



Geneology of Religious Thought and Activities of Ex-Terrorist Prisoners in Surakarta

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Abstract

This article aims to shed light on the roots of ex-jihadists' thinking and activities following their exit from the de-radicalization program. It seeks to continue the discussion on radicalism and de-radicalization in Indonesia. Based on field data and interviews with several informants in Surakarta, this article explains that former jihadists have different ideological genealogies. However, after their departure from these groups and activities, there are similarities in terms of survival strategies. The results of this study also show that almost all of them experienced obstacles when they first returned to normal society. But now they have managed to carry out their activities as traders and entrepreneurs in their own way. Some of them are even able to create associations that voice the importance of upholding the spirit of nationalism and rejecting acts of terror. Applying Weber's theory of individual action, this article also shows a shift in rational action choices that are intertwined with quite complex interests.

Keywords: Ex-convicts, Rational Choice, Radicalism, De-radicalization

Abstrak

Artikel ini bertujuan untuk menjelaskan akar pemikiran mantan jihadis dan aktifitasnya pasca keluarnya dari program de-radikalisasi. Artikel ini berusaha untuk melanjutkan diskusi tentang radikalisme dan de-radikalisasi di Indonesia. Berdasarkan data lapangan dan hasil wawancara pada beberapa informan di Surakarta, artikel ini menjelaskan bahwa sebagaimana antar satu individu dengan individu lainnya yang pernah masuk dalam kelompok jaringan teroris mempunyai geneologi ideologi yang berbeda. Meski demikian, pasca berhentinya mereka dari kelompok dan aktifitas itu, terlihat adanya kesamaan dalam hal strategi survival untuk bertahan hidup. Hasil penelitian ini juga menunjukkan bahwa hampir semua dari mereka mengalami kendala saat awal kembali ke masyarakat secara normal. Namun kini mereka berhasil menjalani aktifitasnya sebagai pedagang dan berwirausaha dengan caranya masing-masing. Beberapa di antara mereka mampu membuat perkumpulan yang menyuarakan pentingnya memegang teguh semangat nasionalisme dan menolak aksi-aksi terror. Mengaplikasikan teori tindakan individu Weber, artikel ini juga menunjukkan adanya pergeseran pilihan tindakan rasional yang berkait kelindan dengan kepentingan-kepentingan yang cukup kompleks.

Kata Kunci: Eks Narapidana, Pilihan Rasional, Radikalisme, De-radikalisasi

Introduction

Over the past few decades, the issues of radicalism, extremism, and terrorism have become serious discussions in all circles. The government takes these issues seriously because they affect the stability and security of the nation. In Indonesia, the phenomenon of radicalism and terrorism has emerged in almost all regions. Zuly Qodir claimed that Java is one of the islands where various social movements, from the far left to the far right, have their origins. In particular, Surakarta, or Solo Raya, is the most fertile ground for the growth of radical Islamic movements and leftist communism. (Qodir 2014).

In Surakarta, there are Islamic groups, especially the Front Pembela Islam (FPI) and the Front Pemuda Islam Surakarta (FPIS), Hizbullah, and Jundullah, that justify the use of violence to fight for what is right for them. They often vandalize entertainment venues that are considered places of immorality and gambling locales. Radical groups in Surakarta also often organize sweeping actions against American citizens when American political policies are unjust, such as the US attack on Afghanistan.

Events related to acts of terrorism that occurred in several parts of Indonesia throughout 2016 apparently involved many terrorists from Surakarta. Surakarta is still an important area for the spread of extremism inspired by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) group. According to Nor Huda Ismail, founder of the 'Prasasti Perdamaian Foundation', Solo and the surrounding area have strong factors that make radical movements continue to thrive: history, actors, and environment. Historically, Surakarta is the birthplace of the Jemaah Islamiyah Jihad movement and its network. There are still many influential jihadi actors or activists living in Surakarta. In addition, there are also many schools, pesantren, recitations, publishing jihadi books, including radical mass organizations, and mushrooming Islamic Laskar (Hasan 2018). In addition, Surakarta is also a very heterogeneous region in terms of the emergence of religious groups, both traditionalist, modernist, salafi, and new groups that prioritize the piety of urban Muslim communities (Sunarwoto 2012; Mahmud 2017; Laili 2016). This is one of the reasons why this region often experiences struggles for religious authority between one group and another (Sunarwoto 2015).

