions which symbolically showed religious elements, whether in Muslim-majority areas such as Pamekasan, Hindu-majority in Bali, or Christian-majority areas in Eastern Indonesia.

The evolution of legal developments re-emphasizes the religious area in Indonesia which, although not directly interfered with by the state, is given access to move dynamically in the implementation of activities based on religious values. In this case, the government does not directly interfere in religious affairs, as we have seen in the concept of an integral state. The government does not give full freedom and keeps a distance from religion, as in a secular state. Rather, the government as a representative of the state guarantees its citizens to have a freedom of religion, and the laws and regulations do not conflict with the basic values of religion.

### **Moderatism in National Politics, *Maslahat* (Social Benefit) as the Goal**

One of the salient features of Kiai Wahid's thought is his *wasa thi yah* character. His background as a young ulama (Islamic scholar) from an

Islamic boarding school has also strengthened his political and religious views. Of course, his experience as an activist who embraced his career from zero and his extensive interaction with movement leaders, helped him gain more knowledge.

In the context of Kiai Wahid's thoughts at the beginning of independence and Kiai Wahid's acceptance of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, in my opinion, is the anticipation of Muslims to receive "some parts", and not receive "the whole parts", and to make Indonesia an Islamic state may face great difficulties in the future, and it may also be a boomerang for Muslims due to the plurality of religion, culture, and social life in Indonesia (Wahid, 2001). Likewise, when separating religion from the state, it will remove religion from its responsibility in various injustices and human tragedies. Religion would also become irresponsible for the tyranny of the rulers (Wahyudi, 2007).

Therefore, it is not surprising that he later agreed to delete seven words in the "Jakarta Charter", even though at first he and the Islamic nationalist group tried to defend the sentence in the BPUPKI trial. Two reasons for Kiai Wahid's acceptance of Pancasila—without the seven words in the First Precept—as explained in the middle of this article were the conditions during that time when Indonesia urgently needed unity to face the Dutch who were trying to return to their colonies. Another reason is that there was an obligation to follow Islamic law for Muslims which is mentioned in the Article 29 of the 1945 Constitution which guarantees the freedom of every citizen to embrace religion and practice according to their religions (Zuhri, 1987).

In the first reason, Kiai Wahid seems to use the rule of *dar' al-mafasid muqaddam ala jalb al-masalih*; Prioritizing efforts to avoid danger or riots over carrying out the greater benefit. It could be that this rule is also supported by another rule, *idza ta'arad al-mafsadatani ru'ya a'dzamuha dhararan bi irtikabi akhaffihima*; if there is a possibility of dangerous complications, the greater risk is considered, by carrying out the least risk. Both of these rules prioritize preventive efforts to avoid danger rather than carrying out higher benefits.

Considering the age of the newly proclaimed republic, he avoided the risk of division, especially with the eastern part of Indonesia and with people of other religions, with the consequence of requesting to remove the seven words in the Jakarta Charter. In fact, what was needed at that time was unity, not division caused by sectarian differences. Thus, if he persisted in defending his opinion, then the polarization and acute friction that will occur among internal Muslims and non-Muslim groups. For Kiai Wahid, what must be accepted and the most important thing is what is “inside” Indonesia, namely the existence of a state that allows Muslims to carry out their religious teachings in real life. Thus, According to Abdurrahman Wahid (2001) the implementation of the Shari’a can be done through persuasive means, or social ethics. Social ethics or ethical Islam, not ideological Islam that wants the state to be fully religious-based, is Islam that can integrate and become a driving force for the establishment of Indonesian society with religious values on the one hand; and on the other hand, Islamic scholars are important factors to encourage a democratic, just, tolerant society that are taking the side of the people, and defending the people (Wahid, 2006).

In this case, if viewed from the aspect of fiqh, the efforts made by Kiai Wahid have implemented two important aspects of Islamic governance, both internally and externally. As for the internal aspect, the state has full power over all individuals and institutions in the Islamic state. The people must fully obey the government as long as it is still within the realms of sharia. In this aspect, al-Mawardi explained that if the imam (head of state) has carried out all his duties in fulfilling the rights of his people and upholding the rights of Allah SWT among them, then it is obligatory for his people to fulfill the two rights of the imam: the right to obey him and the right to assist his duties. (al-Mawardi, 1994).

Thus, Kiai Wahid tried to prevent a monocultural perspective on reality and at the same time tried to provide a rational and supportive area if religious goals in the political sector were experiencing deadlock. All fiqh thinking provides a way out without being trapped in extreme attitudes.