The mapping of radicalism in Solo by Muhammad Wildan (2008) is important enough to provide an overview. Wildan mapped radicalism in Solo by referring to Geertz's theory. He reads the phenomenon of radical movements by looking at the aspect of the abangan group, which tends to be close to power and has an important role in managing government affairs. Meanwhile, the Santri in Solo are a minority community. The santri here is synonymous with a group that wants the implementation of sharia law in Solo. However, in terms of power, they cannot enter the bureaucracy. These groups take a path that tends to be radical. In addition, radicalism in Solo is influenced by social, political, and economic conditions (Wildan 2008).

In addition to mapping the radicalism movement in Solo, Wildan also wrote "The Nature of Radical Islamic Groups in Solo." In general, this writing is almost the same as his previous writing, which is about radicalism in Solo. Wildan also said that the causes of radical movements in Solo are the factors that trigger the emergence of radical movements in Indonesia. Wildan said that Solo is indeed a city that is quite conducive to the growth of radicalism. Solo's history of conflict and socio-political

conditions play an important role in triggering the birth of radical movements. The actors of the radical movement in Solo are dominated by the “abangan” group, which is then mobilized by the preachers (ustaz). In this case, Islamist groups emerged instantly and saw Islam as the solution to every problem. They loudly shout for jihad and the implementation of sharia law (Wildan 2013).

Muzayyin Ahyar, who did the research on the Hisbah group, conducted another study that looks at the radical movement in Solo. He said that radicalism is not only read as a religious phenomenon, but at the same time, it is a symptom of social movements, mobilization processes, and the use of democratic tools. Therefore, he proposes a contextual strategy based on field facts in the de-radicalization process, not just through religious lectures (Ahyar 2015). In this regard, from time to time, de-radicalization programs and prevention of the spread of radicalism have also been carried out by various groups, both by the government, universities, and civil society (Toto Suharto 2014; Chalmers 2017; M. Zainal Anwar 2021; Nur Kafid 2021).

In the context of Surakarta, there are several ex-convicts of terrorism who later became part of the efforts to prevent the spread of radical extremism. Therefore, the article attempts to answer the religious doctrine of ex-convicts of terrorism and their activities after they return to being ordinary citizens. To answer this question, this article was produced through qualitative research. Interviews with a few key informants were conducted in the process of searching for data, in addition to a number of documents, both printed and electronic. Theoretically, the data collected was analyzed using Weber's theory of social action, one of which explains rational action. This action is understood as a pattern of action based on rational considerations, calculated, efficient, and oriented towards higher values (Ritzer 2011). In his study of Protestant adherents, people with strong work ethics are primarily responsible for carrying out this action (Weber 2001). In this case, ex-convicts of terrorism can be seen in their actions, categorizing which one is their main purpose, which is an affective action, and which is a traditional action.

Surakarta and Radical Groups

Historically, Solo has a history of radicalized groups and conflicts. These include ethnic conflicts between Chinese-Javanese and Arab-Javanese, as well as conflicts between indigenous and non-indigenous people (Javanese and non-Javanese) (Baidhawy 2014). In addition, conflicts under the pretext of religious purification have also occurred in Solo to this day. The issue of Christianization is a strong trigger for acts of violence. (Amir, 2019). Solo then known as a city with a short-wheelbase community (Kafid 2016). There are many factors that affects some of these short-wheelbase and combustible groups. Among these are their social, cultural, economic, and political defeats. The election of F.X. Hadi Rudyatmo, who is a non-Muslim, has fueled their emotions. So it is not surprising that in Solo, which then also spread to the surrounding areas, Islamic groups that tend to use quite violent methods in religion have flourished.

Muzayyin Ahyar's study on radicalism in Solo illustrates that Solo has a long history of socio-religious dynamics, especially the issue of violent Islamist movements. In his article, Ahyar explains that the Islamic movement in Solo began during the colonial era with the emergence of the Islamic Trade Union founded by H. Samanhudi on 16 October 1905, which later turned into the Islamic Union (Ahyar 2015). In addition, there were several other resistances in the colonial era in Greater Solo such as the Islamic communism movement carried out by Haji Misbah, (Bakri 2015) and others.