In addition, the formal form of a state that has met the qualifications according to the *shari'ah*, which was decided *de jure* at the NU Congress in Banjarmasin in 1936, is a religious order that must be followed (Haidar, 1994). As a nationalist who was familiar with Islamic values, Kiai Wahid tried to live a life as a statesman, as well as a Muslim. As a statesman, he did not want the unity of the nation to be torn apart by rebellions in various regions (Dijk, 1983; Zuhri, 1987). What Kiai Wahid wanted in viewing the position of the state was that the state had an important role as an "agreement" from various elements of the nation. For this reason, he insisted on maintaining the unity and integrity of the nation. He is also willing to accept Pancasila as the basis of the state because Pancasila is considered respectable (*mashlahat*), and Islam must provide motivation to accept, not only Pancasila, but all respectable elements that can contribute to the concrete realization of Islamic values (Madjid, 2008).

According to Abdurrahman Wahid, this effort was carried out by Indonesian Muslims to save the form of the state in the midst of debates to create a secular and Islamic state. Pancasila for Muslims is the basis of the state, while Islam is the faith. Pancasila regulates state life, while religious life is regulated by Islam. The two will not collide and do not need to be collided, so according to Gus Dur, Islam does not need to be the official state religion and be formalized in the form of state law, but what is important is that the state guarantees Muslims to practice their religion (Wahid, 2001).

This is in line with what Abdelwahab el-Affendi said, that the state will comply with the sharia which if it is not forced, and it is a true expression of the will of the people. When there is no force in implementing the sharia, the Muslim community in this country is a community that chooses to live in accordance with Islam and obey the sharia. This obedience is essentially a matter of conscience. As a result, the sharia is truly obeyed only when the people are willing to do it voluntarily and sincerely (el-Affendi, 2001).

Kiai Wahid's idea is actually based on the principle of the goal and the method of achieving it (*al-Ghayah wa al-Wasail*) to see the importance of the functionalization aspect of religious teachings. It was in this context that Kiai Wahid then attempted to provide a solution to the tension between the two different groups; between Islamic nationalists and secular nationalists as well as between those who want Islam as the basis of the state and want secularism to grow in Indonesia.

In the macro context, Kiai Wahid indirectly wanted to put Islam as a social ethic in the life of the state. This thinking then tends to be closer to the symbiotic paradigm where the state and religion support each other. Islam should be placed as a complementary factor in socio-cultural life. Thus, it can guarantee a foundation of hope for those who reject state religion, while also providing a place for religion. This is an *appeal* to fanatics who are looking for the identification of Islam in the life of the nation and state.

Thus, through this style of *fiqh* thinking, Kiai Wahid has opened up the relationship between Islam and the modern state—which has always been suspicious of each other. Thus, at one point, Islam does not lose its relevance for contemporary life, while at the same time Islam is included in the structure of secular culture as a result of modernity.

## Conclusion

Through the above review, Kiai Wahid is a figure who is not only consistent in practicing his Islamic values, but he also has a love for his nation. Becoming a good Muslim as well as being a good citizen of Indonesia is the essence of his ideas. In his various writings, as well as the narratives of his colleagues, Kiai Wahid has a view that places Islam and Indonesia as something that does not need to be contradicted. Both can support and complement each other. In this context, Kiai Wahid's notion of religion and state relations falls into the category of symbiotic view, not secularistic, or even integralistic.

In the statement that is used as the title of this article, Kiai Wahid always emphasizes his self-confidence as an Indonesian who is a Muslim, not as a Muslim who has no contribution in Indonesia. Thus, Kiai Wahid's ideas are still relevant today. As a home, Indonesia cannot become a secular state that eliminates the role of religion, nor can it become a religious (integralistic) state that interferes the private affairs of its citizens. Instead, it becomes a country that serves the needs of its citizens in the field of religious administration, and on the contrary places the position of religious believers as Indonesian citizens who can contribute to their country.

Kiai Wahid's Nationalism-Religious idea lies in his self-confidence as a nationalist as well as a Muslim who has contributed to his nation. Indonesia and Islam cannot be separated. Both can synergize well to achieve their respective goals. Furthermore, Kiai Wahid's religious nationalism is still relevant today. Especially in the context of maintaining the relationship between the state and religion, and allowing the government to participate as an effort to facilitate its citizens in practicing their religion.

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