Islamic movements continued into the Old Order period with the emergence of Darul Islam/NII. DI/NII was commanded by Kartosoewiryo, who was disappointed with the central leaders who, failed to create a common force. Together with Daud Beureuh and Kahar Muzakar, he then created a resistance movement against the government using the DI/NII movement, which aspired to establish an Islamic state. Daud Beureuh himself was a charismatic figure who mobilized around 300 Acehese scholars to demand regional autonomy in Aceh. Together with Acehese scholars, Beureuh held a congress of Acehese scholars in the 1950s. This congress was held to voice their disappointment with the central government. With the slogan *amar ma'ruf*

nabi mungkar, they then carried out resistance. Beureuh himself was a charismatic figure. He was able to hypnotize many people with hours of lectures (Tempo 2011).

Meanwhile, Kahar Muzakkar fought in South Sulawesi because of his disappointment with the central government, as his demand for his men to be accepted into the national army without a process was rejected. This disappointment prompted Kahar to take up arms against the government. On August 7, 1953, Kahar joined the NII after being offered to join by Kartosoewiryo. These forms of resistance ultimately aim for power. Because in the end, the NII itself experienced a split. Daud Beureuh eventually protested Kartosoewiryo's policies. The Imamah system of government in the NII was initiated by Kartosoewiryo himself (Tempo 2011). This was one of the causes of the split because each of them fought for power.

Although DI/NII was disbanded during the Old Order, its ideas and spirit continued into the New Order and Reformation eras. In the case of Solo, the main actors of the Islamic movement, such as Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, have emerged. Both of them, in spirit and ideology, are the successors of the spirit of resistance carried out by DI/NII (Ahyar 2015). Some studies noted that Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and Abdullah Sungkar then formed Jama'ah Islamiyah (JI), which was recorded as a new jihad movement. Several cases of terrorism that occurred in Indonesia were influenced by this movement (Abdullah 2018).

Although during the New Order era, Soeharto's centralized-militaristic system managed to suppress resistance from various groups, especially the radical religious movement and the conflict in Solo, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and Abdullah Sungkar, who migrated to Malaysia, were quite vocal in their opposition to the New Order regime at that time, which according to them, was not in accordance with God's law (Kafid 2016). The two of them with their Ngruki and Usrah networks, continued to fight against the government.

After the collapse of the New Order regime and the opening of democracy, Islamist groups began to flourish in Solo, such as FPI, LUIS, Laskar Hizbullah, Tim Hisbah, Laskar Jundulloh, FPIS, and others. These groups continue to carry out radical actions. However, these groups have diverse movements, and not all of them have

been involved in suicide bombings. However, the radical religious thinking propagated and developed by these groups has influenced the thinking of some individuals, which can lead to extreme actions and acts of terror.

The continuity of this idea has gained momentum due to the emergence of variants of Islamic organizations that carry the ideology of pan-Islamism. An ideology that aims to bring Islam back to being the only intact social system with the symbol of political Islam in the Caliphate. Added to this is the people's disappointment at the government's failure to carry out its functions with corruption cases and the criminalization of ulama. For the last mentioned, that disappointment is increasing because the assumption is that law enforcers (police) are the main actors that need to be watched and are hostile. Therefore, some of the targets of terrorism target police stations. This shift in the target of terrorism is actually not the first motive of terrorist groups. According to Jack Harun, the target of the Bali bombing group was America and its allies. This target did not target Indonesians at all. However, the target began to shift, starting with the doctrine of Aman Abdurrahman. The government policy, under the spearhead of Densus 88, who is a police officer, provides a new target for the implementation of acts of terrorism.

The factors above provide a clear picture of the emergence of groups that are indicated to be radical and have the potential to commit acts of terrorism. In addition, this phenomenon is also inseparable from the fact that Indonesia is a country with the largest Muslim majority population in the world, and moreover with a deeply rooted Islamic culture. This has led to the perception that Indonesia is Islamic, and the history of Indonesia cannot be separated from the history of Islamic students. Because Islam is such an identity, everything that is considered not in line with Islam will cause a rejection response. This rejection is organised in these organisations. The result is that people, Muslims in particular, turn to smaller community organisations rather than larger, older organisations. This is because they perceive that the larger organisations have not made a significant impact on the ideals of Islam, and they find them more concretely in the newer organisations. Therefore, the recruitment system became very

massive and coupled with the articulation of its leaders who were able to attract public sympathy.

However, the fact that Islamic culture is so deeply rooted in Indonesia is also one of the factors in the formation of classifications in the religious understanding of Indonesian Muslims. As it is known that Indonesia with its diverse cultures has formed its Indonesian identity even in its indigenous variants. Therefore, many local customary traditions are considered by some groups to be incompatible with Islamic teachings, or what is called *bid'ah*. This labelling of *bid'ah* has consequences in shaping the mindset of Muslim communities in Indonesia in general, and Solo in particular. Because those who understand traditions as *bid'ah* are categorised as those who have left Islam, because they have made innovations in the practice of worship. This *kafir* identity further eliminates other Islamic groups or organisations and tightens the network of radical Islamists. Because those who leave Islam are then included in their group that needs to be hostile, coupled with the interpretation of verses or hadiths that support their understanding. This is how these groups are formed with all their variants, but still intertwined in a strong network of movements.

From Radicalism to Terrorism

Radicalism does not emerge from an empty space. At the very least, there are causes of behaviour that stem from an understanding that then results in actions that lead to acts of terrorism. If terrorism is understood as an act that poses a threat of harm to a person or a certain group by a certain party, then logically, that threat cannot arise without being preceded by anarchic behaviour that departs from radical understanding which then brings the courage of the perpetrator to commit acts of terrorism.

Radicalism is often considered or understood as the doctrine or practice of extreme beliefs. What is meant by extreme understanding is an understanding that is outside or different from the standard understanding in general. In the Big Indonesian Dictionary, radicalism is defined as an ideology or sect that wants comprehensive change by violent or drastic means. Or it can also be understood as defined by Sartono

Kartodirdjo, that radicalism is a social movement that thoroughly rejects the ongoing social order and is characterised by strong moral hatred to oppose and make enemies with the privileged and powerful (Kartodirdjo, 1985). This definition can certainly be interpreted variously according to the context in which it is interpreted. This means that radicalism can take many forms, for example, in politics it means that the desired change is the political order as a whole, while in religion it means imposing a religious understanding that is owned to be adopted by others by means of coercion. Therefore, radicalism, when understood socially, is a view that intends to produce social change according to the ideological interpretation of a particular group, which if necessary can resort to violence.

From the above understanding, it can be concluded that radicalism has a form of ideology that aspires to create major social changes in extreme ways from the general conditions to the ideal conditions according to their ideology. The National Counterterrorism Agency provides characteristics and indicators of radicalism that can lead to acts of terrorism. These characteristics are, first, this movement tends to be intolerant because it considers that other people's ideas or opinions are not true. Second, they are fanatical about their own group's ideology. This second characteristic produces an intolerant attitude. Third, as a continuation of this group fanaticism, it eventually gave rise to an exclusive or closed attitude by taking distance from other groups, and considering their group the most correct. Fourth, as an ideal of change because they see conditions are not ideal according to their understanding, they finally spark ideas and revolutionary movements which then commit acts of violence.

The characteristics of radicalism from BNPT are sufficient to explain the common thread from the understanding of radicalism to acts of terrorism. If these characteristics are seen from the perspective of psychology, it will be clear how the flow of the birth of terrorism from radicalism can be found. In Arie W. Kruglanski's research, violence does not appear suddenly. There are three main factors that can lead to violence, namely need, narrative or discourse, and network (Kruglanski, 2018). According to him, the need for something important will provide an idealistic picture to be realised. This need or need eventually becomes a discourse in one's head to be

used in seeing social conditions or phenomena around them. At this stage a person then becomes a party who feels responsible for evaluating the phenomenon in order to return to ideal conditions in accordance with the discourse ideas he understands. Moreover, if later his identity or discourse is distorted or discriminated against by other groups that have control of social power, then hatred for certain parties can arise. This feeling arises also due to human nature to fight for its existence, and including its ideology. This is what happened to the early terrorist groups in Indonesia, especially the Bali bombers who targeted the allies of the US, Australia and the UK. They felt that these countries were the cause of world instability due to global corruption and colonisation and the spread of evil ideas in the Islamic world, and that they had to be defeated.

Next are the narratives that match or agree with their discourse. These narratives are like concrete support for them and confirm that what they think and discourse is welcomed and also exists in other groups. This is very natural because humans tend to seek agreement with parties outside themselves. Especially if those who support or have discourse with them are larger or more established groups. Then the group will become a role model for them, and base their actions on that group. This also happens to lonely wolf terrorists, where they commit acts of terrorism individually without affiliating with a particular group. It does not mean that they do not want to join, but because the access to join has not been obtained, even though their admiration for certain groups has existed.

The narratives that are built are about ways of change and points of unrest against social conditions that demand significant change. Such narratives will further legitimise the understanding of a radical person or group to take further action. This is also fuelled by the spirit of social contribution, especially when wrapped in religious teachings. Promises of paradise and rewards become a very effective driver in committing acts of violence. The urgency to make extreme changes immediately arises because of this global unrest, so it is understood as a global need that is also felt in other parts of the world.

Next is the network factor. As mentioned in the previous factor, the narratives of change have been conveyed in many parties. This forms a kind of relationship between individuals or groups who aspire to take the same action. This networking factor further emphasizes the legitimacy of their actions. There are at least two main things that are argued by the perpetrators of terrorism from the network they get. Firstly, it confirms the validity of their actions because this network seems to provide support for the acts of terrorism. With a common vision and action, terrorists become more organized, especially if they are connected to bigger and more influential groups. For example, the connection between the Bali bombing perpetrators and the Taliban and Al Qaeda groups, where they can contribute to the expansion of the organization's wings and gain access to the provision of tools and materials for terrorism. Secondly, the existing network also provides a clear line of command, so that strategies and action plans are more organised. There is also the advantage of training provided by veterans within the organisation who have experienced or participated in real warfare.

Religious Doctrines and Rational Choice

The emergence of radical movements is influenced and caused by many things. Fajar Purwawidada divides the causes of radical movements into three categories primary, secondary, and tertiary causes (Purwawidada 2014). Socio-political conditions that occur both at the global (international) and local (national) levels are the primary causes. The phenomenon that occurred in several Middle Eastern countries and the military expansion carried out by the United States and its allies, were used as an excuse for radical groups to carry out acts of violence and terror by targeting American embassies, as had been done by Ali Ghufron, Imam Samudra, and also the Abu Bakar Ba'asyir network (Purwawidada 2014).

Secondary causes are religious affiliation with extreme views that are not in accordance with local wisdom values, such as Wahabi's rigid understanding of interpretation. Meanwhile, tertiary causes that are equally important are community culture, poverty (economic factors), religious education that tends to be harsh, the desire for revenge, the influence of books that contain provocative aspects, and also the

screening of films. A former Bali Bombing II terrorist prisoner said that in the process of encouraging their members, they played films containing the oppression of Muslims by military forces in Middle Eastern countries, as well as several cases that occurred in Poso and Ambon. Similarly, one of the alumni of an Islamic boarding school in Surakarta said that during his studies, he had watched films about the massacre of Muslims in Afghanistan, and others. This then psychologically made him furious at the cruelty of American troops and their allies. In addition, some of them claimed to have a desire to take revenge by destroying churches because of their hatred of non-Muslims.

However, the aspect of instilling doctrine through Islamic literature and studies cannot be underestimated. K.H. Dian Nafi' explained that in looking at cases of perpetrators of violence (radicalism), it is necessary to look at many aspects, including the psychological aspects of the perpetrator, indoctrination, and situating. In the psychological aspect, a terrorist usually has a past burden. For example, they are often treated harshly by their parents or those closest to them. So that someone tends to legalize acts of violence. In this case, not all terrorists have this kind of burden. A study conducted by Sarlito Wirawan, for example, interviewed a number of Bali bombers. The results showed that Imam Samudra, Ali Gufron, Amrozi, and Ali Imron all had no history of violence or persecution as children. Although in Ali Gufron's case, he was frustrated by the behavior of his friends during his school days at PGA (Sarwono 2012).

The next aspect is indoctrination, where people involved in terrorism and radicalism networks are usually people who are thirsty for religion, plus their position is backward in terms of economic, socio-political, and education aspects. So these people are easily exposed to religious doctrines that tend to be harsh and deviant. At the same time, they join groups that are conditioned to take action. This doctrinal process is also supported by creating conditions within their group by adding films or videos about the massacre of other Muslims, such as those that occurred in Afghanistan, Ambon cases, Poso, Syria, and others. So that the spirit of jihad appears to fight the enemies of Islam, such as America, Israel, Christians, and other groups that they call the enemies of

Islam. Such indoctrination leads to unstable thinking, so that people commit acts of violence and radicalism.

Furthermore, radicalized groups are born through a long and complex process. Defeat in the economic, social, cultural, and political fields is one of the triggers. This is because they were not prepared for it. Most of them were not prepared for the rapid pace of globalization. Many of them only have the ability to trade on a microscale, for example, many of them sell perfume, soy milk, and herbal medicines. This defeat makes them seek out and create like-minded communities. Even in terms of religious studies, they will look for like-minded communities, and the studies and readings they do are also limited to rigid, doctrinaire aspects. In the case of Solo, the Ngruki network became one of their escapes. Although nowadays many have also emerged in the Solo area.

Many scholars of radicalism in Solo have linked the emergence of radical Muslim groups to Ngruki (Wildan 2008). This is undeniable when affiliated with Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's network. However, according to K.H. Dian Nafi, reading Ngruki must look at three aspects. First, the educational aspect, where there are things that are taught in educational institutions (modern pesantren) in general. For example, education about multiculturalism that creates conditions to get along with all students from various regions (Matin 2017). Therefore, not all who become alumni of the Ngruki pesantren become radicalized. In this educational aspect, Ngruki is positioned as an educational institution.

Second is the da'wah aspect, which is then filled by ustadz-ustadz who go to the community with the aim of preaching. Although later on, this side needs to be read as an activity around the pesantren. In their da'wah activities, many of the groups then have affiliations here and have the same emotions that want to fight for Islam. So the laskar-laskar group in Solo was born, which then needs to be read as the third aspect, namely the movement aspect. In this aspect of the movement, there are many people who do not purely study religion, but many who enter because of similar emotions. In these laskar, they do a short course on religion, then dare to appear to preach by wearing religious symbols, such as surbans, trousers, beards, etc.

A person's activities and actions are always connected to their past. The context of one's life history will always have an influence. In this case, childhood, family conditions, education, teachers, and friendship communities determine a person's attitude and way of thinking. Sarlito Wirawan, in his investigation of former Bali bombers, always included the actors' childhood records in analyzing their actions. Of course, this is psychologically important (Sarwono 2012). To see the genealogy of a person's thinking, it is necessary to look at the lives of terror actors, especially those in Solo.

From the results of the data mining conducted, several informants showed some similarities in activities during their teenage years. Although there are many differences in their childhoods. For example, Abu Rijal grew up in an *Abangan* family with a military background. His father was a soldier who was quite strict. His father had three wives, while Abu Rijal himself was the last child of the third wife. During his childhood, his father was quite protective. He admitted that his father often defended him if he got into trouble with anyone. But until the 4th grade of elementary school, his father died, and he lived with his brother and mother under economic limitations. It was at this time that he experienced deep pressure, losing a hero figure who then became a shy, insecure, and quiet figure. This feeling continued until he entered junior high school, and he experienced a slight change when he entered high school.

During his senior high school years, he felt more courageous than before. It was during this period that he joined a number of activities and communities, such as the student council and others, including joining the Tabligh Jama'ah group. It was during this period that he often saw his friends committing juvenile delinquencies, such as dating brawls and others. He just pondered, even though he was still in the community. At this time, he admitted that he was more deeply immersed in things that smelled of worship. After high school, he went on to study economics at a university in Jombang. He admitted that he finished his studies late due to financial reasons. He also became a busker on the city bus. It was during this time that he reflected a lot and read Islamic magazines such as Sabili and Hidayatullah. From these media, he read a lot of news about Muslim brothers and sisters who were oppressed in other parts of the

world and wanted to join in defending and fighting together. He also later joined a recitation group that discussed issues of tawhid, fiqh, and other Islamic teachings. It was during this period that the tendency of his thinking towards religion was fundamentally formed.

This is different from Rosyid, who, from junior high school, was introduced to global issues about the oppression of Muslims in Bosnia and others by his brother, who was a Rohis activist at his high school. The indoctrination was carried out by a group that followed the NII movement. Upon entering high school, Rosyid then joined a similar organization that carried the spirit of NII. When he joined this group, the indoctrination process began to intensify by rethinking the commitment of a Muslim who must follow an Islamic state, not a state based on Pancasila, which is clearly not Islamic. They are also indoctrinated to uphold the Islamic state and fight the infidels.

Terrorists, on average, receive religious education from communities that develop exclusive religious thoughts and are oriented towards upholding the Islamic state. In it, they are indoctrinated into the failures of the government because it does not apply the law of Allah. Their thinking is further developed by gathering with Muslim Brotherhood members who share the same spirit. It was at this time that the doctrine of jihad gained momentum. At this time, Abu Rijal was looking for his identity in religion, such as attending recitations conducted by several religious organizations such as NU, Muhammadiyah, and Hidayatullah. However, his desire to participate in jihad could not be carried out. Until finally, he met his colleagues who had a recitation of halaqah that had the same goal. In the halaqah, the emphasis is on jihad fi sabillillah. It was in this halaqah that there was indoctrination about jihad and the screening of films about the massacre of Muslims in Bosnia, Afghanistan, Ambon, and so on.

The same thing happened to Rosyid, who said that after finishing high school, he went to a university in Solo. Along with his formal education, he joined the NII network, which was based in Sekarpace, Solo. It was during this time that the Islamic State doctrine was recruited. The activism to instill the doctrine continued at the Islamic center under Daulah Islamiyah. From there, they met many ustaz and several other ikhwan. They conducted studies on tawhid, tahsin, and other Islamic studies.

Until finally the Ambon war broke out, in which then they also participated and left for Ambon.

The phenomenon mentioned above shows that one of the causes of violence and terrorism is religious understanding. In this case, the doctrine of religious teachings adopted is a teaching that wants to purify religious teachings that lead to acts of judgment. This also refutes Fajar's opinion, which positions the understanding of religious teachings as a secondary cause in the process of terrorism. In relation to this religious understanding, Iman Fauzi describes this phenomenon as *bakimiyah* theology, in which a person makes judgments, disbelieving others. This doctrine then manifests in behavior and leads to radical and extreme actions (Ghifarie 2016). In addition, it is equally important to note here the doctrine of *istisyhad* (martyrdom) with the lure of heavenly angels by carrying out acts of terror against religious enemies.

The doctrine can change a person's mindset to take action. The question then, is how to instill the doctrine so that it can be stuck in the heart and held for a long time. The indoctrination process goes through many stages. Some informants said that the process was carried out since they entered high school, in religious studies at their school. In this case, there has been a planting of doctrine by showing deviant phenomena that occur in society, the negligence of the state in taking care of complexity, and the phenomenon of the defeat of Muslims in several other Muslim countries. In this case, they then believe that the government has failed to manage the country and has allowed injustice to occur everywhere. In addition, there is a visualization process that shows the massacres committed by America and its allies. In this process, anxiety arises in the hearts of terrorists to take part in the struggle in various ways. One of them is to fight back by attacking offices and other stopover places, such as embassy offices, or gathering places for the 'enemies' of Islam.

It is under such conditions that one's rational choices are determined by one's understanding of what one believes in, one's line of thinking, and one's surrounding worldview. When the inculcated religious doctrine teaches the spirit of capitalism, such as Calvinist teachings, then the resulting individual actions are a manifestation of the work ethic to continue to multiply capital. However, that is not the only factor driving

the Protestant work ethic. There is a surrounding circle of experience that makes the ethos emerge strongly (Weber, 2001). This is also the case with terrorist groups that have religious doctrines to commit acts of violence and fight against something that is against their beliefs.

Shifting Forms of Radicalism and Activities of Former Terror Prisoners

The history of the emergence and development of radicalism in the name of Islam in Indonesia has been a long journey. Many people say that the phenomenon began with the emergence of the Padri movement (Al-Maududi 2008). In this case, the Padri war was identified with the resistance of Muslims against the Dutch colonizers. If this action is considered an act of resistance against the government by means of violence, then the same thing was also done in several regions in the archipelago, one of which was Solo. In Solo, there was an association and movement of Sarekat Dagang Islam, which later transformed or changed its name to Sarekat Islam, which also fought against the Dutch colonial government through trade (Ahyar 2015).

Since independence, the ways and movements of radicalism have changed. Although it must be recognized, everything boils down to a form of resistance to the state. Nevertheless, radicalism has always experienced development and change in each phase. Many studies on Islamic radicalism began to reappear in the 1950s, marked by the emergence of Darul Islam/NII, led by Kartosoewiryo (Thoyyib 2018). Zaki Mubarak explained that the radicalism that occurs in Indonesia is still related to the radicalism carried out by Kartosoewiryo with NII or DI/TII. In its journey, radicalism in Indonesia has undergone several shifts, especially related to the figures who influence someone to commit acts of terrorism. In the past, Kartosoewiryo used DI/NII, but now many terrorist groups are influenced by ISIS. In this case, Zaki then divides radicalism in post-independence Indonesia into four phases. The first is the emergence of DI/TII, commanded by Kartosoewiryo, followed by Kahar Muzakar and Daud Beureuh. The second phase, characterized by the emergence of the jihad command (komji) around the 1970s and 1980s, in this phase the names involved were former members of Kartosoewiryo. Names such as Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar

Ba'asyir have appeared in this phase. The third phase was several acts of violence and terror that occurred during and after the reformation in the late 1990s. The fourth phase is terrorist acts carried out by new radical groups and in new ways. In this fourth phase, the actors are heavily influenced by global factors and new technological developments (Mubarak 2015).

The growth of radical-extremist groups is not only determined by religious doctrine but also the socio-political and economic conditions that surround them. After the election of Joko Widodo as president, the map of radical groups in Indonesia has changed considerably. Especially after the dissolution of HTI and the freezing of FPI, many of the groups, including salafis, negotiated by accepting the government as the legitimate leader of the country (Sunarwoto 2020). Because from the beginning they used religious doctrine, one of the strategies used to legitimize their actions was to change the argument.

Although they reject democracy from the start, in practice they use democratic instruments to carry out their actions (Ahyar 2017; 2019). Therefore, when the direction of political policy changes and does not provide opportunities for these groups to grow, some of them will change their attitudes. Some ex-convicts of terrorism that we met, although they still maintain their previous religious attributes, such as trousers and beards, have changed their way of thinking. They are more open to new people and changes. In fact, they have now collaborated with the government on de-radicalization programs by forming communities supported by the government.

The change in rational action is done because the opportunity and doctrine have changed. Rationally, some of them also have to survive by surviving and supporting their families. While the skills they have are quite limited, since adolescence, the focus of their lives has been spent on carrying out actions under the pretext of defending religion. The only way is to make peace with the situation and create a different image in society. Almost all of them are now engaged in economic activities as traders and microentrepreneurs. Some who have succeeded in running their businesses provide economic empowerment to their fellow groups. We argue that changes are still

to come as the political situation and supporting conditions change. The occurrence of acts of extremism cannot only be seen from one factor but involves many others.

Conclusion

This study concluded several things: first, that the religious ideology followed and developed by radical groups in Solo, especially the perpetrators of terror mostly follows the way of thinking of groups that want to establish an Islamic state (NII). However, the recruitment and movement methods are different from the previous ones. Second, the new terrorist group in Solo has experienced a shift in outlook. If in the past the goal of committing acts of terrorism was to attack the enemies of Islam who were foreigners, now many terrorists no longer believe and even consider the government as their enemy. Some actions in the name of religion are only superficial, but the goal of establishing an Islamic state is the substance. This is, of course, similar to what Kartosoewiryo and his group did with the idea of establishing the Indonesian Islamic State (NII). If there was an NII in the past, then the new face that has emerged to encourage that spirit is HTI.

These groups also carry out massive recruitment and indoctrination by entering the education sector. Because of it, the motive of the movement can easily be wrapped in educational motives. The author sees that the phenomenon of radicalism in Indonesia will continue in various ways. Although HTI has been disbanded, their ideas will continue to be carried out with various faces. In addition, massive knowledge support is currently being carried out through social media and the internet. In the case of the bomb that exploded in Kartasura in 2019, it was noted that the perpetrator received information or indoctrination from a group channel affiliated with ISIS. Because of this, he no longer believes in Pancasila. Therefore, there is a need for an early deradicalization program. All parties need to join hands to jointly spread moderate and tolerant Islamic values and be highly committed to the unity of the country.

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